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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970456-CA 
v. : 
BRENDA F. ELLINGSWORTH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of workers' compensation 
insurance fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109 (1994).1 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal per Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress defendant's 
medical records and all evidence derived from those records on the basis that the 
Workers' Compensation Fund is not a state agency for Fourth Amendment purposes? 
*A11 of former Title 35 has been renumbered or repealed, and its provisions are 
now found in Titles 34 and 35A. See Title 35 (1997), compiler's notes. A copy of 
former Title 35 and is attached in Add. A. All citations in this brief to the Utah Code, 
unless otherwise noted, will be to the law in effect at the time of trial in 1995. 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress 
evidence, the appellate court reviews the lower court's findings of fact for clear error and 
its legal conclusions for correction of error. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Higgins. 837 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in permitting the prosecutor to ask 
defendant about the veracity of two State's witnesses where defendant's responses 
explained the discrepancies between her own testimony and that of both witnesses 
without labeling anyone a liar, and the remaining evidence of guilt was strong? 
Standard of Review: Defendant failed to object to some of the challenged questioning. 
Therefore, she must establish plain error as to the unpreserved claim, requiring that any 
error be both obvious and harmful. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 
1997). Reversal is warranted on the preserved claim involving Dr. Seeman "'only if the 
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in 
the verdict.'" State v. Piansiaksone 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997)). 
Reversal is not warranted as to the remaining questions unless "'the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict.'" 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1227). 
3. Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to recognize and act on three 
instances in which the prosecutor allegedly misstated the evidence where, in any event, 
2 
the remaining evidence of guilt minimized any possible prejudice arising from the 
statements? Standard of Review: Because defendant failed to object below to any of 
the challenged instances, he must establish plain error to prevail on his claim. That 
standard is set forth at point 2, supra. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to resolution of the 
issues involved herein is attached in addendum A, including Utah Code Ann. sections: 
31A-1-105 (1994) 31A-31-105 (1994) 35-3-3 (1988) 
31A-22-1001 (1994) 34A-2-101 to -112 (1997) 35-3-1 to -18 (1994) 
31A-28-201 to-221 (1994) 35-1-1 to-109 (1994) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of workers' compensation insurance fraud, 
a third degree felony (R.89-92).2 Following resolution of several pre-trial evidentiary 
motions (R.109-16, 121-2), a jury convicted defendant as charged (R.123-9, 193). The 
court sentenced her to serve zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison, stayed imposition 
of the sentence, and placed her on thirty-six months' probation (R. 196-7). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Events of October 12, 1994: Around September 29, 1994, defendant Brenda 
Eliingsworth began work at Blynco Manufacturing Company, whose business involved 
2This charge is in the second amended information, replacing two earlier 
informations charging various degrees of insurance fraud (R.3-10, 75-79). 
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making window coverings (R.213/139-42). Defendant was responsible for putting the 
slats in a pre-made cord form hanging from a rack in front of her and for ensuring that 
each blind worked properly (R.213/139-41; 215/536). Two weeks later, on October 12, 
defendant allegedly injured her upper back and right shoulder when a pulley jammed as 
she pulled a cord to adjust the height of a blind she was finishing (R. 213/152, 157, 166, 
146, 171-2; 214/ 447; 215/536-7). She reported to her supervisor, Debbie Cleverly, who 
had her rest, then sent her to St. Mark's Hospital when defendant complained of "really 
bad" pain (R.213/146; 215/537-9). She never returned to work (R.213/146, 153). 
Cleverly found that no one had seen the alleged incident happen (R.213/150, 160-
1). She reported the claim to Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (WCF), Blynco's 
insurance company, then wrote a letter to submit with the claim, explaining why she had 
doubts about the claim's validity (R.213/146-52). Her letter explained that no one 
working near defendant saw or heard anything when the alleged accident occurred, and 
that defendant's attendance and attitude in her short time with the company strongly 
suggested that she "didn't want the position" and she was "looking for a way out" (R. 
213/150-1). Neither Cleverly—with ten years of experience at Blynco-nor Sharon 
Rowley—a 4.5 year veteran with the company and the worker directly behind defendant 
when the injury occurred (R.213/171-2, 176)-could understand how the injury could 
have happened (R.213/139, 170-2,176, 181). Rowley could not remember hearing of any 
similar injury ever occurring at Blynco (R.213/175-6). 
4 
Rebecca Dickinson treated defendant at St. Mark's on October 12 (R.215/467-8, 
484). For the shoulder and upper back pain defendant complained of, Dickinson 
suggested Tylenol, rest, and returning to work on light duty the next day (R.215/469-70). 
Dickinson gave defendant four narcotics pills at defendant's request (R.215/485).3 Before 
she left, defendant was given Dr. Michael Borne's name and address in case she needed 
follow-up care, and the hospital set up an appointment (R.214/246; 215/476, 566-7). 
Events of October 14. 1994: On October 14, 1994, defendant was physically 
assaulted by her ex-husband (R.213/190-2). She told the responding officer and the 
ambulance crew that he struck her several times in the face and head (R.213/192-3, 196-
7, 213-14). To the ambulance crew, she complained of "pain in [her] upper [&] lower 
back, neck, shoulder" and face (R.213/213-4). When asked about her medical history, she 
mentioned only ulcers and the Blynco injury (R.213/216). 
Dr. Steven Minnaugh treated defendant at St. Mark's Hospital after the assault (R. 
214/248-9). Defendant told him that she had been punched "several times," had been 
thrown against a wall and was suffering, among other things, neck and upper back pain 
(R.214/254-5). She did not mention the Blynco injury (R.214/269). Although 
defendant's back looked uninjured and x-rays were normal, Minnaugh prescribed 
narcotics for pain at defendant's request, including Stadal and Lortab (R.214/255-7, 260, 
3The evidence suggested that part of the motive behind the fraud was defendant's 
desire for narcotics (R. 214/260,284-85,330-32, 345, 358-60,417,419; 215/485). 
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263-4, 268). The doctor did not obtain her earlier records from St. Mark's because he did 
not know about them (R.214/269). Defendant never returned to this doctor (R.214/260). 
Events of October 17. 1994: On October 17, defendant visited Dr. Eugene Seeman 
complaining of right shoulder and upper back pain from the Blynco incident (R.214/273, 
281-2, 290). During the entire course of her lengthy treatment by Dr. Seeman, she failed 
to mention the domestic assault or her resultant medical treatment (R.214/282, 305). Dr. 
Seeman never got any records from St. Mark's, but treated defendant based on her 
incomplete account of her medical history (R. 214/281, 291-2). Defendant saw Dr. 
Seeman one or two times a week through November 1995, and the doctor submitted his 
bills to WCF (R.214/284, 288, 290; 215/549, 570). Her complaints expanded to include 
severe headaches, of which she admitted she has a history (R.214/285, 293, 298-9). Dr. 
Seeman prescribed several narcotics, sending the bills to WCF (R.214/284-5). He also 
recommended that she not return to work (R.214/299). 
Workers' Compensation Involvement: Paola Valente was the adjustor for 
defendant's workers' compensation claim (R.214/232-3). Her duties included ensuring 
that claims were compensable, monitoring that appropriate medication and treatment 
were received and when or if claimants would return to work, and helping to manage all 
treatment (R.214/233, 238-9, 241, 343). Paola spoke with defendant on October 17 and 
asked her about her medical treatment and her medical history (R.214/237-8, 240-1). 
Defendant claimed to have had no previous injuries and did not mention the domestic 
6 
abuse (R.214/240). Defendant explained that she had an appointment with Dr. Michael 
Borne later that day (R.214/246; 215/567, 593). Paola told defendant to call afterward to 
describe Dr. Borne's recommendations (R.214/245-7). 
When defendant failed to call back, Paola called Dr. Borne and discovered that 
defendant had not shown up for her appointment (R.214/247). Paola also discovered that 
defendant had neither returned to work since the incident nor submitted the required 
doctor's release (R.214/247-8, 329). The same day, Paola got a call from Dr. Seeman's 
office seeking authorization for treating defendant (R.214/329-30). 
Over the next three days, Paola received numerous requests for authorization to fill 
various prescriptions (R.214/330-2, 358-9). She granted some requests and refused a 
number of others, including requests for prescriptions of Stadol, Loritab, Hydrocodone, 
and "several" others (R.214/359-60). Refusals were based, in part, on the fact that 
prescriptions were written by doctors other than the treating physician, Dr. Seeman, and 
WCF had no information from Dr. Seeman about the necessity of some of the drugs (R. 
214/358). 
Two such requests ultimately convinced Paola that defendant's claim warranted 
further investigation (R.214/332-3, 345). On October 21, 1994, a pharmacy called for 
authorization to fill a Stadol prescription (R.214/330-2). The following day, another 
pharmacy called for authorization to fill another Stadol prescription (R.214/332, 358). 
Aside from the fact that the prescriptions were from two different doctors, Paola also 
7 
noticed that the drug was a "rather strong medication" not normally prescribed for similar 
injuries (R.214/345). 
Paola had Dr. Jeffery Chung do an independent medical examination of defendant 
on January 11, 1995 (R.214/345-7, 446-7). When he asked defendant about injuries prior 
and subsequent to the Blynco incident, she mentioned only prior injuries unrelated to her 
back (e.g., knee surgery, stomach ulcers) and denied any subsequent injuries (R.214/447-
8, 455-7). Based on her answers, the written report from her October 12 visit to St. 
Mark's Hospital, reports from Dr. Seeman, and his examination of defendant, Dr. Chung 
determined that defendant was taking too many narcotics and analgesics (R.214/448-9, 
456-7). Because he found no reason to doubt that the Blynco incident was the only 
possible source of the pain, Dr. Chung prescribed a work-hardening program for 
defendant (R.214/347-8, 449-50, 460-1).4 
Defendant also met with Paola on January 11 (R.214/333, 336, 346-7). She denied 
receiving any of the written forms to release her medical records which Paola had 
repeatedly mailed to her (R.214/333, 371), so Paola provided her with two new forms 
during her visit: one released her medical records (R.214/334-35), and the second asked 
4A work-hardening program is an "intense personalized treatment program" that 
runs eight hours a day, five days a week (R.214/389). It reacquaints a person who has 
been off work with an eight-hour work day, includes "concentrated physical therapy" to 
improve various injuries, and can show if an injury is as bad as is claimed (R.214/347-8, 
389-90, 449-50, 460-1). Defendant's failure to follow through on this program resulted in 
termination of her medical benefits, in part (R.214/348, 382-3). Her monetary benefits, 
however, continued until Dr. Chung filed his second report (R.214/348). 
8 
defendant to list all the physicians, hospitals and clinics she had visited in the previous ten 
years (R.214/336-7). In response, defendant listed four doctors and St. Mark's Hospital 
(R.214/336-7). Defendant said these were all she could recall and refused Paola's 
suggestion that she take the list home to check her records and ensure that the list was 
complete (R.213/27-8; 214/337, 373-4). 
Because of defendant's equivocal answer (R.214/374) and WCF's practice of 
sending record requests to all hospitals and clinics with which all listed doctors are 
associated, Paola sent her request to the hospital and doctors on defendant's list as well as 
to twenty more area hospitals and clinics (R.214/337-9, 374). The response was "several 
hundred medical records from the various places," including "several emergency room 
i 
reports" from 1994, many of which contradicted defendant's claim that she had suffered 
no previous back or shoulder injury (R.214/339, 351-2). Paola received records from 
Cottonwood and Holy Cross Hospitals concerning visits for claimed back injuries, and 
from other hospitals for injuries unrelated to the back (R.214/337, 375-6). Between 
March 1976 and October 19, 1994, defendant had been admitted to St. Mark's eighty 
times, of which seventy-four were to the emergency room (R.214/407). The medical 
visits during the calendar year in which the Blynco incident allegedly occurred include: 
I 
1/30/94: Cottonwood Hospital emergency room; claim was upper back injury 
and severe headaches from moving furniture a day or two earlier (R.214/412-5, 
420); treatment was a shot of Demurral and Phenergan, a prescription for a muscle 
relaxant, and a prescription for a narcotic pain medicine (R.214/417); 
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2/11/94: Cottonwood Hospital emergency room; same back problem and 
headaches which "flared up" due to something defendant had done (R.214/415-9, 
420); treatment was a prescription for Thyroidal and an injection of Phenergan 
(R.214/419); 
3/16/94: Holy Cross Hospital emergency room; claim was headaches and upper 
back problems after moving furniture (R.214/421-3); treatment was a muscle 
relaxant; doctor believed narcotics were inappropriate (R. 214/423, 425-7); 
5/18/94: Holy Cross Hospital; claim was upper back, neck and shoulder pain (R. 
214/429-33); treatment was a muscle relaxant and an anti-inflammatory 
(R.214/433); 
10/12/94: St. Mark's Hospital emergency room; claim of upper back and right 
shoulder pain from Blynco incident (R. 215/467-70, 484); treatment was four 
narcotics pills at defendant's request (R. 215/485); 
10/14/94: St. Mark's Hospital emergency room; claim of upper back and neck 
injuries, among others, from assault (R. 214/248-9, 351); treatment was Stadal and 
Lortab, both narcotics (R. 214/260). 
Paola forwarded copies of the medical records to Dr. Chung and requested an 
addendum to his original report (R.214/346, 352). In the addendum, Dr. Chung noted 
"quite a few" reports of injuries of which he had no previous knowledge, including the 
domestic assault (R.214/451-2). Based on the new information, he decided that any pain 
defendant was suffering was unrelated to the alleged Blynco incident (R.214/452-3, 463). 
Paola also sent the records to WCF's investigations department (R.215/486-8). 
After reviewing the records, investigator Brett Mann met with defendant on February 27, 
1995 (R.215/489-90). Mann was aware that the records showed that defendant had an 
"extensive history" of back problems (R.215/493-4) and asked defendant more than ten 
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times whether she had any shoulder or back injury prior to the Blynco incident 
(R.215/491-3, 510). Defendant repeatedly denied any such injury (R.215/492, 499-500, 
510). Mann asked at least twice whether defendant had been injured "in any way, shape 
or form" after the Blynco incident, to which defendant responded, "no" (R.215/493, 496, 
510, 512, 523). Defendant also denied having been in the hospital "in the last couple of 
years" exclusive of the Blynco incident (R.215/496, 510, 512, 523). Once Mann 
suggested he knew about injuries occurring after Blynco, defendant admitted the assault 
and that she had been hospitalized five or six times in the last year (R.215/497-8, 512-3). 
Mann spoke with defendant again by phone on March 3, 1995 (R.215/500-1), at 
which time defendant claimed that any prior back problems she had involved the lower 
back instead of the upper back, and that she saw Dr. Seeman before the assault instead of 
after (R.215/502-5). Mann thereafter gave the information to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office for criminal investigation (R.215/522). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: WCF is not a state actor and is therefore not subject to the search and 
seizure restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. There is no definitive test for this issue, 
but significant guidance can be found in case law dealing with whether an entity is an 
"arm of the state" under the Eleventh Amendment. Such a review looks at all aspects of 
the entity's power and relationship to the state. A similar review of WCF, its history and 
its operation under these cases establishes that WCF is essentially a private insurer, and 
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its operation and solvency should not be jeopardized by unrealistically characterizing it as 
a state agency for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
In the event WCF is deemed to be a state agency, reversal would not be warranted 
because WCF's act of obtaining and reviewing defendant's medical records in connection 
with her claim for benefits does not amount to a search and seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively, WCF's act of providing the records to law 
enforcement for criminal investigation was reasonably within the scope of the consent 
granted by defendant. Defendant had received previous written warnings that workers' 
compensation fraud was a crime under Utah law, knew that she was required to prove that 
her injury was work-related before receiving benefits, and reasonably knew that an 
evaluation of her eligibility would include a review for fraudulent conduct. Further, 
defendant's interpretation contravenes strong public policy which encourages the 
reporting of criminal activity. 
Point II: It was inappropriate for the prosecutor to ask defendant if other witnesses 
were lying. However, reversal is not warranted because no prejudice resulted. The 
questions were brief and isolated, and defendant's responses avoided labeling anyone a 
"liar," thereby diffusing any prejudice which might otherwise have resulted. Further, the 
remaining evidence, much of which was corroborated, makes it highly unlikely that the 
questions affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
Point III: None of the three instances in which defendant claims the prosecutor 
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misstated the evidence constitute plain error because, even if they were erroneous, the 
errors were neither obvious nor prejudicial. First, whether defendant told the officer 
investigating the assault about the resulting upper back pain had little, if any, impact on 
whether defendant ever complained of such pain and ascribed it to the assault (established 
by two other witnesses) and whether she thereafter sought to hide that fact from other 
physicians or workers' compensation employees (established by numerous witnesses). 
Second, the prosecutor's challenged cross-examination of defendant sought only to 
clarify a misunderstanding arising from defendant's direct testimony. Even assuming the 
questioning was error, it was not obvious, and it merely established what defendant had 
already said: that she gave Paola Valente the information she requested without 
mentioning the domestic assault. 
Third, the prosecutor's closing argument about defendant's repeated denials of 
hospitalization is fully in accord with the evidence. Even assuming error, the remarks did 
not prejudice the proceedings when taken in context. The denial of hospitalization was 
"part of the pattern" of conduct used by defendant to defraud WCF. The remainder of the 
prosecutor's remarks correctly presented an appropriate, factually-supported, 
unchallenged explanation of the overall, "ongoing" pattern (R.215/613), including 
numerous other acts, omissions, and evidence which support the determination of an 




WCF IS NOT A STATE ACTOR FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PURPOSES 
BECAUSE STATE LAW VIEWS IT AS A PRIVATE INSURER, IT IS FREE FROM 
STATE CONTROL, IT OPERATES IN THE SAME MANNER AND UNDER THE 
SAME LEGAL RESTRICTIONS AS ALL PRIVATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
INSURERS, AND IT HAS NO FINANCIAL TIES TO THE STATE 
A. WCF Is Not A State Actor For Fourth Amendment Purposes 
1. Introduction: 
Defendant argues that use of her medical records to facilitate a criminal fraud 
prosecution violates her federal Fourth Amendment rights because obtaining the medical 
records amounted to a constitutional seizure which exceeded the scope of her consent 
(written release of the records) where the release form included the phrase, "This 
information will be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers 
compensation benefits." Br. Apt. at 19-23. Alternatively, defendant argues that her 
consent was involuntary, requiring suppression of the medical records and all derivative 
information. Id. at 23-25. 
As a necessary precursor, defendant contends that the Workers' Compensation 
Fund is a state agency for Fourth Amendment purposes and is subject to the basic 
constitutional restrictions surrounding a consensual search and seizure. Id. at 13-19. 
This presents a question of first impression in this jurisdiction which, upon careful 
review, should be decided against defendant. 
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While no Utah cases have addressed this specific point, defendant offers six 
factors she believes are determinative of the issue: 1) WCF was statutorily created; 2) 
i I 
WCF boasts a board of directors appointed by the governor with the advice and consent 
of the senate; 3) the directors are removable for cause by the governor; 4) WCF's officers 
and employees have governmental immunity for good faith acts; 5) WCF's officers and 
employees are exempt from certain statutes otherwise applicable to all governmental 
agencies; and 6) WCF is a quasi-public corporation, which qualifies it as a governmental 
actor for Fourth Amendment purposes in Puerto Rico. Id. at 15-17. Defendant claims 
that these factors establish that "governmental action is implicated" in the existence and 
continuance of WCF, thereby allegedly making WCF a state actor. Id. She sees the fact 
that WCF "essentially operates" as a private insurance company as irrelevant. Id. at 17. 
i i 
It is undisputed that the Fourth Amendment reaches beyond the area of law 
enforcement. Michigan v. Tvler. 436 U.S. 499, 504, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1947 (1978). It acts 
in both the civil and criminal arenas to restrain "governmental action," i.e., "'activities of 
sovereign authority.'" New Jersey v. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325, 335, 105 S. Ct. 733, 739 
I 
(1985) f quoting Burdeau v. McDowell 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 576 (1921)). It 
has been applied to public school officials, building inspectors, Occupational Safety and 
Health Act inspectors, and firemen entering privately owned premises for firefighting 
purposes. See New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 335, 105 S. Ct. at 739 (citing to these cases). 
However, there is no definitive test for determining whether any given entity 
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outside of law enforcement is subject to the Fourth Amendment. In New Jersey v. 
T.L.CL 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985), the United States Supreme Court provided 
little analysis when it applied Fourth Amendment principles to searches of students 
conducted by public school officials. Funding and regulatory ties between state and 
public schools is well-known, and the Court's reference to the "statutes regulating school 
disciplinary policies and establishing the authority of school officials over their students" 
identifies a large part of the basis for equating the conduct of such officials to 
"governmental action." 469 U.S. at 336, 105 S. Ct. at 740. These obvious and 
unassailable ties do not exist in the case at hand. 
In contrast to such obvious governmental ties, defendant claims that once 
governmental action is implicated, the inquiry ends and the Fourth Amendment applies. 
Br. Apt. at 17. She offers no authority, however, for the proposition that mere implication 
of a minimal amount of governmental involvement will activate Fourth Amendment 
restrictions. In fact, authority is to the contrary. Cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-
18, 91 S. Ct. 381, 386 (1971) (the home visitation required as part of the AFDC program 
as structured by New York statutes and regulations does not fall within the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures); United States v. 
Cleveland. 38 F.3d 1092, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1994) (Portland General Electric Company 
search of power meter on private property, done with a police officer, was not subject to 
the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Cote, 444 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Mass. App. 
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1983) (Fourth Amendment does not apply to search by employees of public utility 
employed by municipality; 'The mere fact of State regulation of a public utility does not 
imply State action whenever the utility acts, in the absence of some relationship between 
the State and the challenged action."); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: 
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.8 (a)-(h), at 216-90 (1996) (demonstrating the 
difficulties in deciding how much and what kind of governmental involvement in private 
or nonpolice matters will trigger Fourth Amendment protections). 
With no articulated test, no law enforcement involvement, no obvious and 
overwhelming tie between the State and WCF, and no case addressing the relationship 
between state workers' compensation funds and the Fourth Amendment,5 this Court 
^Defendant cites to a federal circuit case which purports to hold that merely 
because the Puerto Rico Telephone Company is a quasi-public corporation, it is 
automatically a government actor subject to the Fourth Amendment (Br. Apt. at 16). 
Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997). However, the 
court in that case offers no analysis on the point, and only one of the two cases on which 
it relies includes any analysis. In Torres-Ponce v. Jimenez, 113 P.R.Dec. 58 (1982), the 
Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rico Telephone Company was a 
"private-public corporation" which could be "considered a public or a private corporation, 
for certain legal purposes, depending on the particular case." Translation at 91 (attached 
in Add. B). The court held that it was a public corporation for purposes of applying to its 
employees the benefits of the public personnel administration (id at 91-94) because of a 
number of factors, none of which apply here: 
—while the Puerto Rico Telephone Company ["Company"] was "incorporated as a 
private corporation under the Delaware Corporation Law," the Telephone 
Authority ["Authority"], which was "a public corporation of the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico," owned 100% of the stock in the Company (id at 87-88); 
-the board of directors of the Company consisted of the entire Board of 
Government of the Authority, with the Authority's executive director serving as 
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should look to the status of such fluids generally under other federal constitutional 
provisions. See New Jersey. 469 U.S. at 336-37, 105 S. Ct. at 740 (in applying the Fourth 
Amendment to public school officials, the United States Supreme Court noted that where 
such officials were already viewed as state actors under both the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, it was unlikely that they could justifiably be found to be acting in any other 
capacity under the Fourth Amendment). 
Other courts have addressed similar questions relating to the Eleventh 
Amendment. Lipofskv v. Steingut, 86 F.3d 15 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 401 
(1996); Austin v. State Industrial Insurance System. 939 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1991); Simon 
v. State Compensation Insurance Authority, 946 P.2d 1298 (Colo. 1997), cert, denied, 
118 S. Ct. 1827 (1998). This analysis involves review of numerous factors, some or all of 
which are relevant to the instant inquiry. Those factors fit generally into three broad 
categories: 1) how state law characterizes the entity; 2) whether the entity is autonomous 
and free from the control of the state, and 3) whether a judgment against the entity would 
ultimately be paid by the state. Simon, 946 P.2d at 1305. These categories include 
consideration of numerous factors, including: the nature of the entity's functions, powers 
and responsibilities (Austin, 939 F.2d at 678); the entity's relation to and control by other 
President of the Company (kL at 88); 
-the Authority had full discretion on whether to dissolve the Company (kL); 
—the law provided a public purpose to operation of the Company (id at 88-89); 
—the Company was exempt from taxes like other public agencies (id. at 89). 
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units of government (id.); the entity's corporate status (i± at 678); the entity's ability to 
sue or be sued (id); the entity's power to hold property (id); the State's authority to veto 
regulations promulgated by the entity (Simon. 946 P.2d at 1305); the comingling of the 
entity's funds with other state funds (Lipofsky. 86 F.3d at 17); and the financial influence 
the state has over the entity (id at 16-17; Simon, 946 P.2d at 1305). The test itself 
necessarily involves balancing the various factors. See Simon. 946 P.2d at 1300 
(determining whether a government entity is an "arm of the state" requires "balancing the 
entity's independent powers with those entirely dependent on the state."). "The greater 
the state administrative and financial influence on the entity, the more likely it is that the 
entity will be treated as an arm of the state." Id at 1305. 
Because the balancing requires a review of a large number of factors 
encompassing all aspects of the entity's power and relationship to the State, this Court 
should decline defendant's invitation to ignore the function and purpose of WCF, and 
properly should view the fund and its operations in their totality. 
2. Trial Court Ruling: 
This issue was addressed at least three times during the first day of trial: prior to 
selecting a jury (R.213/20-50), again minutes later (R.213/69-73), and before opening 
statements (R.213/79-84). After hearing testimony and argument, the trial court ruled in 
essence that WCF is not a state agency but "essentially a private insurance company[,]" 
and that the consent was knowingly and voluntarily given (R.213/50, 72-3, 83-4) 
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(attached in Add. C). 
3. WCF is Not a State Actor for Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Purposes: 
Assuming, arguendo, that WCF's review of defendant's medical records qualifies 
as a search and seizure, the question is whether, after considering all relevant factors, it 
can be said that WCF is so dependent on or involved with the State that its actions must 
be seen as those of a state actor. A review of the history and development of WCF, its 
connections with the State, and its responsibilities and duties establishes that WCF is not 
a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
a) How state law characterizes the entity: WCF, formerly known as the 
State Insurance Fund, was statutorily created by the state legislature in 1917. Chez v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 90 Utah 447, 449, 62 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah 1936). 
However, in the last ten years, the legislature has moved toward privatizing WCF and 
removing state control. It has moved the administrative control of WCF from various 
state agencies over the years to a board of directors made up of policyholders (see 
subsection 3b, infra). Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1994). In 1990, it removed from the 
enabling legislation language labeling WCF "an independent state agency and a body 
politic and corporate[.]" Compare Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-3-3 (1994). This leaves WCF with the legal status at the time of trial of "a non-
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profit, self-supporting, quasi-public corporation^]"6 Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3. As a 
quasi-public corporation, WCF is not covered by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (1993); it does not fit within the definition of either the 
"state" or its "political subdivisions" as defined in the Act. Id. 
The legislature expressly immunized the State from WCF debts. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-3-4; see also Chez. 62 P.2d at 551. The legislature also expressly exempted WCF 
from certain administrative provisions generally applicable to state agencies-including 
the Government Records Access and Management Act—thereby demonstrating its 
position that WCF not be considered or administered as a state agency. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-3-18. It has provided that WCF can sue and be sued in its own name, as can any 
private company. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3(1). Finally, WCF receives no public money, 
and it pays its own administrative expenses from the premiums paid by its policyholders. 
Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Board. 652 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court also basically views WCF as a private insurer, and has 
determined that state and federal due process and equal protection guarantees apply to 
6A quasi-public corporation is a corporation which is private in ownership but has 
a public purpose. WCF is private in that it is owned by its policyholders. See Chez, 62 
P.2d at 550 (WCF's assets belong to contributing employers, not the State and upon 
liquidation anything not needed to pay contingencies would be returned to contributing 
policyholders). It's public purpose is to insure "employers against liability for the 
compensation, and [to] assur[e] to the persons entitled thereto the compensation, provided 
by this title." Id Since 1986, WCF has served the additional purpose of being the insurer 
of the residual workers' compensation market. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1001 (1994). 
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WCF. As early as 1936, the Court held that an indebtedness to the State Insurance Fund 
was not an indebtedness to the State. Chez, 62 P.2d at 549. The Court noted that the 
State Insurance Fund constituted "a common fund belonging to the participating 
employers. It is therefore not derived from anything owing to the state nor paid out on 
behalf of any state obligation". LdL at 550. 
In 1977, the Court made clear that the legislature could not appropriate funds from 
the State Insurance Fund to pay safety inspectors for the Industrial Commission (which 
was the administrative agency over the State Insurance Fund at the time) without 
violating due process. Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah 1977). The Court 
held that the money in the workers' compensation fund was not public money and that, if 
the appropriation were made, "it would amount to a seizure of trust funds for State 
purposes without due process of law." Id, 
In 1978, the Court was faced with a 1% tax levied by the Tax Commission on the 
premiums collected by the State Insurance Fund, but not levied on private insurance 
companies. State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 
1978). The Court held that the tax violated equal protection because it singled out the 
State Insurance Fund and imposed on it a tax not imposed on any other insurers. IdL at 
1299 (imposing the tax violated the Utah Constitution "[b]ecause all companies 
furnishing workmen's compensation insurance are of a single class, . . . a law operating 
exclusively upon one member of that class is constitutionally invalid as a special law."). 
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In rejecting the tax, the Court said, 
The Fund has the same rights to sue and be sued and make contracts that a private 
insurer has. The Fund enjoys no immunities not provided to private insurers. The 
only distinguishable feature is that the Fund is administered by a State agency, the 
cost therefor being paid from the premiums. This feature is not a rational basis to 
treat the Fund as a distinct classification. 
Id.7 The Court further held that the funds, although publicly administered, amounted to a 
private trust "to be used to meet liabilities of various employers when an employee is 
entitled to compensation.'9 Id at 1298; see also Hansen, 652 P.2d at 1341. 
Finally, in 1982, the Court rejected a claim by the Utah Attorney General that the 
State Insurance Fund was a "state officer" for whom the Attorney General had exclusive 
authority to act as legal advisor. Hansen. 652 P.2d at 1334. The Court held that the Fund 
was not an executive department agency, that it "operates essentially as a private 
insurance company[,]" and that it "receives no public moneys and pays its own 
administrative expenses from the premiums received[.]" LdL at 1340-41. 
The fact that employees of WCF are invested with immunity from civil liability 
when they, in good faith, report a suspicion of fraud to an authorized agency is a neutral 
factor in the overall equation inasmuch as private insurers are granted the same immunity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-31-105(1) (1994). Legislative creation of the Workers' 
7At the time, the State Insurance Fund was administered by the Finance 
Commission. State Tax Commission. 576 P.2d at 1298. However, as of 1988, state 
agency administration ceased and a governing board of directors was put into place, 
which remains today. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1988). 
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Compensation Act is also a neutral factor inasmuch as the Act applies to WCF and 
private insurers equally. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et secu (1997). 
The fact that WCF is the sole workers' compensation insurer for the state (Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-49 (1994)) simply makes the State a policyholder, like all other 
policyholders. WCF does not limit its policyholders to state employees, WCF is the 
insurer of choice for all other policyholders, and WCF conducts its business in the best 
interest of all its policyholders. See generally, Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5(a) and § 35-3-6. 
Further, the legislature's act of exempting WCF from certain statutes otherwise applying 
to all governmental agencies (Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-18) represents its attempt, early in 
WCF's existence, to reinforce its intent that WCF, despite its beginnings, is not a 
governmental agency and hence is not bound by the same laws governing other agencies. 
WCF differs from other private insurers in that the State has granted its employees 
and officers immunity from civil liability for all good faith actions performed in the 
administration and management of WCF. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-8. This grant of 
immunity merely gives to WCF liability protection similar to that available to private 
corporations under Utah law (see Utah Code Ann. §§. 16a-10a-840(4) and 16a-10a-841 
(Supp. 1994)) and justifies the unique burden on WCF of being the insurer of last resort. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1001 (1994). If more were intended, the legislature could 
have expressly submitted WCF to coverage by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
That some immunity has been granted WCF does not warrant a determination that 
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state law views WCF to be a state actor. To submit the largest workers' compensation 
provider in the state to federal constitutional provisions not applicable to other private 
insurers simply because it must insure those who otherwise would not have such 
insurance would do a disservice to those intended to benefit from the continuation of 
WCF. It would severely hinder WCF's ability to ferret out ineligible claims and thereby 
manage its funds for the benefit of its policyholders and the continuation of the program, 
to the ultimate detriment of policyholders who have or will have legitimate claims. 
Neither does the mandate change the fact that the legislature has repeatedly demonstrated 
its intent to distance WCF from state ties. Instead, it represents the best way available to 
the State to provide the service to more of its populace while at the same time distancing 
itself from WCF and permitting WCF to carry out the mandate in good faith as it sees fit. 
Accordingly, the characterization of WCF by state law, in the aggregate, weighs 
against a finding that WCF is a state actor. 
b) Whether the entity is autonomous and free from the control of the State: The 
WCF is autonomous and largely free from administrative, financial and operational 
control by the State—much more so than public school districts and state building 
inspectors to which the Fourth Amendment has been applied.8 See generally Tyler, 436 
8Whatever control the state legislature maintains over WCF through its legislative 
powers is limited by state and federal due process and equal protection guarantees. See 
generally. State Tax Commission. 576 P.2d at 1298-99; Gronning. 561 P.2d at 690. 
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U.S. at 506 (firemen); Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 
1820 (1978) (OSHA inspectors); Camara v. Municipal Court. 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. 
Ct. 1727, 1730 (1967) (building inspectors). WCF is regulated, like private insurers, by 
the Department of Insurance, and is subject to all provisions of the Utah Insurance Code 
as well as the rules of the Labor Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-105 (1994). As 
with other private insurers, WCF has filed articles of incorporation and by-laws and has 
obtained a license from the Department of Insurance. Nothing in the relevant statutes 
suggests that WCF employees are paid by the State. 
Administrative control of WCF has graduated from the Industrial Commission to 
the Finance Commission to the department of Administrative Services, and, as of 1988, to 
an appointed board of directors made up of policyholders. State Tax Commission, 576 
P.2d at 1298; Chez. 62 P.2d at 550; Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1985); see also Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 35-3-1 and -5. While the governor appoints part of the board (Utah Code Ann. § 
35-3-5), the members do not serve at the governor's pleasure. They must meet certain 
criteria which qualifies them for administering such an insurer, they must be 
policyholders, and they cannot be removed without cause. Id This situation distances 
WCF from its earlier ties to the State. Further, the fact that WCF money belongs solely to 
its policyholders, and the fact that the board members can be removed only for cause, 
suggest that the board must administer the company in the best interests of all the 
policyholders, regardless of independent state interests. For example, all directors must 
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represent different policyholders, one must be the executive director of the Department of 
Administrative Services, one must be the chief executive officer of the fund, at least four 
must boast previous experience in investments, risk management, occupational safety, 
casualty insurance, or law, and none may have a competing interest in a competing 
insurance carrier. Id. These requirements ensure that the directors can efficiently and 
effectively run the company, and that they are not merely random appointments by the 
governor meant to stack the deck in the State's favor. 
WCF maintains absolutely no financial ties with the State. Any dividend WCF 
may declare based on a surplus of funds in any fiscal period goes back to the 
policyholders, not to the State. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-16. WCF receives no public 
money, but is self-supporting, paying its own expenses from the premiums it receives 
from its policyholders. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3(1); Hansen. 652 P.2d at 1339. The 
funds are, in essence, trust funds for an insurance program and are unavailable for use by 
the State. See subpoint 3a, supra. By contrast, where state workers' compensation funds 
in other states have been found to be state actors, their funds have invariably been mixed 
with state funds and made available for payment of state obligations (Lipofsky, 86 F.3d at 
17), or state legislation demonstrates a clear intent that the state workers' compensation 
insurer is a state actor (Austin, 939 F.2d at 678). 
c) Whether a judgment against the entity would ultimately be paid by the State: 
As noted above, the funds held by WCF are considered to be entirely separate from state 
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funds. See Hansen, 652 P.2d at 1341: State Tax Commission. 576 P.2d at 1298; 
Gronning. 561 P.2d at 691-92; Chez. 62 P.2d at 550. "The state is not liable for the 
expenses, liabilities, or debts of the Workers' Compensation Fund, and may not use any 
assets of the Injury Fund for any purpose." Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-4. In addition, as a 
licensed insurer, WCF is required to be a member of the Property and Casualty Guaranty 
Association ["Association"]. Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-28-201, -202, and -205 (1994). 
The Association handles all insolvencies and liquidations which have commenced since 
July 1, 1986 (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-219), and provides the means by which the 
obligations of an insolvent member insurer are handled in this State for the protection of 
the policyowners and insureds. Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-28-201 and -202. The necessary 
operating funds come directly from the member insurers as periodic assessments. Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-28-208. The Association is not a state agency (Utah Code Ann. §§ 
31A-28-204 and -205), and gets none of its funding from the State. Moreover, the 
Association's failure "to perform its duties or to fulfill its stated purpose" does not result 
in liability on the State's part. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-217(2). In light of the strict 
separation of funds and liabilities, as well as the statutory mechanism for coverage of 
insolvencies, it is highly unlikely that the State would pay a judgment against WCF. 
After reviewing the history of WCF, its development since its inception, its 
functioning, and the mechanisms in place in the event of its insolvency, it becomes clear 
that whatever status might have applied to WCF at its inception has graduated to the point 
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that WCF is essentially a private insurer on the same basic footing as other workers' 
compensation insurers in the State. WCF has attained significant independence from the 
State and would not be viewed as an arm of the state under the Eleventh Amendment. 
See Simon. 946 P.2d at 1305. Consequently, it should be viewed as no less independent 
for Fourth Amendment purposes, and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress should be affirmed. 
R Assuming WCF Is Viewed As A State Actor For Fourth Amendment Purposes, 
Reversal Is Not Warranted As No Constitutional Violation Occurred 
1. No Fourth Amendment Analysis Applies as No Search is Implicated Here: 
Even if WCF is deemed a state actor, defendant's claim fails because the act of 
obtaining and reviewing defendant's medical records in connection with her workers' 
compensation claim does not amount to a search and seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Defendant's election to pursue workers' compensation benefits was 
wholly voluntary on her part. The review of her medical records to evaluate her claim 
and eligibility for the benefits is clearly connected to the continuation of her benefits. 
Defendant need not permit the review of her medical records, at which point her benefits 
are likely to be terminated. While it might generate a difficult choice for a defendant, it 
does not equate with a search and seizure in the criminal law context as defendant 
assumes. See Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317-18, 91 S. Ct. at 386 (finding that a home visit 
required by regulations for state AFDC program did not constitute a "search" in the 
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traditional criminal law context of the Fourth Amendment). 
2. There was No Constitutional Violation Where the Scope of Consent 
Reasonably Included Reporting a Suspicion of Fraud: 
Even if this Court finds that WCF is a State actor for Fourth Amendment purposes 
and that the review of defendant's medical records constitutes a search, reversal is not 
warranted. The trial court determined that defendant signed a "complete release" for a 
"full investigation" and that the consent was voluntary (R.213/50). Because a reasonable 
interpretation of the consent under the facts at hand includes WCF's release of the 
medical information to law enforcement for criminal investigation, WCF did not exceed 
the scope of the consent, and suppression of the evidence was not warranted. 
Scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is a matter of "objective" 
reasonableness — what the "typical reasonable person would have understood by the 
exchange" by which consent was granted. See Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-
04 (1991); accord State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah App. 1992). "^Whether the 
search remained within the boundaries of the consent is a fact to be determined from the 
totality of the circumstances.'" State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
Instead of viewing the release form in isolation, this Court must view the release in 
the context of the surrounding circumstances. State v. Archuleta, 925 P.2d 1275, 1277-78 
(Utah App. 1996). After initiation of the workers' compensation claim, defendant began 
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receiving temporary total disability benefit checks from WCF (R.214/242-3). She 
admitted below to receiving and endorsing six checks between October 31, 1994, and 
January 25, 1995 (R.215/573-5). "Right next" to defendant's endorsement on the back of 
each of the checks was printed the following warning: 
Workers' Compensation insurance fraud is a crime punishable by Utah law. Do 
not endorse or attempt to cash this check unless you are entitled to payment for the 
goods, services, disability benefits or health care services represented herein. 
(R.214/319; 215/575). Defendant admitted reading the warning before she signed the 
checks, said that she understood it, and reiterated that she knew that fraud was a crime 
punishable by law (R.215/575, 577). 
On January 11, 1995, defendant executed the written release of her medical 
records. That release stated: "This information will be used for the sole purpose of 
evaluating my claim for workers compensation benefits." Br. Apt. at Add. A (copy of 
written release). Review of the medical records and further WCF investigation raised a 
suspicion of fraud which WCF properly reported to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
as all insurers are encouraged to do. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-31-105. 
Under these circumstances, WCF's use of the. medical records comports with the 
consent granted by defendant. When an evaluation of a claim for workers' compensation 
benefits reveals information suggesting that fraud has occurred, a reasonable and natural 
consequence is further investigation and, if warranted, fraud prosecution. This is clearly 
true where consent is given with express notice of the actionability of fraud. 
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That defendant's consent was voluntary is also apparent. WCF gave defendant a 
choice: consent to a limited review of her medical records in order to maintain any 
possibility of receiving more benefits, or refuse to permit the review and relinquish any 
possibility of more benefits.9 While such a choice may be difficult for a defendant, it is 
not unconstitutional. See Wvman. 400 U.S. at 324, 91 S. Ct. at 389 (the fact that a choice 
by defendant to refuse a home visit required by the AFDC program carried the 
consequence that her aid would cease does not implicate anything of constitutional 
magnitude); United States v. Davis. 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973) (choice open to all 
prospective airline passengers to submit to a search of their person and possessions as a 
condition to boarding or to forego their flight is an acceptable choice). 
Moreover, a review of factors relevant to the issue of whether consent arose from 
coercion shows that no coercion occurred here. Those factors include: 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an 
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by 
9The fact that disclosure of a claimant's medical history is necessary to an 
evaluation of every claim submitted to any workers' compensation insurer also suggests 
that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in those records once obtained by 
WCF. Not only must a claimant release the records in order to receive benefits, see Wall 
v. Industrial Com'n. 857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah App. 1993) (placing on the claimant the 
burden of establishing that claimed injuries are work-related); Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
97(8)-(10), but society arguably is unwilling to recognize as reasonable anything more 
than a reduced expectation of privacy in such records where disclosure is made necessary 
through a claimant's affirmative choice to seek monetary benefits relating to a medical 
problem. Compare Couch v. United States. 409 U.S. 322, 93 S. Ct. 611 (1973) with State 
v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991). 
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the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the 
officer. 
State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Applied to this case, those factors 
show none of the coercion claimed by defendant. First, there was no claim of authority to 
search—defendant was simply given the permissible choice of releasing her records or 
surrendering her benefits. Second, there was no exhibition of force by WCF. Third, 
WCF proffered a mere request to obtain the records, leaving the choice to defendant. 
Fourth, both defendant and Paola noted defendant's cooperation with WCF throughout 
their dealings. Finally, there was no deception or trick by WCF to obtain the release. 
Paola testified that her sole purpose in obtaining the release and the records was to 
determine defendant's eligibility for benefits, as was represented to defendant (R. 
214/335, 372-3). Any determination to seek criminal prosecution in this case arose later 
and does not adversely reflect on the propriety of WCF's actions in obtaining the release. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence of 
coercion, WCF's release of the medical records to the State to pursue the evidence of 
fraud therein should be deemed to be within the scope of defendant's consent. 
3. Public Policy Supports WCF's Reporting of Fraud on the Evidence at Hand: 
Finally, defendant's interpretation requires this Court to hold that even though 
WCF found evidence of a crime, it could not report the finding because WCF allegedly 
asked only to look for such evidence, not to report it. Such a result is absurd. .See 
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generally. State v. Genovesi. 871 P.2d 547, 551 n.6 (Utah App. 1994) (noting the 
absurdity of holding that an officer who finds evidence during a constitutional search 
cannot remove the evidence merely because he asked to search for it, not to take it); see 
also State v. Shepard. 955 P.2d 352, 357 (Utah App. 1998) (discovery and seizure of pipe 
in plain view when, during routine traffic stop, defendant opened the door in response to 
the officer's order to get out of the car was within the scope of the traffic stop). It is also 
against public policy, which encourages people to report criminal activity to the 
authorities. See Fox v. MCI Communications Corp.. 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997) 
(recognizing the "long-established proposition that public policy encourages citizens to 
report crimes" and that effective implementation of the policy "requires the cooperation 
of citizens" with such knowledge). To interpret the challenged release as restrictively as 
defendant urges would seriously compromise WCF's fraud prevention efforts and the 
public policy those efforts symbolize. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-31-105 (1994) and § 34A-
2-110 (11) & (12) (1997). The knowledge that workers' compensation fraud committed 
against WCF could not be prosecuted because WCF cannot provide evidence of the fraud 
to insurance regulators or law enforcement agencies.is an open invitation to defraud 
WCF. This would affect the insurance costs for all of WCF's policyholders, reduce the 
availability of benefits for employees with truly eligible claims, and put WCF in an 
unequal position relative to other private workers compensation insurance providers who 
would not suffer these effects as they remain free to report such suspicions of fraud. 
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POINT II 
ANY ERROR IN QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PROSECUTOR TO DEFENDANT 
CONCERNING THE VERACITY OF OTHER WITNESSES WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL IN THIS CASE AND DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor asked her about the credibility of other 
witnesses twice during the trial. Br. Apt. at 32-33. She argues that such questioning was 
erroneous and warrants reversal because of the harm necessarily resulting to her 
credibility where that credibility was critical to the verdict. Id at 34-36. 
The first challenged exchange occurred when the prosecutor tried to establish what 
defendant was doing when the Blynco injury occurred: 
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. Well, she testified - this is my recollection, and the 
Jury will give this the weight that they deem it deserves. She [Sharon Rowley] said 
that this [type of accident] had never happened before. Is it your testimony that 
she lied or misled the court? 
A. I don't believe she used those specific words. She said, "By pulling on a blind 
cord," to the best of my knowledge. That's all I believe she said. 
(R.215/564) (emphasis added) (the relevant examination is attached in Add. D). 
Defendant made no objection to this examination (R.215/564). 
The second exchange occurred shortly thereafter: 
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. You also testified that you told Dr. Seeman, when you 
saw him on October the 17th, about this [domestic] assault that happened three 
days earlier? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you hear him testify repeatedly that he knew nothing about that until this 
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case was convened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He isn't lying? 
A. I don't believe ~ 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, objection . . . . 
THE COURT: . . . . She can answer. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Do you need me to repeat that question? 
A. No, I understood. 
No, I don't believe that Dr. Seeman was lying. But towards the end, Dr. 
Seeman was having health problems and he had had strokes and stuff and he 
wasn't keeping track of things in the office like he should have been. So he could 
have forgotten, or, you know, I am not saying he was lying. 
(R.215/568-9) (emphasis added). Add. D. 
Defendant's claim of error as to the first challenged question is reviewed on appeal 
under the plain error doctrine, requiring that any error be both obvious and harmful. State 
v. Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 1997). Reversal is warranted on the 
preserved claim involving Dr. Seeman "'only if the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict.'" State v. Piansiaksone 
954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 
1997)). 
While it is "inappropriate" to ask a criminal defendant to comment on the veracity 
of another witness, reversal is not automatic. State v. Taylor. 884 P.2d 1293, 1298-99 
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(Utah App. 1994). It is necessary to examine the overall effect of the questioning in each 
case to determine its impact. See id. at 1298-99 (reviewing the issue under the plain error 
doctrine); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 546 (Utah 1994) (reviewing the issue under an 
ineffectiveness claim; clarifying that such questions are not per se reversible error). 
In this case, the questioning was not lengthy and essentially served to clarify 
defendant's testimony in relation to prior testimony of other witnesses. Any suggestion 
that someone was committing perjury was effectively diffused by defendant's responses, 
which did not identify anyone as a liar. Instead, defendant offered reasonable 
explanations for the differing testimony that avoided labeling anyone as a "liar": Rowley 
spoke about an injury caused by a blind cord, while defendant was allegedly injured by a 
pulley jamming (R.213/262-4); Dr. Seeman might have forgotten defendant's mention of 
the assault because of his health problems (R.215/569). In fact, the latter response may 
have actually helped defendant's case by undermining Dr. Seeman's credibility. See 
Goddard, 871 P.2d at 546. 
Further, it was clear from the questions asked by the prosecutor throughout the 
cross-examination that he was generally trying to elicit from defendant exactly what 
defense counsel stated below was appropriate: that defendant's testimony on each point 
was different than that previously given by a state's witness. Counsel simply failed to use 
consistent phraseology. Aside from the two identified instances, the prosecutor asked the 
following unchallenged similar questions: 
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-whether it was defendant's testimony "that what really happened [whether 
Debbie said to go to St. Mark's or to go home] is different from what she [Debbie] 
testified to" (R.215/566); 
-whether the testimony and records of the three doctors whom defendant heard 
testify about pre-Blynco upper back injuries "seem to be pretty accurate" (R. 
215/579-80); 
-whether defendant had "[a]ny reason to believe that this transcript [of 
defendant's February interview with Brett Mann] and his [Mann's] testimony was 
inaccurate" (R.215/5 84); 
—whether defendant could say if Dr. Minnaugh's report of his treatment of her 
following the domestic assault "is accurate or not" (R.215/585). 
Moreover, this was not a case in which the determination of guilt was based on the 
jury's assessment of the victim's credibility versus the defendant's, as was the situation in 
the cases cited by defendant in his prejudice argument. Br. Apt. at 35-36. The State 
called fifteen witnesses; defendant alone testified for the defense. The jury weighed all 
the evidence concerning what was and was not disclosed to various individuals at 
different times, what problems defendant complained of and when, and what treatments 
she received (see Point 111(C)). Much of the testimony from the State's witnesses was 
corroborated by other witnesses or by written documentation. Therefore, the challenged 
questioning is not likely to have had a significant impact on the jury's determination of 
defendant's credibility, especially in light of defendant's responses. Accordingly, whether 
reviewed for plain error or reversible error, the challenged exchanges do not undermine 
confidence in the jury's verdict. See Taylor. 884 P.2d at 1299 (rejecting defendant's 
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plain error claim upon finding that the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant as to 
another witness' veracity was neither obvious error nor prejudicial). 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO PLAIN ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUA 
SPONTE ACT ON THREE INSTANCES OF ALLEGED MISSTATEMENTS OF THE 
EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR BECAUSE, EVEN ASSUMING ERROR, NO 
INSTANCE WAS OBVIOUS OR PREJUDICIAL 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to correct 
the prosecutor's misrepresentation of evidence in three instances. Br. Apt. at 36-41. 
Defendant's failure to object below to any of the challenged instances waives the claim 
unless the remarks amount to plain error, which requires that any error be obvious and 
harmful. Tavlor. 884 P.2d at 1298. 
A± No Plain Error Occurred In The Prosecutor's Opening Statement 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor informed the jury in his opening statement 
that they would hear specific evidence during trial which the prosecutor never adduced. 
Specifically, she claims that the prosecutor told the jury that the evidence would show 
that defendant told not only the ambulance driver but also the investigating police officer 
that she had suffered upper back pain due to the assault by her ex-husband. Br. Apt. at 
36-37. (the prosecutor's opening statement is attached in Add. E.) 
The prosecutor's comment in his opening statement was not in accord with the 
evidence later adduced (compare R.213/125 to 213/196-7, 201-2) (the officer's testimony 
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is attached in Add. F). However, reversal is not warranted because the statement could 
not have been obvious at the time it was made where the trial court could not have known 
the evidence would not be forthcoming. Defendant relies on case authority prohibiting a 
prosecutor from questioning a defendant during trial in a manner that "implies the 
existence of a prejudicial fact" when the prosecutor has no ability to establish the fact's 
existence. Br. Apt. at 39. That authority is inapposite to the situation involved in this 
part of defendant's claim, where the prosecutor was not questioning defendant in his 
opening remarks, and the fact that such evidence was not adduced does not establish that 
it did not exist. Moreover, the brief comment escaped the notice of defense counsel as 
well once the evidence was out, no further reference was made to it thereafter by either 
counsel, and the jury received repeated warnings, both before and after the challenged 
remark, that the statements of counsel were not evidence (R.213/133, 177). 
Additionally, the comment was not harmful in the context of this case. The State 
offered considerable evidence that defendant failed to tell various people about different 
parts of her medical history, including her multiple complaints of upper back pain both 
prior and subsequent to the Blynco incident. As it related to the domestic assault, the 
evidence established that, while defendant failed to mention upper back pain to the 
investigating officer immediately following the assault, she almost immediately thereafter 
complained of such pain to the ambulance driver and to the treating physician upon her 
arrival at the hospital, attributing it to her ex-husband having thrown her against a wall 
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(R.213/213-4; 214/ 254-9). Thereafter, she failed to mention either the assault or the 
resulting back pain to Dr. Seeman during the thirteen months she saw him (R.214/282), 
and she omitted any reference to the upper back pain when she finally confessed to Paola 
and Mann that she had been assaulted (R.215/497-500). In light of this evidence, the 
question of whether or not she told the investigating officer of her upper back pain on the 
night of the assault had little impact on whether she in fact complained of such pain after 
the assault or whether she thereafter sought to hide that fact from subsequent treating 
physicians or workers' compensation employees. 
Further, while both parties mentioned defendant's reporting of the assault in their 
closing arguments, neither one mentioned the prosecutor's misstatement from his opening 
statements or led the jury to believe the evidence on the point was anything other than 
what was adduced at trial. Defense counsel went over the domestic assault evidence, 
correctly reflecting that defendant had mentioned to Officer Anjeweirden only pushing, 
punching and pulling hair, with resulting injuries to the face and jaw (R.215/633-4). She 
then noted that defendant reported the back pain to the ambulance driver and the treating 
physician, offering alternative explanations or different interpretations of the evidence (R. 
215/634-5). In rebuttal, the prosecutor properly indicated that the report to Officer 
Anjeweirden basically involved the punching to defendant's face and jaw (R.215/647-8). 
Both counsel focused their remarks in this area on the reports to the treating physician 
and the ambulance driver, thereby minimizing any likelihood that the jury would 
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remember the prosecutor's opening remark involving the officer and use it against 
defendant in deliberations on this point. 
Finally, not only did the court remind the jury repeatedly before opening 
statements that what counsel said was not evidence, but defense counsel began her 
opening statement by saying, "Judge Henriod, when he started off this jury trial and 
during the jury selection and then prior to opening statements, indicated to you one very 
important factor, and that is statements that were given by me, statements that are given 
by [the prosecutor] are not evidence." (R.213/133). This sentiment was reiterated in the 
written jury instructions (R. 177, jury instruction #17). 
As the impact of the statement was minimal, at best, and the comment was never 
emphasized or referenced by the parties thereafter, confidence in the jury verdict is not 
undermined, and reversal is not warranted. See State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1254-55 
(Utah 1988) (refusing to reverse a capital conviction based on statements made in the 
prosecutor's opening argument where the statements were not prejudicial), vacated on 
other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
R No Plain Error Occurred In The Prosecutor's Cross-Examination Of Defendant 
Defendant claims plain error in the prosecutor's cross-examination of her, arguing 
that the prosecutor's assertion that defendant had said on direct that she told Paola 
Valente about the domestic assault "is wholly unsupported." Br. Apt. at 40. However, 
contrary to defendant's claim, the prosecutor's questioning did not amount to unsupported 
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innuendo. Id at 39. When the previous testimony to which the prosecutor made 
reference is reviewed in context, the prosecutor's questioning is reasonable. 
The challenged questioning is based on defendant's direct examination testimony: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. Now, you provided certain information to Miss 
Valente; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What kinds of information did you bring Miss Valente; do you recall? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, what she asked for. 
Q. Okay. Was there any information that Mrs. [sic] Valente asked you for that 
you didn't provide her to your recollection? 
A. No, there isn't. 
(R.215/549-50) (the exchange is attached in Add. G). After asking the question and 
emphasizing the response with a second question, defense counsel immediately changed 
the subject and discussed several different topics over the next ten pages of transcript 
(R.215/550-9). Only then did she bring out the fact that defendant did not tell Paola 
Valente about the domestic assault. The questioning began, in relevant part: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Why didn't you disclose to Miss Valente or Mr. Mann 
that you had been assaulted on October 14th prior to your interview? 
A. I didn't feel that, you know, the fact that my husband hit me in my private life 
was information that would benefit them in any way because it wasn't to the same 
area that I was injured at work. 
Q. Okay. When you told Mr. Mann and Miss Valente that you didn't have prior 
back injuries, what was your intent? What were you thinking? 
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A. That I didn't have any injuries to that area where I was injured at work 
(Indicating). 
(R.215/559-60) (the exchange is attached in Add. G). 
This sequence of questioning could easily mislead the jury into believing 
something unsupported by the evidence, as shown by the prosecutor's later questioning: 
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. You also testified that vou told Paola Valente, when you 
talked to her by phone on October 17th, about the domestic violence assault that 
happened three days earlier: is that your testimony? 
A. I don't recall. I don't remember saying those specific words. 
Q. Do you remember telling the Jury that you told Paola Valente all the 
information she asked you for? 
A. Yes. But Paola Valente didn't come out and say, "Has you — does your 
husband beat you?" That's not something — you know, "Had you been 
assaulted?", you know, she didn't ask me anything like that, no. 
Q. Okay. But when you talked to her on the phone on October the 17th, you didn't 
tell her about the fact that three days earlier you had been assaulted; did you? 
A. I felt that it was irrelevant because it wasn't to the same area that I was hurt at 
work. 
Q. Okay. A few minutes ago I thought I heard you testify that vou told Paola 
Valente about this assault. Did I misunderstand you or did your testimony change? 
A. I may have misunderstood you. I don't know. 
Q. But on October the 17th, you did not tell Paola; is that your testimony? 
A. On October the 17th? 
Q. That's right. 
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A. I don't think that I even spoke to Paola Valente on October 17th. 
(R.215/570-2) (emphasis added) (the exchange is attached in Add. H). 
The prosecutor clearly interpreted defendant's initial testimony on direct to mean 
that defendant disclosed the domestic assault to Paola because she gave Paola "what she 
asked for" and could remember nothing that she did not provide (R.215/549-50). Paola 
had already testified that she had asked defendant about her post-Blynco medical 
treatment (R.214/238), thereby supporting the prosecutor's interpretation. The 
prosecutor, and possibly some jurors, did not connect defendant's later testimony on 
direct that the domestic assault was an exception to her earlier claim that she told Paola 
everything she wanted. Moreover, the direct examination reasonably but incorrectly 
implied that defendant failed to disclose the domestic assault only when both Paola and 
Brett Mann jointly interviewed defendant in February; it makes no reference to the 
contact defendant had with Paola over the previous four months. The format and 
phraseology of the direct examination exchanges reasonably give rise to the prosecutor's 
interpretation and, hence, justify his cross-examination to clarify the issue and prevent a 
similar misinterpretation by jurors. 
Moreover, the effect of the questioning was not prejudicial. The prosecutor 
expressly acknowldged that he may have misunderstood the previous testimony, then 
clarified the point of the questioning-that defendant did not tell Paola about the domestic 
assault in October, which defendant had acknowledged, albeit less than clearly, in her 
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direct examination (R.215/559-60). Hence, the jury was left with nothing more than 
defendant had already established. Further, the claimed error was not raised, let alone 
argued, by either counsel in closing arguments, rendering it unlikely that the exchange 
had any effect beyond clarifying defendant's direct examination. 
Viewed in context with defendant's testimony on direct, the challenged cross-
examination was not erroneous and does not undermine confidence in the jury's verdict. 
Accordingly, reversal is not warranted under the plain error doctrine. See Winward, 941 
P.2d at 634-35 (no reversible error under the plain error doctrine in the prosecutor's 
cross-examination clarifying a statement appellant made during his direct examination). 
C. No Plain Error Occurred In The Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
Finally, defendant faults an argument made by the prosecutor a little more than 
halfway through his initial closing remarks in which the prosecutor explained that despite 
multiple questions by Brett Mann about whether defendant "had been in the hospital 
recently [,]" defendant did not say that she had just been released from the hospital after a 
month-long stay (R.215/61-13) (the prosecutor's closing remarks are attached in Add. I). 
Because the prosecutor was mistaken in his assertion that Mann asked specifically 
if defendant had been in the hospital recently, his argument, to the extent it is based on a 
misinterpretation of the evidence, is erroneous (the exchange is attached in Add. J). 
However, the error was not so obvious as to constitute plain error where it not only 
generated no objection by defense counsel, but defense counsel failed to deem it 
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important enough to even mention in his responsive closing argument. 
Further, when the argument is viewed in the context of both the prosecutor's 
closing remarks and the remaining evidence, it does not undermine confidence in the 
jury's verdict. Eleven of the first eleven-and-one-half pages of the prosecutor's closing 
argument are aimed at identifying not only the conflicting evidence between defendant 
and most of the State's fifteen witnesses, but at how defendant's actions throughout her 
dealings with WCF and various treating physicians conform to a pattern of conduct which 
the prosecutor ultimately argues establishes that defendant "intentionally and knowingly 
formed a scheme or artifice" (R.215/601-611, 613). Add. I. These points culminate in 
the challenged remarks concerning hospitalization (R.215/612-3). Add. I. The 
prosecutor closed those remarks by identifying the hospitalization denial as "part of the 
pattern" of conduct defendant employed to defraud WCF (R.215/612-3). He then 
launched immediately into an appropriate, factually-supported, unchallenged explanation 
of the overall, "ongoing" pattern (R.215/613), and went on to articulate numerous other 
acts, omissions, and evidence which support the determination of an intentional scheme to 
defraud (R.215/613-21). Add. I. That evidence includes: 
a. defendant's medical history, including — 
—80 admissions to St Mark's hospital alone in the past eighteen years, at 
least 74 of which were emergency room visits (R.214/407); 
-medical reports showing four emergency room visits to hospitals other 
than St. Mark's in 1994 before the Blynco incident, all involving claims of 
upper back injury and severe headaches (R.214/412-23, 429-33); 
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b. defendant's woefully incomplete list of doctors and hospitals on the WCF form 
and her refusal to complete it using her records at home (R.214/336-7, 373-4); 
c. defendant's limited disclosure of her medical problems to her multiple treating 
physicians, the ambulance personnel, and WCF, and her repeated failure, despite 
ample opportunity, to tell these people about the majority of her pre- and post-
Blynco injuries: 
—Rebecca Dickinson (emergency room nurse): told only about the Blynco 
incident (R.215/469-70, 481); 
-Steve Anjeweirden (officer): told only about the assault and resulting 
injuries (excluding back pain) (R.213/196-8, 201); 
—Cal Kunz (ambulance driver): told about assault and resulting back pain, 
Blynco incident, and previous ulcer problems (R.213/214, 216); 
—Dr. Minnaugh: told only about assault and the resulting back pain (R. 
214/254-5,259,267); 
-Dr. Seeman: told only about the Blynco incident and previous migraines 
over a 13-month period of treatment (R.214/273, 281-2, 288, 290, 299, 382; . 
215/549,570); 
—Dr. Chung: told about the Blynco incident, and previous medical problems 
unrelated to her back (R.214/447, 455-7); 
—Paola Valente: told only about the Blynco incident until four months into 
the claim and after receipt of defendant's medical records (R.214/237-8); 
d. defendant's false assertion to Brett Mann on March 3, 1995 that all prior back 
injuries involved only her lower back (R.215/502-5); 
e. defendant's receipt of two prescriptions for the same narcotic drug from two 
different doctors in two days and the fact that the drug was stronger than was 
normally warranted for minor injuries (R.214/330-2, 345, 358-9); 
f. defendant's assertion to Mann on March 3, 1995 that she saw Dr. Seeman 
before the domestic assault, compared with her trial testimony that she told him of 
the assault the first time she saw him (R.215/502-5, 548); 
g. defendant's claim to Paola that she would see Dr. Borne on Oct. 17 when she 
had and kept an appointment with Dr. Seeman instead (R.214/246-7, 273, 281-2, 
290; 215/567, 593); 
h. defendant's decision to see an unknown doctor miles away from her home in 
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lieu of a hospital-recommended doctor whose office was within 20 blocks of her 
home (R.214/306; 215/544, 585-6, 594); 
i. defendant's failure to appear for the work-hardening program (R.214/382-3; 
215/594-5); 
j . defendant's claim during her first interview with Brett Mann that she needed her 
paperwork to clear up the confusion, and her subsequent failure to appear with that 
paperwork at a later scheduled interview (R.215/516-7); 
k. defendant's conduct while at Blynco suggesting that she did not want to work 
there (R.213/150-1); 
1. testimony from Cleverly, Rowley, and Dickenson that they could not imagine 
how such an injury could occur (R.213/171-2, 176; 215/480-1); 
m. testimony from Rowley that defendant admitted having back problems prior to 
the Blynco incident and that the incident made them worse (R.213/173); 
n. defendant's receipt of medical treatment for over a year for an injury several 
witnesses considered to be very minor (R.214/273, 281-2, 288, 290, 330, 345, 449-
50; 215/480-1, 549, 570); 
o. defendant's repeated receipt of narcotics for an injury several wits considered 
very minor (R.214/284-5; 215/485). 
When the challenged argument is reviewed in context and considered in light of 
the wealth of remaining evidence against defendant, there is no reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for defendant in the absence of the argument. See State v. 
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 345 (Utah 1993) (rejecting a claim of plain error in prosecutorial 
statements because they were harmless in light of the strong proof of defendant's guilt 
and the trial court's instructions that counsel's arguments were not evidence). 
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D. The Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Apply In This Case 
Defendant claims that the cumulative effect of the errors compromised the 
integrity of the verdict to his prejudice. Br. Apt. at 41. This Court will revers under the 
cumulative error doctrine only if "'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines 
our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 
1993). As noted above (see subsections III(A)-(C), supra), defendant has identified only 
one error, that being harmless. The cumulative error doctrine does not apply absent 
multiple identifiable errors. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 
513 U.S. 966 (1994); Rasmussen v. Sharapata. 895 P.2d 391, 392 n.l (Utah App. 1995). 
In any case, each of the three claimed errors constitutes, at most, harmless error. 
Even in the aggregate, the minimal prejudice possibly arising does not undermine 
confidence in the fairness of the trial, given the totality of the remaining evidence. State v. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f ^ d a y of June, 1998. 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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31A-1-105. Presumption of jurisdiction. 
(1) Any insurer, including the Workers Compensa-
tion Fund of Utah, that provides coverage of a resi-
dent of this state, property located in this state, or a 
business activity conducted in this state, or that en-
gages in any activity described in Subsections 
31A-15-102(2)(a) through (h), is doing an insurance 
business in this state and is subject to the jurisdiction 
of the insurance commissioner and the courts of this 
state under Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310 to the 
extent of that coverage or activity. 
(2) Any person doing or purporting to do an insur-
ance business in this state as defined in Subsection 
31 A-1-301(44) is subject to the jurisdiction of the in-
surance commissioner and this title, unless the in-
surer can establish that the exemptions of Section 
31A-1-103 apply. 
(3) This section does not limit the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state under other applicable law. 
1993 
WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS 
31A-22-1001. Obligation to write workers com-
pensation insurance. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah shall 
write all workers' compensation insurance for which 
application is made to the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah. This requirement does not apply to any 
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PROPERTY AND CASUALTY GUARANTY 
ASSOCIATION 
31A-28-201. Purpose. 
The purpose of this part is to provide for an associa-
tion of insurers that, as a condition of their authority 
to transact insurance business in this state, shall 
guarantee the payment of benefits and the continua-
tion of coverages as provided for and limited in this 
part-
 1968 
31A-28-202. Scope . 
This part applies to protect resident policyowners 
and insureds under all types of direct insurance, ex-
cept life, title, surety, disability, credit (including 
mortgage guarantee), ocean marine insurance, insur-
ance of warranties or service contracts, financial 
guarantee, and all insurance coverages guaranteed 
by the United States Government. 1968 
31A-28-203. Defini t ions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Covered claim" means an unpaid claim, 
excluding unearned premiums, that arises out of 
and is within the coverage and is not in excess of 
the applicable limits of an insurance policy to 
which this part applies, where the insurer who 
issued the policy becomes an insolvent insurer, 
and where the claimant or insured is a resident 
of this state at the time of the insured event or 
the property from which the claim arises is per-
manently located in this state. "Covered claim" 
does not include any amount awarded as punitive 
or exemplary damages or any amount due any 
reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwrit-
ing association, as subrogation recoveries or oth-
erwise, nor does it include any supplementary 
payment obligation, including adjustment fees 
and expenses, attorneys' fees and expenses, court 
costs, interest, and bond premiums, prior to the 
appointment of a liquidator. 
(2) "Net direct written premiums" means di-
rect gross premiums written in this state on in-
surance policies that this part applies to, less re-
turn premiums and dividends paid or credited to 
policyholders on the direct business. "Net direct 
written premiums" does not include premiums on 
contracts between insurers or reinsurers. 
(3) Other definitions applicable to this part are 
given under Section 31A-28-105. IWI 
31A-28-204. Unlawful statements. 
(1) It is unlawful to make any statement, written 
or oral, regarding the coverages and protections pro-
vided by the association for the purpose of promoting 
the purchase of any form of insurance. 
(2) It is unlawful to indicate or imply that the asso-
ciation is an agency of the state or that the existence 
of the association is in any way a guarantee by the 
state or any of its instrumentalities to insure the pay-
ment of claims. 
(3) The commissioner shall prescribe rules to pre-
vent' 
(a) use of the association as an inducement for 
the sale of insurance; 
(b) the dissemination of false or misleading in-
formation regarding the association and its lim-
ited guarantees; and 
(c) the dissemination of information implying 
that the association is an agency of the state and 
that the state in any way insures the payment of 
claims. 
(4) Any person who violates Subsection (1) or (2) is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Any person who 
violates a rule under Subsection (3) is liable to the 
state for a civil penalty of not less than $250 or more 
than $1,000. IWI 
31A'28-205. Creation of the association. 
(1) The Utah Property and Casualty Insurance 
Guaranty Association shall continue as a nonprofit 
legal entity. All member insurers are, and remain, 
members of the association as a condition of their 
authority to transact insurance business in this state. 
The association shall perform its functions under the 
plan of operation established and approved under 
Section 31A-28-209 and shall exercise its powers 
through a board of directors established under Sec-
tion 31A-28-206. For the purposes of administration 
and assessment, the association shall maintain a 
workers' compensation insurance account, an auto-
mobile insurance account, and a miscellaneous ac-
count for all other insurance to which this part ap-
plies-
(2) Meetings or records of the association shall be 
open to the public upon a majority vote of the board of 
directors of the association. 
(3) The association is not an agency of the state. 
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31A-28-206. Board of directors. 
(1) The board of directors of the association con-
sists of not less than five nor more than nine mem-
bers, serving terms established in the plan of opera-
tion. The members of the board shall be selected by 
member insurers, subject to the commissioner's ap-
proval. Vacancies on the board shall be filled for the 
remaining period of the term by a majority vote of the 
remaining board members, subject to the commis-
sioner's approval. 
(2) In approving selections or in appointing mem-
bers to the board, the commissioner shall consider 
whether all member insurers are fairly represented. 
(3) Members of the board may be reimbursed from 
the assets of the association for expenses incurred by 
them as members of the board of directors. Other 
than these expenses, the members of the board may 
not otherwise be compensated by the association for 
their services. 1985 
31A-28-207. P o w e r s and duties of the associa-
tion. 
(1) (a) The association is obligated on the amount 
of the covered claims existing prior to the deter-
mination of insolvency and rising within 30 days 
after the determination of insolvency, or before 
the policy expiration date if it is less than 30 
days after the determination, or before the in-
sured replaces the policy or causes its cancella-
tion, if he does so within 30 days of the determi-
nation. The obligation includes only that amount 
of each covered claim that is in excess of $100 
and is less than $300,000. However, the associa-
tion shall pay the full amount of any covered 
claim arising out of a workmen's compensation 
policy. In no event is the association obligated to 
a policyholder or claimant in an amount in ex-
cess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer un-
der the policy from which the claim arises. 
(b) The association is considered as the insurer 
to the extent of its obligation on the covered 
claims, and to that extent, has all the rights, du-
ties, and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if 
the insurer had not yet become insolvent. 
(c) The association shall allocate claims paid 
and expenses incurred among the three accounts 
separately, and assess member insurers sepa-
rately for each account amounts necessary to 
pay: 
(i) the obligations of the association under 
Subsection (l)(a) subsequent to an insol-
vency; 
(ii) the expenses of handling covered 
claims subsequent to an insolvency; 
(iii) the cost of examinations under Sec-
tion 31A-28-214; and 
(iv) other expenses authorized by this 
part. 
(d) The association shall investigate claims 
brought against the association and adjust, com-
promise, settle, and pay covered claims to the 
extent of the association's obligation and deny all 
other claims and may review settlements, re-
leases, and judgments that the insolvent insurer 
or its insureds were parties to in determining if 
the settlements, releases, or judgments may be 
properly contested. 
(e) The association shall notify the persons the 
commissioner requests under Subsection 31A-28-
210(2)(a). 
(f) The association shall handle claims 
through its employees or through one or more 
insurers or other persons designated as servicing 
facilities. Designation of a servicing facility is 
subject to the approval of the commissioner, but 
this designation may be declined by a member 
insurer. 
(g) The association shall reimburse each ser-
vicing facility for obligations of the association 
paid by the facility and for expenses incurred by 
the facility while handling claims on behalf of 
the association and shall pay the other expenses 
of the association as authorized by this title. 
(2) The association may: 
(a) employ or retain the persons, including pri-
vate legal counsel, necessary to handle claims 
and perform other duties of the association; 
(b) borrow funds necessary to implement the 
purposes of this part in accord with the plan of 
operation; 
(c) sue or be sued; 
(d) negotiate and become a party to the con-
tracts necessary to carry out the purpose of this 
part; 
(e) perform any other acts necessary or proper 
to accomplish the purposes of this chapter; or 
(f) refund to the member insurers, in propor-
tion to the contribution of each member insurer 
to that account, the amount that the assets of the 
account exceed the liabilities, if, at the end of any 
calendar year, the board of directors finds that 
the assets of the association in any account ex-
ceed the liabilities of that account as estimated 
by the board of directors for the coming year. 
(3) (a) Any person recovering under this part is 
considered to have assigned his rights under the 
policy to the association to the extent of his re-
covery from the association. Every insured or 
claimant seeking the protection of this chapter 
shall cooperate with the association to the same 
extent the person would have been required to 
cooperate with the insolvent insurer. The associ-
ation has no cause of action against the insured 
of the insolvent insurer for any sums the associa-
tion has paid out except those causes of action the 
insolvent insurer would have had if the sums had 
been paid by the insolvent insurer. When an in-
solvent insurer operates on a plan with assess-
ment liability, payments of claims of the associa-
tion do not reduce the liability of the insurer to 
the receiver, liquidator, or statutory successor for 
unpaid assessments. 
(b) The association shall have the right to re-
cover from the following persons the amount of 
any "covered claim" paid on behalf of such person 
pursuant to the act: 
(i) any insured whose net worth on De-
cember 31 of the year next preceding the 
date the insurer becomes insolvent, exceeds 
$50,000,000, and whose liability obligations 
to other persons are satisfied in whole or in 
part by payments made under this act; and 
(ii) any person who is an affiliate of the 
insolvent insurer and whose liability obliga-
tions to other persons are satisfied in whole 
or in part by payments made under this ac-
tion. 
(c) The receiver, liquidator, or statutory suc-
cessor of an insolvent insurer is bound by settle-
ments of covered claims by the association or a 
similar organization in another state. The court 
having jurisdiction shall grant these settled 
claims a priority equal to that which the claim-
ant would have been entitled to in the absence of 
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this chapter, against the assets of the insolvent 
insurer. The expenses, including legal fees, of the 
association or similar organization in handling 
claims are given the same priority as the liquida-
tor's expenses. 
(d) The association shall periodically file with 
the receiver or liquidator of the insolvent in-
surer, statements of the covered claims paid by 
the association and estimates of anticipated 
claims on the association. This filing preserves 
the rights of the association for claims against 
the assets of the insolvent insurer. 
(e) The association need not pay any claim 
filed after the final date under Sections 
31A-27-315 and 31A-27-328, or similar statutes 
of other states, for filing the same type of claim 
with the liquidator of the insolvent insurer. 1989 
31A-28-208. Assessments . 
(1) In order to provide the funds necessary to carry 
out the powers and duties of the association, the 
board of directors shall assess the member insurers, 
separately for each account, at the time and in the 
amount the board finds necessary. Assessments are 
due not less than 30 days after written notice to the 
member insurers and accrue interest at 10% per 
annum, or the then legal rate of interest provided in 
Section 15-1-1, whichever is greater, to the extent 
unpaid after the due date. 
(2) There are two classes of assessments as follows: 
(a) Oass A assessments are made to meet ad' 
ministrative costs and other general expenses. 
Class A assessments may be made whether or 
not they are related to a particular impaired or 
insolvent insurer. 
(b) Class B assessments for each account are 
made in the amount necessary to carry out the 
powers and duties of the association under Sec-
tion 31A-28-108 for an impaired or insolvent 
member insurer. 
(3) The amount of any Class A assessment is deter-
mined by the board. The assessment may not exceed 
$150 per member insurer in any one calendar year. 
(4) Class B assessments against member insurers 
for each account are in the proportion that the direct 
written premiums of the member insurer for the pre-
ceding calendar year on the kinds of insurance in the 
account bears to the net direct written premiums of 
all member insurers for the preceding calendar year 
on all kinds of insurance in the account. 
(5) No member insurer may be assessed in any 
year on any account for an amount greater than 2% of 
that member insurer's net direct written premiums 
for the preceding calendar year on the kinds of insur-
ance in the account. 
(6) If the maximum assessment, together with the 
other assets of the association in any account, do not 
provide in any one year in any account an amount 
sufficient to make all necessary payments from that 
account, the funds available shall be prorated and the 
unpaid portion shall be paid as soon as funds become 
available. 
(7) The association may exempt or defer, in whole 
or in part, the assessment of any member insurer, if 
the assessment would cause the member insurer's fi-
nancial statement to reflect amounts of capital or sur-
plus less than the minimum amounts required for a 
certificate of authority by any jurisdiction in which 
the member insurer is authorized to transact insur-
ance. 
(8) Each member insurer may set off against any 
assessment authorized payments made on covered 
claims and expenses incurred in the payment of the 
claims by the member insurer, if they are chargeable 
to the account for which the assessment is made. usi 
31A-28-209. Plan of operation. 
(1) The association shall submit to the commis-
sioner a plan of operation and any amendments nec-
essary or suitable to assure the fair, reasonable, and 
equitable administration of the association. The plan 
of operation and amendments are effective upon ap-
proval in writing by the commissioner. Any amend-
ments made after July 1, 1986, shall be made within 
18o days of the changed circumstance. 
(2) The plan of operation shall continue in force 
until modified by the commissioner or superseded by 
* Plan submitted by the association and approved by 
th$ commissioner. 
(3) All member insurers shall comply with the plan 
of operation. 
(4) The plan of operation shall, in addition to re-
quirements enumerated elsewhere in this chapter: 
(a) establish procedures for handling the as-
sets of the association; 
(b) establish the amount and method of reim-
bursing members of the board of directors under 
Section 31A-28-206; 
(c) establish regular places and times for meet-
ings of the board of directors; 
(d) establish procedures for records to be kept 
of all financial transactions of the association, its 
agents, and the board of directors; 
(e) establish the procedures on how selections 
for the board of directors shall be made and sub-
mitted to the commissioner; 
(D establish any additional procedures for as-
sessments under Section 31A-28-208; and 
(g) contain any additional provisions which 
are necessary or proper for the execution of the 
powers and duties of the association. 
(5) The plan of operation may provide that any or 
all of the powers and duties of the association, except 
those under Sections 31A-28-207 and 31A-28-208, are 
delegated to a corporation, association, or other orga-
nisation. This corporation, association, or organiza-
tion shall be reimbursed for any payments made on 
behalf of the association and shall be paid for its per-
formance of any function of the association. A delega-
tion under this subsection takes effect only with the 
approval of both the board of directors and the com-
missioner. 1966 
31A-28-210. Duties and powers of the commis-
sioner. 
U) In addition to the duties and powers enumer-
ated elsewhere in this part, the commissioner shall: 
(a) notify the association of the existence of an 
insolvent insurer not later than three days after 
he receives notice of the determination of the in-
solvency; 
(b) upon request of the board of directors, pro-
vide the association with a statement of the pre-
miums in this state for each member insurer. 
{2) (a) The commissioner may require that the as-
sociation notify the insureds of the insolvent in-
surer and any other interested parties of the de-
termination of insolvency and of their rights un-
der this part. This notification shall be by mail at 
their last known address, where available, but if 
sufficient information for notification by mail is 
not available, notice by publication in a newspa-
per of general circulation is sufficient. 
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(b) The commissioner may suspend or revoke, 
after notice and hearing, the certificate of au-
thority to transact insurance in this state of any 
member insurer that fails to pay an assessment 
when due or fails to comply with the plan of oper-
ation or the rules adopted. As an alternative, the 
commissioner may levy a fine on any member 
insurer that fails to pay an assessment when due. 
This fine shall not exceed 5% of the unpaid as-
sessment per month, except that no fine may be 
less than $100 per month. 
(c) The commissioner may revoke the designa-
tion of any servicing facility if he finds claims are 
being handled unsatisfactorily. 
(3) Any final action or order of the commissioner 
under this part is subject to judicial review in a court 
of competent jurisdiction. 1965 
31A-28-211. Repealed. 1966 
31A-28-212. Cred i t s for a s s e s s m e n t s paid. 
( D A member insurer may offset against its pre-
mium tax liability to this state an assessment de-
scribed in Section 31A-28-208, but only up to 20% of 
the amount of the assessment for each of the five 
calendar years following the year in which the assess-
ment was paid. If a member insurer ceases doing 
business, all uncredited assessments may be credited 
against its premium tax liabilities for the year it 
ceases doing business. 
(2) Any sums acquired by a member insurer as a 
refund from the association which previously had 
been offset against premium taxes as provided in 
Subsection (1) shall be paid immediately by the mem-
ber insurer to the State Tax Commission. 1986 
31A-28-213. Miscellaneous provisions. 
(1) (a) Any person who has a claim against an in-
surer under any provision in an insurance policy, 
other than a policy of an insolvent insurer that is 
also a covered claim, is required to first exhaust 
his right under his policy. Any amount payable 
on a covered claim under this part under an in-
surance policy is reduced by the amount of any 
recovery under that insurance policy. 
(b) Any person having a claim that may be 
recovered under more than one insurance guar-
anty association or its equivalent shall first seek 
recovery from the association of the place of resi-
dence of the insured. However, if this claim is a 
first-party claim for damage to property with a 
permanent location, he shall seek recovery first 
from the association of the location of the prop-
erty, and if this claim is a workmen's compensa-
tion claim, he shall seek recovery first from the 
association of the residence of the claimant. Any 
recovery under this part shall be reduced by the 
amount of recovery from any other insurance 
guaranty association or its equivalent. 
(2) Nothing in this part shall be construed to re-
duce the liability for unpaid assessments of the in-
sureds of an impaired or insolvent insurer operating 
under a plan with assessment liability. 
(3) Records shall be kept of all negotiations and 
meetings in which the association or its representa-
tives are involved to discuss the activities of the asso-
ciation in carrying out its powers and duties under 
Section 31A-28-207. Records of these negotiations or 
meetings shall be made public only upon the termina-
tion of a liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation 
proceeding involving the impaired or insolvent in-
surer, upon the termination of the impairment or in-
solvency of the insurer, or upon the order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction. This subsection does not limit 
the duty of the association to render a report of its 
activities under Section 31A-28-214. 
(4) For the purpose of carrying out its obligations 
under this part, the association is considered to be a 
creditor of the impaired or insolvent insurer, except 
to the extent of any amounts the association is enti-
tled as subrogee under Section 31A-28-207. 
(5) (a) Prior to the termination of any liquidation, 
rehabilitation, or conservation proceeding, the 
court may take into consideration the contribu-
tions of the respective parties, including the asso-
ciation, the shareholders, and the policyowners of 
the insolvent insurer, and any other party with a 
bona fide interest, in making an equitable distri-
bution of the ownership rights of the insolvent 
insurer. In making this determination, consider-
ation shall be given to the welfare of the policy-
holders of the continuing or successor insurer. 
(b) No distribution to stockholders, if any, of 
an impaired or insolvent insurer may be made 
until the total amount of valid claims of the asso-
ciation with interest on those claims for funds 
expended in carrying out its powers and duties 
under Section 31A-28-207 regarding this insurer 
have been fully recovered by the association. 
(6) A rehabilitator, liquidator, or conservator ap-
pointed under any section of this code may recover on 
behalf of the insurer for excessive distributions paid 
to affiliates, pursuant to Section 31A-27-322. 1986 
31A-28-214. Examination of the association — 
Annual report 
The association is subject to examination and regu-
lation by the commissioner. The board of directors 
shall submit, not later than March 30 of each year, a 
financial report for the preceding calendar year in a 
form approved by the commissioner together with a 
report of its activities during the preceding calendar 
year. 1985 
31A-28-215. Tax exemptions. 
The association is exempt from payment of all fees 
and taxes levied by this state or any of its subdivi-
sions, except taxes levied on real property. 1985 
31A-28-216. Asses smen t inc lus ion in p r e m i u m s . 
The rates and premiums charged for insurance pol-
icies that are covered under this part shall include 
amounts sufficient to reimburse amounts paid to the 
association by the member insurer, less any amounts 
returned to the member insurer by the association. 
The rates and premiums charged are not considered 
as excessive because they contain an amount reason-
ably calculated to recover assessments paid by the 
member insurer. The insured shall be advised of the 
nature of the increased rates or premiums. 1985 
31A-28-217. Immunity. 
(1) There is no liability on the part of and no cause 
of action of any nature shall arise against any mem-
ber insurer or its agents or employees, the association 
or its agents or employees, members of the board of 
directors, or the commissioner or his representatives, 
for any action or omission by them in effecting this 
part. 
(2) The state does not waive any defense under this 
part, including the defense of governmental immu-
nity. The state is not liable for any action or omission 
of the association, its members, or their respective 
agents or employees. The state is not liable for any 
failure of the association to perform its duties or to 
fulfill its stated purpose under this part. 1988 
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31A-28-218. Stay of proceedings — Tteopening 
default judgments. 
All proceedings in which the insolvent insurer is a 
party or is obligated to defend a party in any court in 
this state sha)) be stayed for a period not }ess than 60 
days nor more than six months from the date the 
insolvency is determined to permit proper defense by 
the association of all pending causes of action. As to 
any covered claims arising from a judgment under 
any decision, order, verdict, or finding based on the 
default of the insolvent insurer or its failure to defend 
an insured, the association either on its own behalf or 
on behalf of the insured may apply to have the judg-
ment, order, decision, verdict, or findings set aside by 
the same court or administrator that made the judg-
ment, order, decision, verdict, or finding and shall be 
permitted to defend against the claim on the merits. 
1987 
31A-28-219. Prospective application. 
This chapter applies to all liquidations commenced 
after July 1, 1986. For each liquidation in process on 
that date, the board of the Property and Casualty 
Insurance Guaranty Association shall, in the event of 
a conflict, apply to the court which issued the liquida-
tion order for an order specifying the extent to which 
this chapter applies to that liquidation. The court 
shall apply this title instead of former Title 31 to the 
maximum extent possible without affecting vested 
rights or creating serious administrative difficulties. 
1966 
31A-28-220. Termination of association's opera-
tion. 
(1) The commissioner shall by order terminate the 
operation of the Utah Property and Casualty Insur-
ance Guaranty Fund for any kind of insurance cov-
ered under this part when he finds there is in effect a 
statutory or voluntary plan that: 
(a) is a permanent plan that is adequately 
funded or where adequate funding is provided; or 
(b) extends, or will extend to residents and pol-
icyholders, protection and benefits regarding in-
solvent insurers which are not substantially less 
favorable and effective to residents and policy-
holders than the protection and benefits provided 
regarding the kinds of insurance covered under 
this part. 
(2) The commissioner shall, by the order under 
Subsection (1), authorize discontinuance of future 
payments by insurers to the Utah Property and Casu-
alty Insurance Guaranty Fund regarding the kinds of 
insurance that are the subject of the order. However, 
the assessments and payments shall continue, as nec-
essary, to liquidate covered claims of insurers who 
are adjudged insolvent prior to the order and to pay 
the related expenses not covered by any other plan. 
(3) If the operation of the insurance guaranty asso-
ciation is terminated under Subsection CI), the associ-
ation shall, as soon as possible, distribute the balance 
of monies and assets remaining, after discharging the 
functions of the association as to prior insurer insol-
vencies which were not covered by any other plan, 
together with related expenses, to the insurers that 
are then writing in this state policies of the kinds of 
insurance covered by this part, and that had made 
payments to the association. This reimbursement 
shall be pro rata, based upon the aggregate of the 
payments made by the respective insurers during the 
period of five years next preceding the date of the 
order. Upon completion of the distribution regarding 
all of the kinds of insurance covered by this part, this 
part shall terminate. 1966 
31A-28-221. Insolvencies — Recommendations 
and reports of board of directors. 
(1) Upon majority vote, the board of directors of the 
association may make recommendations and provide 
assistance to the commissioner for the detection and 
prevention of insurer insolvencies, and may respond 
to requests by the commissioner to discuss and make 
recommendations regarding the status of any mem-
ber insurer whose financial condition may be hazard-
ous to policyholders or the public. These recommen-
dations may not be considered public documents. 
(2) The board of directors of the association may, at 
the conclusion of any domestic insurer insolvency in 
which the association was obligated to pay covered 
claims, prepare a report on the history and causes of 
the insolvency, based on the information available to 
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(DA person, insurer, or authorized agency is im-
mune from civil action, civil penalty, or damages 
when in good faith that person, insurer, or authorized 
agency cooperates with, furnishes evidence, provides 
or receives information regarding suspected insur-
ance fraud to or received from: 
(a) the department or any division of the de-
partment; 
(b) any federal, state, or government agency 
established to detect and prevent insurance 
fraud; or 
(c) any agent, employee, or designee of an en-
tity listed in Subsection (l)(a) or (1Kb). 
(2) A person, insurer, or authorized agency is im-
mune from civil action, civil penalty, or damages if 
that person, insurer, or authorized agency complies in 
good faith with a court order to provide evidence or 
testimony requested by the entities described in Sub-
sections (l)(a) through (l)(c). 
(3) This section does not abrogate or modify com-
mon law or statutory rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties enjoyed by any person or entity. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision in this 
section, a person, insurer, or service provider is not 
immune from civil action, civil penalty or damages 
under this section if that person commits the fraudu-
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This chapter shall be known as the "Workers' Compensation 
Act." 1W7 
34A-2-102. Definition of terms. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Average weekly wages" means the average weekly 
wages as determined under Section 34A-2-409. 
(2) "Award" means a final order of the commission as to 
the amount of compensation due: 
(a) any injured employee; or 
(b) the dependents of any deceased employee. 
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and benefits 
provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act. 
(4) "Decision" means the ruling of an administrative 
law judge or, in accordance with Section 34A-2-801, the 
commissioner or Appeals Board and may include: 
(a) an award or denial of medical, disability, death, 
or other related benefits under this chapter or Chap-
ter 3. Utah Occupational Disease Act; or 
(b) another adjudicative ruling in accordance with 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. 
(5) "Director" means the director of the division, unless 
the context requires otherwise. 
(6) "Disability" means an administrative determina-
tion that may result in an entitlement to compensation as 
a consequence of becoming medically impaired as to 
function. Disability can be total or partial, temporary or 
permanent, industrial or nonindustrial. 
(7) "Division" means the Division of Industrial Acci-
dents. 
(8) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition reflect-
ing any anatomical or functional abnormality or loss. 
Impairment may be either temporary or permanent, in-
dustrial or nonindustrial. 
(9) "Order" means an action of the commission that 
determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immuni-
ties, or other interests of one or more specific persons, but 
not a class of persons. 
(10) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out of and 
in the course of employment" includes any injury 
caused by the willful act of a third person directed 
against an employee because of the employee's em-
ployment. 
(b) "Personal injury by accident arising out of and 
in the course of employment" does not include a 
disease, except as the disease results from the injury. 
(11) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment 
or place of employment, means the freedom from danger 
to the life or health of employees reasonably permitted by 
the nature of the employment. 
(12) "Workers* Compensation Fund of Utah" means the 
nonprofit, quasi-public corporation created in Title 31A, 
Chapter 33, Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 1*7 
34A-2-103. Employers enumerated and defined -
Regularly employed — Statutory employers. 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school 
district in the state are considered employers under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act 
prescribed in Sections 34A-2-105 and 34A-3-102, the state 
is considered to be a single ep-nloyer and includes any 
office, department, agency, a- V" *y, commission, board, 
institution, hospital, college, urn *rsity, or other instru-
mentality of the state. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, 
including each public utility and each independent contractor, 
who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in 
the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, 
is considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. As used in Subsection (2): 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual 
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of 
the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or 
for only a portion of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person en-
gaged in the performance of any work for another who, 
while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all 
that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to 
the routine rule or control of the employer, is engaged only 
in the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and 
is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrange-
ment under Title 58, Chapter 59, Employee Leasing 
Company Licensing Act, is considered the employer of 
leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation 
benefits for them by complying with Subsection 34A-2-
201(1 Xa) or (b) and commission rules. 
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite workers' com-
pensation secured in accordance with Subsection (3Xa) 
showing the leasing company as the named insured and 
each client company as an additional insured by means of 
individual endorsements. 
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the division as 
directed by commission rule. 
(d) The division shall promptly inform the Division of 
Occupation and Professional Licensing within the Depart-
ment of Commerce if the division has reason to believe 
that an employee leasing company is not in compliance 
with Subsection 34A-2-201(l)(a) or (b) and commission 
rules. 
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an em-
ployer under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act, if: 
(i) (A) the employer's employees are all members 
of the employer's immediate family; and 
(B) the employer has a proprietary interest in 
the farm where they work; or 
(ii) the employer employed five or fewer persons 
other than immediate family members for 40 hours or 
more per week per employee for 13 consecutive weeks 
during any part of the preceding 12 months, 
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one 
employee or more than one employee at least 40 hours per 
week is not considered an employer under this chapter 
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
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»5» An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic aer-
r^tf who is not considered an employer under this chapter 
r d Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, may come 
sider this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
fct. by complying with this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, and the rules of the commission. 
•6> (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for the employer by a 
contractor over whose work the employer retains super-
vision or control, and this work is a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all 
persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors 
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of 
these subcontractors, are considered employees of the 
original employer for the purposes of this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improv-
ing, repairing, or remodelling a residence that the person 
owns or is in the process of acquiring as the person's 
personal residence may not be considered an employee or 
employer solely by operation of Subsection (6)(a). 
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole 
proprietorship may not be considered an employee under 
Subsection (6)(a) if the employer who procures work to be 
done by the partnership or sole proprietorship obtains 
and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the partnership's or sole 
proprietorship's compliance with Section 34A-2-201 
indicating that the partnership or sole proprietorship 
secured the payment of workers' compensation ben-
efits pursuant to Section 34A-2-201; or 
(ii) if a partnership or sole proprietorship with no 
employees other than a partner of the partnership or 
owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' compen-
sation policy issued by an insurer pursuant to Sub-
section 31A-2M04(8)"stating that: 
(A) the partnership or sole proprietorship is 
customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, occupation, profession, or business; 
and 
(B) the partner or owner personally waives 
the partner 's or owner's entitlement to the ben-
efits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occu-
pational Disease Act, in the operation of the 
partnership or sole proprietorship. 
(d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be 
considered an employee under Subsection (6)(a) if the 
director or officer is excluded from coverage under Sub-
section 34A-2-104(4). 
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of 
the employer under Subsection (6)(a), if the employer who 
procures work to be done by the contractor or subcontrac-
tor obtains and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or sub-
contractor's compliance with Section 34A-2-201; or 
(ii) if a partnership, corporation, or sole proprietor-
ship with no employees other than a partner of the 
partnership, officer of the corporation, or owner of the 
sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy 
issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 3LA-21-
104(8) stating that: 
(A) the partnership, corporation, or sole pro-
prietorship is customarily engaged in an inde-
pendently established trade, occupation, profes-
sion, or business; and 
(B) the partner, corporate officer, or owner 
personally waives the partner 's , corporate offi-
cer's, or owner's entitlement to the benefits of 
this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, in the operation of the partnership's, 
corporation's, or sole proprietorship's enterprise 
under a contract of hire for services. 1997 
34A-2-104. "Employee," "worker," or "operative" de-
fined — Mining lessees and sublessees — Cor-
porate officers and directors — Real estate 
agents and brokers — Prison inmates. 
(1) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act, "employee," "worker," and "operative" 
mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any other 
person, in the service of the state, or of any county, city, 
town, or school district within the state, serving the state, 
or any county, city, town, or school district under any 
election or appointment, or underv- ' . .* contract of hire, 
express or implied, written or oralu> *ding each officer 
and employee of the state institutions of learning and 
members of the National Guard while on state active 
duty; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as 
defined in Section 34A-2-103, who employs one or more 
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment, under any contract of 
hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens 
and minors, whether legally or illegally working for hire, 
but not including any person whose employment is casual 
and not in the usual course of the trade, business, or 
occupation of the employee's employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under 
this chapter and Chapter 3, any lessee in mines or of mining 
property and each employee and sublessee of the lessee shall 
be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter 
and Chapter 3, and shall be subject to this chapter and 
Chapter 3 and entitled to its benefits to the same extent as if 
they were employees of the lessor drawing the wages paid 
employees for substantially similar work. The lessor may 
deduct from the proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an 
amount equal to the insurance premium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to 
include any partner of the partnership or owner of the sole 
proprietorship as an employee of the partnership or sole 
proprietorship under this chapter and Chapter 3. 
(b) If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes an 
election under Subsection (3)(a). it shall serve written 
notice upon its insurance carrier naming the persons to be 
covered. A partner of a partnership or owner of a sole 
proprietorship may not be considered an employee of the 
partner 's partnership or the owner's sole proprietorship 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, until this notice has been given. 
(c) For premium rate making, the insurance carrier 
shall assume the salary or wage of the partner or sole 
proprietor electing coverage under Subsection (3Ha) to be. 
100% of the state's average weekly wage. 
(4) (a) A corporation may elect not to include any director 
or officer of the corporation as an employee under this 
chapter and. Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act . 
(b) If a corporation makes an election under Subsection 
(4Xa), it shall serve written notice upon its insurance 
carrier naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. 
A director or officer of a corporation is considered an 
employee under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occu-
pational Disease Act, until this notice has been given. 
(5) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, "employee," 
"worker," and "operative" do not include: 
(a) a real estate sales agent or real estate broker, as 
defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that 
capacity for a real estate broker if: 
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(i) substantially all of the real estate sales agent's 
or associated broker's income for services is from real 
estate commissions; 
(ii) the services of the real estate sales agent or 
associated broker are performed under a written 
contract specifying that the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor; and 
(iii) the contract states that the real estate sales 
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as an 
employee for federal income tax purposes; or 
(b) an offender performing labor under Section 64-
13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or 
**egulation. 1997 
34A«2-105. Exclus ive remedy against employer, or offi-
cer, agent , or employee — Employee leas ing 
arrangements . 
ID The right to recover compensation pursuant to this 
chapter for injuries sustained by an employee, whether result-
ing it* death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the 
employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the Employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse, widow, 
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, 
on amount of any accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the em-
ployee in the course of or because of or arising out of the 
employee's employment, and no action at law may be main-
tained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or 
deatl^ of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee, or the employee's dependents, from 
filing a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance 
with Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) The exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to 
both the client company and the employee leasing company in 
an employee leasing arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, 
Employee Leasing Company Licensing Act. 
(3) (a) For purposes of this section: 
(i) "Temporary employee"means an individual who 
for temporary work assignment is: 
(A) an employee of a temporary staffing com-
pany; or 
(B) registered by or otherwise associated with 
a temporary staffing company. 
(ii) "Temporary staffing company" means a com-
pany that engages in the assignment of individuals as 
temporary full-time or part-time employees to fill 
assignments with a finite ending date to another 
independent entity. 
fb) If the temporary staffing company secures the pa.y-
ihent of workers'compensation in accordance with Section 
35A-3-201 for all temporary employees of the temporary 
staffing company, the exclusive remedy provisions of this 
Section apply to both the temporary staffing company and 
the client company and its employees and provide the 
temporary staffing company the same protection that a 
client company and its employees has under this section 
ft>r the acts of any of the temporary staffing company's 
temporary employees on assignment at the client com-
pany worksite. 1997 
34A«2-106. Injuries or death caused by wrongful i g | 
of persons other than employer, officer, agent, 
or employee o f employer — Rights of ea-
ployer or insurance carrier in cause of actios 
— Maintenance of act ion — Not ice of inten-
t ion to proceed against third party — Right to 
mainta in act ion not involv ing employee-en. 
p loyer re lat ionship — Disbursement of pro-
ceeds of recovery — Exclusive remedy. 
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation it 
payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person 
other than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of the 
employer: 
(a) the injujr T employee, or in case of death, the 
employee's dep** ~*:ts, may claim compensation; and 
(b) the injured employee or the employees heirs or 
personal representative may have an action for damages 
against the third person. 
(2) (a) If compensation is claimed and the employer or 
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, 
the employer or insurance carrier: 
(i) shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party; and 
(ii) may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or 
the employee's heirs or the personal representative of 
the deceased. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2Xa), an employer or 
insurance carrier may not settle and release a cause of 
Action of which it is a trustee under Subsection (2Xa) 
without the consent of the commission. 
(3) (a) Before proceeding against a third party, to give a 
person described in Subsections (3)(a)(i) and (ii) a reason-
able opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceed-
ing, the injured employee or, in case of death, the employ-
ee's heirs, shall give written notice of the intention to 
bring an action against the third party to: 
(i) the carrier; and 
(ii) any other person obligated for the compensa-
tion payments, 
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of death, the 
employee's heirs, shall give written notice to the carrier 
fcnd other person obligated for the compensation pay-
ments of any known attempt to attribute fault to the 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer, 
(i) by way of settlement; or 
(ii) in a proceeding brought by the injured em-
ployee, or, in case of death, the employee's heirs. 
(4) For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding 
Section 34A-2-103, the injured employee or the employee*! 
heirs
 0r personal representative may also maintain an action 
for damages against any of the following persons who do not 
occupy an employee-employer relationship with the injured or 
deceased employee at the time of the employee's injury or 
deatl i: 
(a) a subcontractor; 
(b) a general contractor; 
(c) an independent contractor; 
(d) a property owner; or 
(e) a lessee or assignee of a property owner. 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it 
shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5Xa) 
through (c). 
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ta> The reasonable expense of the action, including 
attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately 
against the parties as their interests may appear. Any fee 
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon 
my fee payable by the injured employee or, in the case of 
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against 
the third party. 
ib> The person liable for compensation payments shall 
be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys* fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the 
payments made as follows: 
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to 
the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the em-
ployer in the action against the third party if the 
combined percentage of fault attributed to persons 
immune from suit is determined to be less than 40% 
prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 
78-27-39(2); or 
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied 
by the percentage of fault attributed to the employer, 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the 
action against the third party if the combined per-
centage of fault attributed to persons immune from 
suit is determined to be 40% or more prior to any 
reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, 
or the employee's heirs in case of death, to be applied to 
reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing 
against the person liable for compensation. 
6» The apportionment of fault to the employer in a civil 
ir.icn against a third party is not an action at law and does 
:.:: impose any liability on the employer. The apportionment 
.:' fault does not alter or diminish the exclusiveness of the 
remedy provided to employees, their heirs, or personal repre-
sentatives, or the immunity provided employ*' ^lrsuant to 
Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102 for injuries f\ Tied by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not. Any court in 
which a civil action is pending shall issue a partial summary 
judgment to an employer with respect to the employer's 
jununity as provided in Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102, even 
•.rough the conduct of the employer may be considered in 
locating fault to the employer in a third party action in the 
aanner provided in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43. 1997 
WA-2-107. Appointment of workers' compensat ion ad-
visory counci l — Composit ion — Terms of 
members — Dut ies — Compensat ion. 
1 > The commissioner shall appoint a workers' compensa-
tion advisory council composed of: 
(a) the following voting members: 
(i) five employer representatives; and 
(ii) five employee representatives; and 
(b) the following nonvoting members: 
(i) a representative of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah; 
(ii) a representative of a private insurance carrier; 
(iii) a representative of health care providers; 
(iv) the Utah insurance commissioner; and 
(v) the commissioner or the commissioner's desig-
nee. 
(2) Employers and employees shall consider nominating 
members of groups who historically may have been excluded 
from the council, such as women, minorities, and individuals 
«ith disabilities. 
<3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (3Kb), as terms of 
current council members expire, the commissioner shall 
appoint each new member or reappointed member to a 
four-year term beginning July 1 and ending June 30. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection 
(3Xa), the commissioner shall, at the time of appointment 
or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure 
that the terms of council members are staggered so that 
approximately half of the council is appointed every two 
years. 
(4) (a) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unex-
pired term. 
(b) The commissioner shall terminate the terms of any 
council member who ceases to be representative as desig-
nated by the member's original appointment. 
(5) The council shall confer at least quarterly for the 
purpose of advising the commission, the division, and the 
Legislature on the Utah workers' compensation and occupa-
tional disease laws, the administration of them, and related 
rules. 
(6) The council shall offer advice on issues requested by the 
commission, the division, and the Legislature and also make 
recommendations to the commission and division regarding 
workers' compensation, rehabilitation, and reemployment of 
employees who are disabled because of an industrial injury or 
occupational disease. 
(7) The commissioner or the commissioner's designee shall 
serve as the chair of the council and call the necessary 
meetings. 
(8) The commission shall provide staff support to the coun-
cil. 
(9) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees 
may not receive compensation or benefits for their 
services, but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official 
duties at the rates established by the Division of 
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service, 
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members 
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from 
their agency for their service may receive per diem 
and expenses incurred in the performance of their 
official duties from the council at the rates estab-
lished by the Division of Finance under Sections 
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) State government officer and employee mem-
bers may decline to receive per diem and expenses for 
their service. 1997 
34A-2-108. Void agreements be tween employers and 
employees . 
(1) Except as provided in Section 34A-2-420, an agreement 
by an employee to waive the employee's rights to compensa-
tion under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, is not valid. 
(2) An agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the 
premium paid by his employer is not valid. 
(3) Any employer who deducts any portion of the premium 
from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to the 
benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act: 
(a) is guilty of a misdemeanor; and 
(b) shall be fined not more than $100 for each such 
offense. 1997 
34A-2-109. Interstate and intrastate commerce. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, apply to employers 
and their employees engaged in: 
(a) intrastate commerce; 
(b) interstate commerce; and 
(c) foreign commerce. 
(2) If a rule of liability or method of compensation is 
established by the Congress of the United States as to inter-
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^te or foreign commerce, this chapter and Chapter 3 apply 
°nly to the extent that: 
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3 has a mutual connection 
with intrastate work; and 
(b) the connection to intrastate work is clearly sepa-
rable and distinguishable from interstate or foreign com-
merce. 1907 
34A-2-110. Workers' compensation insurance fraud — 
Elements — Penalties — Notice. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in Subsec-
tion 76-2-201(3). 
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in Subsec-
tion 76-2-103(1). 
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 
76-2-103(2). 
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in Subsection 
76-1-601(8). 
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 
76-2-103(3). 
(2) (a) Any person is guilty of workers'compensation insur-
ance fraud if that person intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly: 
(i) devises any scheme or artifice to obtain workers' 
compensation insurance coverage, disability compen-
sation, medical benefits, goods, professional services, 
fees for professional services, or anything of value 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions; and 
(ii) communicates or causes a communication with 
another in furtherance of the scheme or artifice, 
(b) Workers' compensation insurance fraud under Sub-
section (2Ha) is punishable in the manner prescribed by 
Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud. 
(§) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of 
wo
*kers' compensation insurance fraud under the same Con-
d o n s as those set forth in Section 76-2-204. 
H) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
Subsection (2) shall be measured by the total value of all 
Property, money, or other things obtained or sought to be 
0Dtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (2), 
except as provided in Subsection 76-10-1801(l)(e). 
($) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary 
ele^ent 0f the offense described in Subsection (2). (§) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense 
described in Subsection (2) to permanently deprive any person 
°f Property, money, or anything of value is not a necessary 
ele*nent of this offense. 
O) An insurer or self-insured employer giving written no-
^
c e
 in accordance with Subsection (10) that workers'compen-
s a t e insurance fraud is a crime is not a necessary element of 
the offense described in Subsection (2). 
<§) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation 
h^-^rance coverage includes day scheme <rr&rti£ce ta make ar 
cause to be made any false written or oral statement or 
DUStness reorganization, incorporation, or change in owner-
sn
*J> intended to obtain insurance coverage as mandated by 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at 
rat
*s that do not reflect the risk, industry, employer, or class 
codts actually covered by the policy. 
(§) A scheme or artifice to obtain disability compensation 
incluc]es a scheme or artifice to collect or make a claim for 
teroporary disability compensation as provided in Section 
34A-2-410 while working for gain. 
(1.0) (a) Each insurer or self-insured employer who, in 
connection with this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act, prints, reproduces, or furnishes a form 
to any person upon which that person applies for im .^ 
ance coverage, reports payroll, makes a claim by reasoni 
accident, injury, death, disease, or other claimed Ion,» 
otherwise reports or gives notice to the insurer or te& 
insured employer, shall cause to be printed or displayed a 
comparative prominence with other content the stat*. 
ment: *Any person who knowingly presents false « 
fraudulent underwriting information, files or causes to be 
filed a false or fraudulent claim for disability compear. 
tion or medical benefits, or submits a false or fraudulent 
report or billing for health care fees or other professional 
services is guilty of a crime and may be subject to fine* 
and confinement in state prison." 
(b) Each insurer or self-insured employer who issues t 
check, warrant, or other financial instrument in payment 
of compensation issued under this chapter or Chapter 8, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall cause to be printed 
or displayed in comparative prominence above the am 
for endorsement the statement: "Workers' compensate 
insurance fraud is a crime punishable by Utah law.' 
(c) (i) The provisions of Subsections (10)(a) and (b) 
apply only to the legal obligations of an insurer on 
self-insured employer. 
(ii) A person who violates Subsection (2) is guilty of 
workers' compensation insurance fraud, and the fail-
ure of an insurer or a self-insured employer to fully 
comply with the provisions of Subsections (lOXa)aad 
(b) may not be: 
(A) a defense to violating Subsection (2); or 
(B) grounds for suppressing evidence. 
(11) In the absence of malice, a person, employer, insurer, or 
Sovernmental entity that reports a suspected fraudulent ad 
f a t i n g to a workers' compensation insurance policy or claim 
13
 hot subject to any civil liability for libel, slander, or any 
other relevant cause of action. 
(12) In any action involving workers' compensation, this 
section supersedes Title 31A, Chapter 31, Insurance Fraud 
A<
*. vm 
34\-2- l l l . Managed health care — Health care cost 
containment. 
, (l) Self-insured employers and workers' compensation car-
n e
*s may adopt a managed health care program to provide 
empi0yees the benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, beginning January 1, 1993. Thi 
Plan may include one or more of the following: 
-° (i) A preferred provider program may be developed 
. 'o long as the program allows a selection 'by the 
employee of more thar one physician in the health 
care specialty required for treating the specific prob-
lem of an industrial patient. If a preferred provider 
program is developed by an employer, insurance 
carrier, or self-insured entity, employees are required 
to use preferred provider physicians and medical care 
facilities. If a preferred provider program is not 
developed, an industrial claimant may have free 
choice of health care providers. Failure of an indus-
trial claimant to use a preferred health care facility 
as defined in Section 26-21-2 as part of a preferred 
provider program, or failure to initially receive treat-
ment from a preferred physician, may, if the claimant 
has been notified of the program, result in the claim-
ant being obligated for any charges in excess of the 
preferred provider allowances. 
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsec-
tion (lXaXi), a self-insured entity or other employer 
may: 
(A) have its own health care facility on or near 
its worksite or premises and continue to contrad 
with other health care providers; or 
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(B) operate a health care facility and require 
employees to first seek treatment at the provided 
health care or contracted facility. 
(iii) An employee of an employer using a preferred 
provider program or having its own health care 
facility may procure the services of any qualified 
practitioner: 
(A) for emergency treatment, if a physician 
employed in the program or at the facility is not 
available for any reason; 
(B) for conditions the employee in good faith 
believes are nonindustrial; or 
(C) when an employee living in a rural area 
would be unduly burdened by traveling to a 
preferred provider. 
(b) (i) Other contracts with medical care providers or 
medical review organizations may be made for the 
following purposes: 
(A) insurance carriers or self-insured employ-
ers may form groups in contracting for managed 
health care services with medical providers; 
(B) peer review; 
(C) methods of utilization review; 
(D) use of case management; and 
(E) bill audit. 
(ii) Insurance carriers may make any or all of the 
factors in Subsection (D(bXi) a condition of insuring 
entities in their insurance contract. 
(2) As used in Subsection (1), "physician" means any health 
are provider licensed under: 
(a) Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric Physician Licensing 
Act; 
(b) Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice 
Act; 
(c) Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act; 
(d) Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical 
Practice Act; 
(e) Title 58, Chapter 69, Dentist and Dental Hygienist 
Practice Act; 
(f) Title 58, Chapter 70, Physician Assistant Practice 
Act; 
(g) Title 58, Chapter 71, Naturopathic Physician Prac-
tice Act; 
(h) Title 58, Chapter 72, Acupuncture Licensing Act; 
and 
(i) Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Prac-
tice Act. 
(3) Each workers' compensation insurance carrier writing 
insurance in this state shall maintain a designated agent in 
this state registered with the division. 
(4) (a) In addition to managed health care plans, an insur-
ance carrier may require an employer to establish a work 
place safety program if the employer: 
(i) has an experience modification factor of 1.00 or 
higher, as determined by the National Council on 
Compensation Insurance; or 
(ii) is determined by the carrier to have a three-
year loss ratio of 100% or higher, 
(b) A workplace safety program may include: 
(i) a written workplace accident and injury reduc-
tion program that promotes safe and healthful work-
ing conditions, which is based on clearly stated goals 
and objectives for meeting those goals; and 
(ii) a documented review of the workplace accident 
and injury reduction program each calendar year 
delineating how procedures set forth in the program 
are met. 
(5) A written workplace accident and injury reduction pro-
pain permitted under Subsection UXbXi) should describe: 
CODE 34A-2-201 
(a) how managers, supervisors, and employees are re-
sponsible for implementing the program; 
-(b) how continued participation of management will be~ 
established, measured, and maintained; 
(c) the methods used to identify, analyze, and control 
new or existing hazards, conditions, and operations; 
(d) how the program will be communicated to all em-
ployees so that the employees are informed of work-
related hazards and controls; 
(e) how workplace accidents will be investigated and 
— corrective action implemented; and 
(f) how safe work practices and rules will be enforced. 
(6) The premiums charged to any employer who fails or 
refuses to establish a workplace safety program pursuant to 
Subsection (4Xb)(i) or (ii) may be increased by 5% over any 
existing current rates and premium modifications charged 
that employer. 1997 
34A-2-112. Administrat ion of this chapter and Chapter 
3 . 
(1) Administration of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, is vested in the commission to be 
administered through the division, the Division of Adjudica-
tion, and for administrative appeals through the commis-
sioner and the Appeals Board. 
(2) The commission: 
(a) has jurisdiction over every workplace in the state 
and may administer this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, and any rule or order issued 
under these chapters, to ensure that every employee in 
this state has a safe workplace in which employers have 
secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
for their employees in accordance with this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; 
(b) through the division under the supervision of the 
director, has the duty and full authority to take any 
administrative action authorized under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(c) through the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, 
and Appeals Board, provide for the adjudication and 
review of an administrative action, decision, or order of 
the commission in accordance with this title. 1997 
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35*1-1. Industrial Commission — Number of 
members — Appointment — Term — 
Compensation. 
(1) The Industrial Commission of Utah shall be 
composed of three members appointed by the gover-
nor with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
(2) The commissioners* terms of office shall be six 
years. The terms shall be staggered so that one term 
expires each odd-numbered year on March 1 of that 
year. Each commissioner shall hold office until a suc-
cessor is appointed and has qualified. 
(3) Not more than two members of the commission 
shall belong to the same political party. 
(4) The governor shall e'stablish the commis-
sioners' salary within the salary range fixed by the 
Legislature in Title 67, Chapter 22, Sta te Officer 
Compensation. 1992 
35-1-2. Act ions by and against commiss ion — 
Service of process. 
By its name "The Industrial Commission of Utah" 
said commission may sue and be sued. Service of sum-
mons or other process on any member of the commis-
sion, or on the secretary thereof, shall be deemed ser-
vice on the commission. 1953 
35-1-3. Commiss ioners — Removal from office. 
The governor a t any time may remove any member 
of the commission for inefficiency, neglect of duty, 
malfeasance or misfeasance in office or other good 
and sufficient cause. 1953 
35-1-4. Commiss ioners shall not hold other of-
fices — Exceptions. 
Each member of the Industrial Commission shall 
devote his full t ime and attention to his official duties 
and shall not hold any other office under the laws of 
this s ta te , except ex officio such offices or titles as 
may be conferred upon him by law. No member shall 
hold office under the laws of any other s tate or under 
the government of the United States, and shall not 
serve on any committee of any political party, but 
this provision shall not be construed to prevent any 
member from holding such nominal position or title 
as may be required by law as a condition to participa-
tion by the s ta te in any appropriation or allotment of 
any money, property or service which may be made or 
allotted for any of the functions of the commission, or 
of the insti tutions under its supervision, nor shall 
this provision be construed to prevent any member 
from acting as head or chief of any of the divisions, 
depar tments or bureaus which may be established for 
the operation of the commission in the performance of 
its duties, but in any such case no additional compen-
sation shall be paid to the member of the commission 
holding such office. 1953 
35-1-5. Commiss ioners — Oath — Bond . 
Each commissioner, before enter ing upon the du-
ties of his office, shall take and subscribe the consti-
tut ional oath of office, and file the same with the 
Division of Archives. Each member of the commission 
shall give a corporate surety bond in such amount 
and in such form as shall be determined by the Divi-
sion of Finance. All employees of the commission re-
ceiving or disbursing funds of the state shall give 
corporate surety bonds to the state in such amount 
and in such form as shall be determined by the Divi-
sion of Finance. The bond premiums shall be paid by 
the state. 19*4 
35-1-6. Chairman — Quorum. 
The governor shall designate one of its members as 
chairman. A majority of the commission shall consti-
tute a quorum to transact business. A single vacancy 
shall not impair the right of the remaining commis-
sioners to exercise all the powers of the commission 
while such vacancy exists. 1953 
35-1-7. Office in Salt Lake City — Sess ions at 
any place. 
The commission shall keep its office in Salt Lake 
City, and shall be furnished necessary rooms and of-
fice furniture; but the commission may hold sessions 
in any place within the state. 1977 
35-1-8. Seal — Judicial notice — Copies of 
records, evidence. 
The commission shall have an official seal for the 
authentication of its orders and proceedings, upon 
which shall be engraved, "The Industrial Commission 
of Utah" and such design as the commission may pre-
scribe. Courts in this state shall take judicial notice of 
the seal of the commission; and in all cases copies of 
orders, proceedings, or record in its office, certified by 
its secretary under its seal, shall be competent evi-
dence. A description and an impression of such seal 
shall be filed with the Division of Archives. 1934 
35-1-9. Office hours — Sessions public — 
Record of proceedings. 
The office of the commission shall be open for the 
transaction of business during all business hours of 
every day except legal holidays. The sessions of the 
commission shall be open to the public. All proceed-
ings of the commission shall be shown on its records, 
which shall be public records, and the vote of each 
member shall be cast as his name is called by the 
secretary, and each member's vote shall be recorded 
as cast. 1953 
35-1-10. Rules for procedure. 
Subject to the provisions of this title, the commis-
sion shall adopt and publish rules and regulations 
governing procedure before it, and shall prescribe 
forms of notices and the manner of serving the same 
in all claims for compensation, and may change the 
same from time to time in its discretion. Such rules 
and regulations shall include provisions for proce-
dures in the nature of conferences in order to dispose 
of cases informally, or to expedite claims adjudica-
tion, narrow issues and simplify the methods of proof 
at hearings. 1965 
35-1-11. Secretary — Assistants — Expenses. 
The commission may employ a secretary, actuaries, 
accountants, inspectors, examiners , experts, clerks, 
physicians, stenographers and other assistants , and 
fix their compensation. Such employment and com-
pensation shall be first approved by the depar tment 
of finance and the compensation shall be paid by the 
state. The members of the commission and its em-
ployees shall also be entitled to receive from the state 
their actual and necessary expenses while traveling 
on the business of the commission, and the members 
of the commission may confer and meet with officers 
of other s tates and officers of the United States, with 
the approval of the governor if outside the state, on 
any mat ters per ta ining to their official duties. Such 
expenses must be itemized and sworn to by the person 
who incurred the expense and must be approved by 
the commission. 1953 
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35*1-12. P laces of employment to be safe — Will-
ful neglect — Penalty. 
No employer shall construct or occupy or maintain 
any place of employment that is not safe, or require 
or knowingly permit any employee to be in any em-
ployment or place of employment which is not safe, or 
fail to provide and use safety devices and safeguards, 
or fail to obey and follow orders of the commission or 
to adopt and use methods and processes reasonably 
adequate to render such employment and place of em-
ployment safe, and no employer shall fail or neglect 
to do every other thing reasonably necessary to pro-
tect the life, health, safety and welfare of his em-
ployees. Where injury is caused by the willful failure 
of an employer to comply with the law or any lawful 
order of the industrial commission, compensation as 
provided for in this title shall be increased fifteen per 
cent, except in case of injury resulting in death. 1953 
35-1-13. Misconduct of employees . 
No employee shall remove, displace, damage, de-
stroy or carry away any safety device or safeguard 
provided for use in any employment or place of em-
ployment, or interfere in any way with the use 
thereof by any other person; nor shall any employee 
interfere with the use of any method or process 
adopted for the protection of any employee in his em-
ployment or place of employment, or fail or neglect to 
follow and obey orders and to do every other thing 
reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety 
and welfare of employees. 1953 
35-1-14. Penalty for failure to use safety device. 
Where injury is caused by the willful failure of the 
employee to use safety devices where provided by the 
employer, or from the employee's willful failure to 
obey any order or reasonable rule adopted by the em-
ployer for the safety of the employee, or from the in-
toxication of the employee, compensation provided for 
herein shall be reduced fifteen per cent, except in case 
of injury resulting in death. 1953 
35-1-15. Right of visitation. 
Any commissioner or any employee of the commis-
sion may enter any place of employment for the pur-
pose of collecting facts and statistics or examining the 
provisions made for the health, safety and welfare of 
the employees therein, and may bring to the atten-
tion of every employer any law, or any order of the 
commission, and any failure on the part of such em-
ployer to comply therewith. No employer shall refuse 
to admit any commissioner or any employee of the 
commission to his place of employment. 1953 
35-1-16. P o w e r s and duties of commiss ion — 
Fees. 
(1) The commission has the duty and the full 
power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the 
facts and apply the law in this or any other title or 
chapter that it administers and to: 
(a) supervise every employment and place of 
employment and to administer and enforce all 
laws for the protection of the life, health, safety, 
and welfare of employees; 
(b) ascertain and fix reasonable standards, and 
prescribe, modify, and enforce reasonable orders, 
for the adoption of safety devices, safeguards, and 
other means or methods of protection, to be as 
nearly uniform as possible, as necessary to carry 
out all laws and lawful orders relative to the pro-
tection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees in employment and places of employ-
ment; 
(c) ascertain, fix, and order reasonable stan-
dards for the construction, repair, and mainte-
nance of places of employment as shall make 
them safe; 
(d) investigate, ascertain, and determine rea-
sonable classifications of persons, employments, 
and places of employment as necessary to carry 
out the purposes of this title; 
(e) promote the voluntary arbitration, media-
tion, and conciliation of disputes between em-
ployers and employees; 
(f) establish and conduct free employment 
agencies, and license, supervise, and regulate 
private employment offices, and bring together 
employers seeking employees and working peo-
ple seeking employment, and make known the 
opportunities for employment in this state; 
(g) collect, collate, and publish statistical and 
other information relating to employees, em-
ployers, employments, and places of employment 
and such other statistics as it considers proper, 
and 
(h) ascertain and adopt reasonable standards 
and rules, prescribe and enforce reasonable or-
ders, and take such other actions as may be ap-
propriate for the protection of life, health, safety, 
and welfare of all persons with respect to all pros-
pects, tunnels, pits, banks, open cut workings, 
quarries, strip mine operations, ore mills, and 
surface operations or any other mining opera-
tion, whether or not the relationship of employer 
and employee exists, but the commission may not 
assume jurisdiction or authority over adopted 
standards and regulations or perform any mining 
inspection or enforcement of mining rules and 
regulations so long as Utah's mining operations 
are governed by federal regulations. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the com-
mission may adopt a schedule of fees assessed for ser-
vices provided by the commission. The fee shall be 
reasonable and fair, and shall reflect the cost of ser-
vices provided. Each fee established in this manner 
shall be submitted to and approved by the Legisla-
ture as part of the commission's annual appropria-
tions request. The commission may not charge or col-
lect any fee proposed in this manner without ap-
proval by the Legislature. Prior to submitting any 
proposed fee to the Legislature, the commission shall 
conduct a public hearing on the proposed fee. 1994 
35-1-17. Appointment of state council — Com-
position — Terms of members — Mem-
bership nominations — Compensation. 
(1) The Industrial Commission shall appoint a 
state council composed of: 
(a) five employer representatives; 
(b) five employee representatives; and 
(c) three members, one representing the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, one repre-
senting a private insurance carrier, and one 
representing health care providers, all of whom 
are nonvoting. 
(2) The Utah insurance commissioner shall serve 
on the state council as an ex officio nonvoting mem-
ber. 
(3) Employers and employees shall consider nomi-
nating members of groups who historically may have 
been excluded from the council, such as women, mi-
norities, and the disabled. 
(4) Each council member shall be appointed for a 
two-year term beginning July 1 and ending June 30. 
The first term shall begin July 1, 1992. The commis-
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sion shall terminate the terms of any council member 
who ceases to be representative as designated by his 
original appointment. The council shall confer at 
least quarterly for the purpose of advising the com-
mission and the Legislature on the Utah workers' 
compensation and occupational disease laws, the ad-
ministration of them, and related rules. 
(5) The council shall offer advice on issues re-
quested by the commission and the Legislature and 
also make recommendations to the commission re-
garding workers* compensation, rehabilitation, and 
reemployment of employees who are disabled because 
of an industrial injury or occupational disease. Mem-
bers of the council shall serve without pay, but they 
shall be entitled to all necessary expenses incurred in 
attending any meetings called by the council or com-
mission. 1993 
35-1-18. Chairman of counci l — Vot ing p o w e r s 
— Calling meet ings . 
The chairman of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah shall be ex officio chairman without vote of the 
state council herein provided for, and shall be 
charged with the responsibility of calling the neces-
sary meetings. 1953 
35-1-19. Invest igat ion of p laces of employment 
— Violations of rules or orders — Tem-
porary injunction. 
(1) Upon complaint by any person that any em-
ployment or place of employment, regardless of the 
number of persons employed, is not safe or is injuri-
ous to the welfare of any employee, the commission 
shall proceed, with or without notice, to make such 
investigation as may be necessary to determine the 
matter complained of. After such investigation, the 
commission shall enter such order relative thereto as 
may be necessary to render such employment or place 
of employment safe and not injurious to the welfare of 
the employees therein. For any Utah mine subject to 
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, the sole 
duty of the commission shall be to notify the appro-
priate federal agency of the complaint. Whenever the 
commission shall believe that any employment or 
place of employment is not safe or is injurious to the 
welfare of any employee, it may, of its own motion, 
summarily investigate the same, with or without no-
tice, and issue such order as it may deem necessary to 
render such employment or place of employment safe. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other penalty provided in 
this title, if any employer, after receiving notice, fails 
or refuses to obey the rules, regulations, or order of 
the commission relative to the protection of the life, 
health, safety, or welfare of any employee, the district 
court of Utah is empowered, upon petition of the com-
mission to issue, ex parte and without bond, a tempo-
rary injunction restraining the further operation of 
the employer's business. isss 
35-1-20. Orders of commission — Presumed 
lawful. 
All orders of the commission within its jurisdiction 
shall be presumed reasonable and lawful until they 
are found otherwise in an action brought for that pur-
pose, or until altered or revoked by the commission. 
1953 
35-1-21. When effective — Time for compl iance . 
All general orders of the commission shall take ef-
fect thirty days after their publication, unless other-
wise provided, and special orders shall take effect as 
therein directed. The commission shall, upon applica-
tion of any employer or any person, grant an exten-
sion of time for compliance with any order, if it finds 
such extension of time necessary. lsss 
35-1-22. Hear ing on i s sue of lawfulness . 
Any employer, or other person interested either be-
cause of ownership in or occupation of any property 
affected by any such order or otherwise, may petition 
for a hearing on the reasonableness and lawfulness of 
any order of the commission provided for in this title. 
1953 
35-1-23. Pet i t ion for hear ing — Contents . 
Such hearing shall be on verified petition filed with 
the commission, setting out specifically and in full 
detail the order upon which a hearing is desired and 
every reason why such order is unreasonable or un-
lawful and every issue to be considered by the com-
mission on the hearing. The petitioner shall be 
deemed to have waived all objection to any irregulari-
ties and illegalities in the order upon which a hearing 
is sought other than those set forth in the petition. 
1953 
35-1-24. Hearing — Procedure . 
Upon receipt of such petition, if the issues pre-
sented therein have theretofore been adequately con-
sidered, the commission shall determine the same by 
confirming, without hearing, its previous determina-
tion, or, if necessary to determine the issue presented, 
the commission shall order a hearing thereon and 
consider and determine the matter at such time as 
shall be prescribed. Notice of the time and place of 
such hearing shall be given to the petitioner and to 
such other persons as the commission may find di-
rectly interested therein. If the order complained of is 
found to be unlawful or unreasonable, the commis-
sion shall substitute therefor such other order as may 
be lawful and reasonable. 1953 
35-1-25. Extension of time for compl iance . 
Whenever at the time of final determination upon 
such hearing it shall be found that further time is 
necessary for compliance with the order of the com-
mission, it shall grant such time as may be reason-
ably necessary therefor. 1953 
35-1-26. Hearing condit ion precedent to action. 
No action, proceeding or suit to set aside, vacate or 
amend any such order of the commission, or to enjoin 
the enforcement thereof, shall be brought unless the 
plaintiff shall have so applied to the commission for a 
hearing thereon, and in the petition therefor shall 
have presented every issue presented by such action, 
proceeding or suit. 1953 
35-1-27. Witnesses — Oaths — Subpoena — Cer-
• tiflcates. 
Each of the commissioners and the secretary of the 
commission, for the purposes mentioned in this title, 
shall have power to administer oaths, certify to offi-
cial acts, issue subpoenas, compel attendance of wit-
nesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, 
documents and evidence. 1953 
35-1-28. Witnesses' fees . 
Each witness who shall appear before the commis-
sion by its order shall receive for his attendance the 
fees and mileage provided for witnesses in civil 
causes in the district court, which shall be audited 
and paid by the state in the same manner as other 
expenses are audited and paid, upon the presentation 
of properly verified vouchers approved by the chair-
man of the commission. But no witness subpoenaed at 
the instance of parties other than the commission 
shall be entitled to compensation from the state for 
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attendance or travel, unless the commission shall cer-
tify that his testimony was material to the matter 
investigated. 1953 
35-1-29. Depos i t ions . 
The commission or any party may in any investiga-
tion cause depositions of witnesses residing within or 
without the state to be taken as in civil actions. 1953 
35-1-30. R e c o r d of p r o c e e d i n g s before commis-
sion. 
A full and complete record shall be kept of all pro-
ceedings before the commission on any investigation. 
Testimony shall be recorded and may be transcribed 
when required by the commission for further analy-
sis, investigation, hearing, or court proceedings. 
Transcription requested by any party to the proceed-
ing shall be provided at the requesting party's ex-
pense. 1990 
35-1-31. Invest igations through representatives. 
For the purpose of making any investigation with 
regard to any employment or place of employment 
the commission shall have power to appoint, by an 
order in writing, any member of the commission, or 
any other competent person who is a resident of the 
state, as an agent, whose duties shall be prescribed in 
such order. In the discharge of his duties such agent 
shall have every power of an inquisitorial nature 
granted in this title to the commission, and the same 
powers as a referee appointed by a district court with 
regard to taking evidence. The commission may con-
duct any number of such investigations contempora-
neously through different agents, and may delegate 
to such agents the taking of evidence bearing upon 
any investigation or hearing. The recommendations 
made by such agents shall be advisory only and shall 
not preclude the taking of further evidence or further 
investigation if the commission so orders. 1953 
35-1-32. Attorney retained by commiss ion — 
Duties of attorney general and county 
and city attorneys. 
The commission may employ or retain counsel to 
represent the commission in proceedings to enforce 
actions of the commission or to defend the commis-
sion from actions brought against it. Upon the re-
quest of the commission, the attorney general, the 
county attorney, or city attorney of the locality in 
which any investigation, hearing, or trial is pending, 
in which the employee resides, or in which the em-
ployer resides or is doing business, shall aid in the 
representation of the commission. i990 
35-1-33. Orders not to be set aside on technicali-
ties. 
A substantial compliance with the requirements of 
this title shall be sufficient to give effect to the orders 
of the commission, and they shall not be declared in-
operative, illegal or void for any omission of a techni-
cal nature. 1953 
35-1-34. Actions to set aside orders. 
Any employer or other person in interest, being 
dissatisfied with any order of the commission requir-
ing protection of life, health, safety or welfare of em-
ployees in any employment or places of employment, 
may commence an action against the commission as 
defendant in the district court of the county where 
the property, plant or place of employment affected 
by such order lies, to set aside, vacate or amend any 
such order, on the ground that the order is unreason-
able or unlawful, and the district court is vested with 
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine 
such action. The commission shall be served with 
summons as in other civil actions. The answer of the 
commission shall be filed within ten days after ser-
vice of summons upon it, and with its answer it shall 
file a certified transcript of its record in such matter. 
Upon the filing of such answer the action shall be at 
issue, and shall be assigned for trial by the court, 
upon the application of either party, at the earliest 
possible date. 1953 
35-1-35. Cons iderat ion of all i s sues b y commis-
s ion a condit ion precedent. 
If upon the trial of such action it shall appear that 
all issues arising in such action have not theretofore 
been presented to the commission in the petition filed 
as provided in Section 35-1-23, or that the commis-
sion has not theretofore had ample opportunity to 
hear and determine any of the issues raised in said 
action, or for any reason has not in fact heard and 
determined the issues raised, the court shall, unless 
the parties to such action stipulate to the contrary, 
before proceeding to render judgment transmit to the 
commission a full statement of such issue or issues 
not adequately considered, and shall stay further pro-
ceedings in such action for fifteen days from the date 
of such transmittal, and may thereafter grant such 
further stay as may be necessary. Upon the receipt of 
such statement the commission shall consider the is-
sues not theretofore considered, and may alter, mod-
ify, amend or rescind its order complained of, and 
shall report its order thereon to the court, within ten 
days from the receipt of the statement from the court, 
for further hearing and consideration. The court shall 
thereupon order the pleadings to be so amended as to 
raise the issues resulting from such alteration, modi-
fication, amendment or rescission of the commission's 
order, and shall thereafter proceed with the action in 
the manner provided by law for other civil actions. 
1953 
35-1-36. Act ions to set as ide orders — Exclus ive 
jurisdict ion of the Supreme Court, dis-
trict courts and the Court of Appeals . 
No court, except the district court, Court of Ap-
peals, and the Supreme Court, has jurisdiction to re-
view, vacate, set aside, reverse, revise, correct, 
amend, or annul any order of the commission requir-
ing protection of life, health, safety, or welfare of em-
ployees in any employment or places of employment, 
or to suspend or delay the execution or operation 
thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the 
commission in the performance of its official duties. 
19SS 
35-1-37. Stay of proceedings — Supersedeas 
bond. 
The pendency of an action to set aside, vacate or 
amend an order of the commission shall not of itself 
stay the operation of an order of the commission; but 
during the pendency of the action the district court in 
its discretion may stay, in whole or in part, the opera-
tion of the commission's order. No order so staying or 
suspending an order of the commission shall be made 
by the court otherwise than upon three days' notice 
and after a hearing. In case the order is stayed, the 
order of the court shall not become effective until a 
supersedeas bond shall have been executed and filed 
in the action and approved by the court or the clerk 
thereof, payable to the state of Utah and sufficient in 
amount and security to ensure the prompt payment 
by the party complaining of all damages caused by 
the delay in the enforcement of the order of the com-
mission. 1953 
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35-1-38. Proceedings preferred on trial calen-
dars. 
All actions and proceedings under this title, and all 
actions or proceedings to which the commission or the 
state may be a party, in which any question arises 
under this title, or under or concerning any order of 
the commission, shall be advanced for trial or hearing 
over all other civil causes, except election and public 
utility causes, irrespective of position on the calen-
dar. The same preference shall be granted upon appli-
cation of the commission in any action or proceeding 
in which it may be allowed to intervene. 1953 
35-1-39. Violation of judgments, orders, decrees 
or provisions of act — Grade of of-
fense. 
If any employer, employee or other person violates 
any provision of this title, or does any act prohibited 
hereby, or fails or refuses to perform any duty law-
fully imposed, or fails, neglects or refuses to obey any 
lawful order given or made by the commission, or any 
judgment or decree made by any court in connection 
with the provisions of this title, such employer, em-
ployee or other person shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. 1953 
35-1-40. Each day's default a separate offense. 
Every day during which any person or corporation 
fails to observe and comply with any order of the com-
mission, or to perform any duty imposed by this title 
shall constitute a separate and distinct offense. 1953 
35-1-41. Furnishing information to commiss ion 
— Employers ' annual report — Rights 
of commiss ion — Examinat ion of em-
ployers under oath — Penalties. 
(1) Every employer shall furnish the commission, 
upon request, all information required by it to carry 
out the purposes of this title. In the month of July of 
each year every employer shall prepare and mail to 
the commission a statement containing the following 
information: 
(a) the number of persons employed during the 
preceding year from July 1, to June 30, inclusive; 
(b) the number of such persons employed at 
each kind of employment; 
(c) the scale of wages paid in each class of em-
ployment, showing the minimum and maximum 
wages paid; and 
(d) the aggregate amount of wages paid to all 
employees. 
(2) The information shall be furnished on blanks to 
be prepared by the commission and furnished to em-
ployers free of charge upon request. Every employer 
shall cause the blanks to be properly filled out so as to 
answer fully and correctly all questions therein pro-
pounded, and shall give all the information therein 
sought, or, if unable to do so, the employer shall give 
to the commission, in writing, good and sufficient rea-
sons for the failure. 
(3) The commission may require the information 
required by this title to be furnished to be made un-
der oath and returned to the commission within the 
period fixed by it or by law. The commission, or any 
member thereof, or any person employed by the com-
mission for that purpose, shall have the right to ex-
amine, under oath, any employer, his agents or em-
ployees, for the purpose of ascertaining any informa-
tion that the employer is required by this title to fur-
nish to the commission. 
(4) Any employer who, within a reasonable time to 
be fixed by the commission and after the receipt of 
written notice signed by at least two members of the 
commission specifying the information demanded and 
served by certified mail, refuses to furnish to the com-
mission the annual statement required by this sec-
tion, or who refuses to furnish other information as 
may be required by the commission under authority 
of this section, or who willfully furnishes a false or 
untrue statement shall be liable to a penalty of not to 
exceed $500 for each offense to be recovered in a civil 
action brought by and in the name of the commission. 
All such penalties when collected shall be paid into 
the combined injury benefit fund. 1994 
35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — 
Regularly employed — Statutory em-
ployers . 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and 
school district in the state are considered em-
ployers under this title. 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in 
this title prescribed in Sections 35-1-60 and 
35-2-3, the state is considered to be a single em-
ployer and includes any office, department, 
agency, authority, commission, board, institu-
tion, hospital, college, university, or other instru-
mentality of the state. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each per-
son, including each public utility and each indepen-
dent contractor, who regularly employs one or more 
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or 
about the same establishment, under any contract of 
hire, express or implied, oral or written is considered 
an employer under this title. As used in this subsec-
tion: 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in 
the usual course of the trade, business, profes-
sion, or occupation of the employer, whether con-
tinuous throughout the year or for only a portion 
of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any per-
son engaged in the performance of any work for 
another who, while so engaged, is independent of 
the employer in all that pertains to the execution 
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of 
the employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordi-
nate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing 
arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, Em-
ployee Leasing Company Licensing Act, is con-
sidered the employer of leased employees and 
shall secure workers' compensation benefits for 
them by complying with Subsection 35-l-46(l)(a) 
or (b) and commission rules. 
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite such a 
risk showing the leasing company as the named 
insured and each client company as an additional 
insured by means of individual endorsements. 
(c) Endorsements must be filed with the com-
mission as directed by rule. 
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered 
an employer under this title if: 
(i) his employees are all members of his 
immediate family and he has a proprietary 
interest in the farm where they work; or 
(ii) he employed five or fewer persons 
other than immediate family members for 40 
hours or more per week per employee for 13 
consecutive weeks during any part of the 
preceding 12 months. 
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ 
one employee or more than one employee at least 
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40 hours per week is not considered an employer 
under this title. 
(5) An employer of agricultural laborers or domes-
tic servants who is not under this title has the right 
and option to come under it by complying with its 
provisions and the rules of the commission. 
(6) (a) If any person who is an employer procures 
any work to be done wholly or in part for him by 
a contractor over whose work he retains supervi-
sion or control, and this work is a part or process 
in the trade or business of the employer, the con-
tractor, all persons employed by him, all subcon-
tractors under him, and all persons employed by 
any of these subcontractors, are considered em-
ployees of the original employer. 
(b) A general contractor may not be considered 
to have retained supervision or control over the 
work of a subcontractor solely because of the cus-
tomary trade relationship between general con-
tractors and subcontractors. 
(c) A portion of a construction project subcon-
tracted to others may be considered to be a part 
or process in the trade or business of the general 
building contractor, only if the general building 
contractor, without regard to whether or not it 
would need additional employees, would perform 
the work in the normal course of its trade or busi-
ness. 
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing, 
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence 
that he owns or is in the process of acquiring as 
his personal residence may not be considered an 
employee or employer solely by operation of Sub-
section (a). 
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a 
sole proprietorship may not be considered an em-
ployee under Subsection (a) if: 
(i) the person is not included as an em-
ployee under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a); or 
(ii) the person is included as an employee 
under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), but his em-
ployer fails to insure or otherwise provide 
adequate payment of direct compensation, 
which failure is attributable to an act or 
omission over which the person had or 
shared control or responsibility. 
(f) For purposes of Subsection (e)(ii): 
(i) a partner of a partnership and an 
owner of a sole proprietorship are presumed 
to have had or shared control or responsibil-
ity for any failure to insure ox otherwise pro-
vide adequate payment of direct compensa-
tion, the burden of proof being on any person 
seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing 
that a partner of a partnership or an owner 
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control 
or responsibility for any failure to insure or 
otherwise provide adequate payment of di-
rect compensation may only be overcome by 
clear and convincing evidence to the con-
trary. 
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may 
not be considered an employee under Subsection 
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from cov-
erage under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(b). iro 
35-1*43. "Employee," "worker" or "workmen,n 
and "operative" defined — Mining lea-
sees and sublessees — Partners and 
sole proprietors —> Corporate officers 
and directors — Real estate agents and 
brokers. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee,* "worker" 
or "workmen/* and "operative" mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and 
any other person, in the service of the state, or of 
any county, city, town, or school district within 
the state, serving the state, or any county, city, 
town, or school district under any election or ap-
pointment, or under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, written or oral, including each officer 
and employee of the state institutions of learning 
and members of the National Guard while on 
state active duty; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, 
as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or 
more workers or operatives regularly in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, 
oral or written, including aliens and minors, 
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but 
not including any person whose employment is 
casual and not in the usual course of the trade, 
business, or occupation of his employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an em-
ployer under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of 
mining property and each employee and sublessee of 
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the 
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this 
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent 
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such 
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar 
work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insur-
ance premium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may 
elect to include as an employee under this chap-
ter any partner of the partnership or the owner of 
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole 
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve 
written notice upon its insurance carrier and 
upon the commission naming the persons to be 
covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of 
a sole proprietorship is considered an employee 
under this chapter until this notice has been 
given. For premium rate making, the insurance 
carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the 
employee to be 150% of the state's average 
weekly wage. 
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any 
director or officer of the corporation as an em-
ployee under this chapter. If a corporation makes 
this election, it shall serve written notice upon 
its insurance carrier and upon the commission 
naming the persons to be excluded from cover-
age. A director or officer of a corporation is con-
sidered an employee under this chapter until this 
notice has been given. 
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real 
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Sec-
tion 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for 
a real estate broker if: 
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's 
or associated broker's income for services is from 
real estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or asso-
ciated broker are performed under a written con-
tract specifying that the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor; and 
(c) the contract states that the real estate 
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as 
an employee for federal income tax purposes. 
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workman," and "operative" do not include an of-
fender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 
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64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or reg-
ulation. 1993 
35-1-44. Definition of terms. 
The following terms as used in this title shall be 
construed as follows: 
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the av-
erage weekly earnings arrived at by the rules 
provided in Section 35-1-75. 
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of 
the commission as to the amount of compensation 
due any injured, or the dependents of any de-
ceased, employee. 
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and 
benefits provided for in this title. 
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically im-
paired as to function. Disability can be total or 
partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or 
nonindustrial. 
(5) "General order" means an order applying 
generally throughout the state to all persons, em-
ployments, or places of employment of a class un-
der the jurisdiction of the commission. All other 
orders of the commission shall be considered spe-
cial orders. 
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition 
reflecting any anatomical or functional abnor-
mality or loss. Impairment may be either tempo-
rary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial. 
(7) "Order" means any decision, rule, regula-
tion, direction, requirement or standard of the 
commission, or any other determination arrived 
at, or decision made, by the commission. 
(8) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out 
of and in the course of employment" includes 
any injury caused by the willful act of a third 
person directed against an employee because 
of his employment. 
(b) The term does not include a disease, 
except as the disease results from the injury. 
(9) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any em-
ployment or place of employment, means the 
freedom from danger to the life, health, or wel-
fare of employees reasonably permitted by the 
nature of the employment. 
(10) "Welfare" means comfort, decency, and 
moral well-being. 1991 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents 
to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury oc-
curred, if the accident was not purposely self-in-
flicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medi-
cines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsi-
bility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and fu-
neral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee. I9ss 
35-1-46. Employers to secure workers' compen-
sation benefits for employees — 
Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunc-
tion — Violation. 
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, 
and school districts, shall secure the payment of 
workers' compensation benefits for their employees: 
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of this compensation with the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments 
shall commence within 30 days after any final 
award by the commission; 
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of this compensation with any stock corpo-
ration or mutual association authorized to trans-
act the business of workers' compensation insur-
ance in this state, which payments shall com-
mence within 30 days after any final award by 
the commission; or 
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission 
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct 
compensation in the amount, in the manner, and 
when due as provided for in this title, which pay-
ments shall commence within 30 days after any 
final award by the commission. In these cases the 
commission may in its discretion require the de-
posit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to 
secure the payment of compensation liabilities as 
they are incurred, and may at any time change or 
modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if 
in its judgment this action is necessary or desir-
able to secure or assure a strict compliance with 
all the provisions of law relating to the payment 
of compensation and the furnishing of medical, 
nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and bur-
ial expenses to injured employees and to the de-
pendents of killed employees. The commission 
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privi-
lege as a self-insurer. 
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered 
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin 
any employer, within the provisions of this chapter, 
from further operation of the employer's business, 
where the employer has failed to provide for the pay-
ment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in 
this section. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, 
the court shall enjoin the further operation of the 
employer's business until the payment of these bene-
fits has been secured by the employer as required by 
this section. The court may enjoin the employer with-
out requiring bond from the commission. 
(3) If the commission has reason to believe that an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting a 
business without securing the payment of compensa-
tion in one of the three ways provided in this section, 
the commission may give such employer five days' 
written notice by registered mail of such noncompli-
ance and if the employer within said period does not 
remedy such default, the commission may file suit as 
provided in this section and the court is empowered, 
ex parte, to issue without bond a temporary injunc-
tion restraining the further operation of the em-
ployer's business. 1989 
35-1-46.10. Notice of noncompliance to em-
ployer — Enforcement power of com-
mission — Penalty. 
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 
35-1-46, if the commission has reason to believe that 
an employer of one or more employees is conducting 
business without securing the payment of benefits in 
one of the three ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the 
commission may give that employer written notice of 
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known 
address of the employer. 
(2) If the employer does not remedy the default 
within 15 days after delivery of this notice, the com-
mission may issue an order requiring the employer to 
appear before the commission and show cause why 
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the employer should not be ordered to comply with 
the provisions of Section 35-1-46. 
(3) If it is found that the employer has failed to 
provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three 
ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the commission 
may order any employer to comply with the provi-
sions of Section 35-1-46. 
(4) The commission may also impose, at the time of 
the hearing, a penalty against the employer of not 
more than one and one-half times the amount of the 
premium the employer would have paid for workers' 
compensation insurance had that employer been in-
sured by the Workers* Compensation Fund of Utah 
during the period of noncompliance. 
(5) This penalty shall be deposited in the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund created by Section 35-1-107 
and used for the purposes of that fund. 1987 
35-1-46.20. Requirements of any order of the 
commiss ion — Court enforcement 
(1) Any order issued by the commission under au-
thority of Section 35-1-46.10 shall: 
(a) be in writing; 
(b) be sent by certified mail to the last-known 
address of the employer; 
(c) state the findings and order of the commis-
sion; and 
(d) specify its effective date, which may be im-
mediate or may be at a later date. 
(2) The order of the commission, upon application 
by the commission made on or after the effective date 
of the order to a court of general jurisdiction in any 
county in this state, may be enforced by an order to 
comply entered ex parte and without notice by the 
court. 1994 
35-1-46.30. Employer's penalty for violation — 
Notice of noncompliance — Proof re-
quired — Admissible evidence — Crim-
inal prosecution. 
(1) Any employer who fails to comply, and every 
officer of a corporation or association which fails to 
comply, with the provisions of Section 35-1-46 is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Each day's failure to 
comply is a separate offense. All funds, fines, or pen-
alties collected or assessed shall be deposited in the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section 
35-1-107 and used for the purposes of that fund. If the 
commission has sent written notice of noncompliance 
by certified mail to the last-known address of the em-
ployer, corporation, or officers of a corporation or as-
sociation, and the employer, corporation, or officers 
do not within ten days provide to the commission 
proof of compliance, the notice and failure to provide 
proof constitutes prima facie evidence that the em-
ployer, corporation, or officers were in violation of 
this section. 
(2) If the commission has reason to believe that an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting 
business without securing the payment of compensa-
tion in one of the three ways provided in Section 
35-1-46, the commission may give the employer, or in 
the case of an employer corporation, the corporation 
or the officers of the corporation, notice of noncompli-
ance by certified mail to the last-known address of 
the employer, corporation, or officers, and if the em-
ployer, corporation, or officers do not, within ten 
days, provide to the commission proof of compliance, 
the employer and every officer of an employer corpo-
ration is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Each day's 
failure to comply is a separate offense. All funds, 
fines, or penalties collected or assessed shall be depos-
ited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by 
Section 35-1-107 and used for the purposes of that 
fund. 
(3) All forms and records kept by the Industrial 
Commission or its designee pursuant to Section 
35-1-47 are admissible as evidence to establish non-
compliance under this section. 
(4) The commission is authorized and empowered 
to prosecute a criminal action in the name of the state 
to enforce the provisions of this title. 1994 
35-1-47. Notification of workers* compensation 
insurance coverage to Industrial Com-
mission — Cancellation requirements 
— Penalty for violation. 
(1) Every insurance carrier writing workers' com-
pensation insurance coverage in this state or for this 
state, regardless of the state in which the policy is 
written, shall file notification of that coverage with 
the Industrial Commission or its designee within 30 
days after the inception date of the policy on forms 
prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Division of 
the Industrial Commission. These policies will be in 
effect from inception until canceled by filing with the 
commission or its designee a notification of cancella-
tion on forms prescribed by the Workers' Compensa-
tion Division within ten days after the cancellation of 
a policy. Failure to notify the commission or its desig-
nee will result in the continued liability of the carrier 
until the date that notice of cancellation is received 
by the commission or its designee. Filings shall be 
made within 30 days of the reinstatement of a policy, 
the changing or addition of a name or address of the 
insured, or the merger of an insured with another 
entity. All filings shall include the name of the in-
sured, the principal business address, any and all as-
sumed name designations, the address of all locations 
within this state where business is conducted, and 
after July 1, 1987, all federal employer identification 
numbers or federal tax identification numbers. Non-
compliance with the provisions of this section is 
grounds for revocation of an insurance carrier's certif-
icate of authority in addition to the grounds specified 
in Title 31 A. 
(2) The commission may assess an insurer up to 
$150, payable to the Uninsured Employers' Fund, if 
the insurer fails to comply with the provisions of this 
section. 1986 
35-1-48. Repealed. 1977 
35-1-49. State department, commission, board, 
or other agency to pay premiums di-
rect to Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah. 
Each department, commission, board or other 
agency of the state shall pay the insurance premium 
on its employees direct to the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah. iss* 
35-1-50,35-1-51. Repealed. 1988, 1990 
35-1-52. Agreements in addition to compensa-
tion and benefits. 
(1) (a) Subject to the approval of the commission, 
any employer securing the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits for its employees under 
Section 35-1-46 may enter into or continue any 
agreement with his employees to provide com-
pensation or other benefits in addition to the 
compensation and other benefits provided by this 
title. 
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(b) An agreement may not be approved if it 
requires contributions from the employees, un-
less it confers benefits in addition to those pro-
vided under this title at least commensurate with 
the contributions. 
(c) An agreement for additional benefits may 
be terminated by the commission, after a hearing 
on reasonable notice to the interested parties, if 
it appears that the agreement is not fairly ad-
ministered, or if its operation discloses defects 
threatening its solvency, or if for any substantial 
reason it fails to accomplish the purposes of this 
title. 
(d) If the agreement is terminated, the com-
mission shall determine the proper distribution 
of any remaining assets. 
(2) (a) Any employer who makes a deduction from 
the wages or salary of any employee to pay for 
the statutory benefits of this title is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(b) However, subject to the supervision of the 
commission, nothing in this title may be con-
strued as preventing the employer and his em-
ployees from entering into mutual contracts and 
agreements respecting hospital benefits and ac-
commodations, medical and surgical services, 
nursing, and medicines to be furnished to the em-
ployees as provided in this title if no direct or 
indirect profit is made by any employer as a re-
sult of the contract or agreement. 
(3) The purpose and intent of this section is that, 
where hospitals are maintained and medical and sur-
gical services and medicines furnished by the em-
ployer from payments by, or assessments on, his em-
ployees, the payments or assessments may not be 
more or greater than necessary to make these bene-
fits self-supporting for the care and treatment of his 
employees. Money received or retained by the em-
ployer from the employees for the purpose of these 
benefits shall be paid and applied to these services. 
Any hospitals so maintained in whole or in part by 
payments or assessment of employees are subject to 
the inspection and supervision of the commission as 
to services and treatment rendered to the employees. 
1992 
35-1-53. Assessment on employers and counties, 
cities, towns, or school districts paying 
compensation direct. 
(1) (a) An employer, including a county, city, 
town, or school district, who by authority of the 
commission under Section 35-1-46 is authorized 
to pay compensation direct shall pay annually, 
on or before March 1, an assessment of the same 
percentage as required by law to be paid by an 
insurance company upon its premiums, based 
upon an amount equivalent to premiums, that 
would be paid by the employer, if insured in the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah; the as-
sessment is to be computed and collected by the 
State Tax Commission and paid by it into the 
state treasury as provided in Subsection 
59-9-101(2). 
(b) An employer whose total assessment obli-
gation under Subsection (1) for the preceding 
year was $10,000 or more shall pay the assess-
ment in quarterly installments in the same man-
ner provided in Section 59-9-104 and subject to 
the same penalty provided in Section 59-9-104 for 
not paying or underpaying an installment 
(2) The State Tax Commission shall have access to 
all the records of the office of the Industrial Commis-
sion for the purpose of computing and collecting any 
amounts described in this section. 1994 
35-1-54. Employee injured outside state — Enti-
tled to compensat ion — Limitation of 
time. 
If an employee who has been hired or is regularly 
employed in this state receives personal injury by ac-
cident arising out of and in the course of such employ-
ment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in 
case of his death, shall be entitled to compensation 
according to the law of this state. This provision shall 
apply only to those injuries received by the employee 
within six months after leaving this state, unless 
prior to the expiration of such six months period the 
employer has filed with the Industrial Commission of 
Utah notice that he has elected to extend such cover-
age a greater period of time. 1953 
35-1-55. Exemptions on employees temporarily 
in state — Conditions — Evidence of 
insurance. 
(1) Any employee who has been hired in another 
state and his employer are exempt from this chapter 
while the employee is temporarily within this state 
doing work for his employer if: 
(a) the employer has furnished workers' com-
pensation insurance coverage under the workers' 
compensation or similar laws of the other state; 
(b) the coverage covers the employee's employ-
ment while in this state; and 
(c) (i) the extraterritorial provisions of this 
chapter are recognized in the other state and 
employers and employees who are covered in 
this state are likewise exempted from the ap-
plication of the workers' compensation or 
similar laws of the other state; or 
(ii) the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah is an admitted insurance carrier in the 
other state or has agreements with such a 
carrier and is able to furnish workers' com-
pensation insurance or similar coverage to 
Utah employers and their subsidiaries or af-
filiates doing business in the other state. 
(2) The benefits under the workers' compensation 
or similar laws of the other state are the exclusive 
remedy against an employer for any injury, whether 
resulting in death or not, received by an employee 
while working for the employer in this state. 
(3) A certificate from an authorized officer of the 
industrial commission or similar department of the 
other state certifying that the employer is insured in 
the other state and has provided extraterritorial cov-
erage insuring his employees while working in this 
state is prima facie evidence that the employer car-
ries compensation insurance. 1993 
35-1-56. Compliance with act — Notice to em-
ployees. 
Each employer providing insurance, or electing di-
rectly to pay compensation to his injured, or the de-
pendents of his killed employees, as herein provided, 
shall post in conspicuous places about his place of 
business typewritten or printed notices stating, that 
he has complied with the provisions of this title and 
all the rules and regulations of the commission made 
in pursuance thereof, and if suet is the case, that he 
has been authorized by the commission directly to 
compensate such employees or dependents; and the 
same, when so posted, shall constitute sufficient no-
tice to his employees of the fact that he has complied 
with the law as to securing compensation to his em-
ployees and their dependents. 1977 
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35-1-57. Noncompliance — Penalty. 
Employers who shall fail to comply with the provi-
sions of Section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the 
benefits of this title during the period of noncompli-
ance, but shall be liable in a civil action to their em-
ployees for damages suffered by reason of personal 
injuries arising out of or in the course of employment 
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the 
employer or any of the employer's officers, agents or 
employees, and also to the dependents or personal 
representatives of such employees where death re-
sults from such injuries. In any such action the defen-
dant shall not avail himself of any of the following 
defenses: the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the 
defense of assumption of risk, or the defense of con-
tributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall consti-
tute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of 
the employer and the burden shall be upon the em-
ployer to show freedom from negligence resulting in 
such injury. And such employers shall also be subject 
to the provisions of Sections 35-1-58 and 35-1-59. In 
any civil action permitted under this section against 
the employer the employee shall be entitled to neces-
sary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed 
against the employer. 18*4 
35-1-58. Rights of employees where employer 
fails to comply. 
Any employee, whose employer has failed to com-
ply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46, who has 
been injured by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment, wheresoever such injury 
occurred, if the same was not purposely self-inflicted, 
or his dependents in case death has ensued, may, in 
lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action 
in the courts as provided in the last preceding section 
[Section 35-1-57], file his application with the com-
mission for compensation in accordance with the 
terms of this title, and the commission shall hear and 
determine such application for compensation as in 
other cases; and the amount of compensation which 
the commission may ascertain and determine to be 
due to such injured employee, or his dependents in 
case death has ensued, shall be paid by such employer 
to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after 
receiving notice of the amount thereof as so fixed and 
determined by the commission. 1943 
35-1-59. Docketing awards in district court — 
Enforcing j u d g m e n t 
An abstract of any award may be filed in the office 
of the clerk of the district court of any county in the 
state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of 
the district court thereof. The time of the receipt of 
the abstract must be noted by him thereon and en-
tered in the docket. When so filed and docketed the 
award shall constitute a lien from the time of such 
docketing upon the real property of the employer sit-
uated in the county, for a period of eight years from 
the date of the award unless previously satisfied. Ex-
ecution may be issued thereon within the same time 
and in the same manner and with the same effect as 
if said award were a judgment of the district court. 
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the 
time of the injury, the county attorney for the county 
in which the applicant or the employer resides, de-
pending on the district in which the final award is 
docketed, shall enforce the judgment when requested 
by the industrial commission. Where the action to 
enforce a judgment is initiated by other counsel, rea-
sonable attorney's fees and court costs shall be al-
lowed in addition to the award. I97t 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or 
officer, agent or employee — Occupa-
tional disease excepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall 
be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common 
law or otherwise, to the employee or to his spouse, 
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, 
heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any 
other person whomsoever, on account of any accident 
or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, 
aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course 
of or because of or arising out of his employment, and 
no action at law may be maintained against an em-
ployer or against any officer, agent, or employee of 
the employer based upon any accident, injury, or 
death of an employee. Nothing in this section, how-
ever, shall prevent an employee, or his dependents, 
from filing a claim with the Industrial Commission of 
Utah for compensation in those cases within the pro-
visions of the Utah Occupational Disease Act, as 
amended. 1994 
35-1-61. Repealed. 1971 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful 
acts of persons other than employer, 
officer, agent, or employee of said em-
ployer — Rights of employer or insur-
ance carrier in cause of action — Main-
tenance of action — Notice of intention 
to proceed against third party — Right 
to maintain action not involving em-
ployee-employer relationship — Dis-
bursement of proceeds of recovery — 
Exclusive remedy. 
(1) When any injury or death for which compensa-
tion is payable under this title shall have been caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than 
an employer, officer, agent, or employee of the em-
ployer, the injured employee, or in case of death, his 
dependents, may claim compensation and the injured 
employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also have an action for damages against the third 
person. 
(2) If compensation is claimed and the employer or 
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensa-
tion, the employer or insurance carrier shall become 
trustee of the cause of action against the third party 
and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or 
his heirs or the personal representative of the de-
ceased, provided the employer or carrier may not set-
tle and release the cause of action without the con-
sent of the commission. 
(3) (a) Before proceeding against the third party, 
the injured employee, or, in case of death, his 
heirs, shall give written notice of the intention to 
the carrier and other person obligated for the 
compensation payments, to give the person a rea-
sonable opportunity to enter an appearance in 
the proceeding. 
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of death, 
his heirs, shall give written notice to the carrier 
and other person obligated for the compensation 
payments of any known attempt to attribute 
fault to the employer, officer, agent, or employee 
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of the employer by way of settlement or in a pro-
ceeding brought by the injured employee, or, in 
case of death, his heirs. 
(4) For the purposes of this section and notwith-
standing the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the in-
jured employee or his heirs or personal representative 
may also maintain an action for damages against 
subcontractors, general contractors, independent con-
tractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, 
not occupying an employee-employer relationship 
with the injured or deceased employee at the time of 
his injury or death. 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third per-
son, it shall be disbursed as follows: 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their inter-
ests may appear. Any'fee chargeable to the em-
ployer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee 
payable by the injured employee or, in the case of 
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had 
against the third party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation pay-
ments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in 
Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as fol-
lows: 
(i) without reduction based on fault attrib-
uted to the employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of the employer in the action against 
the third party if the combined percentage of 
fault attributed to persons immune from suit 
is determined to be less than 40% prior to 
any reallocation of fault under Subsection 
78-27-39(2); or 
(ii) less the amount of payments made 
multiplied by the percentage of fault attrib-
uted to the employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of the employer in the action against 
the third party if the combined percentage of 
fault attributed to persons immune from suit 
is determined to be 40% or more prior to any 
reallocation of fault under Subsection 
78-27-39(2). 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured em-
ployee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied 
to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereaf-
ter accruing against the person liable for com-
pensation. 
(6) The apportionment of fault to the employer in a 
civil action against a third party is not an action at 
law and does not impose any liability on the em-
ployer. The apportionment of fault does not alter or 
diminish the exclusiveness of the remedy provided to 
employees, their heirs, or personal representatives, or 
the immunity provided employers pursuant to Sec-
tion 35-1-60 for injuries sustained by an employee, 
whether resulting in death or not. Any court in which 
a civil action is pending shall issue a partial sum-
mary judgment to an employer with respect to the 
employer's immunity as provided in Section 35-1-60, 
even though the conduct of the employer may be con-
sidered in allocating fault to the employer in a third 
party action in the manner provided in Sections 
78-27-37 through 78-27-43. 19M 
35*1-63. J u d g m e n t s in favor of commiss ion — 
Preference. 
All judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by 
the commission or by the state under the authority of 
this title shall have the same preference against the 
assets of the employer as claims for taxes. 19SS 
35-1-64. Compensation — None for first three 
days after injury unless disability ex-
tended. 
No compensation shall be allowed for the first three 
days after the injury is received, except the disburse-
ments hereinafter authorized for medical, nurse and 
hospital services, and for medicines and funeral ex-
penses, provided, however, if the period of total tem-
porary disability lasts more than fourteen days, com-
pensation shall also be payable for the first three 
days after the injury is received. 1973 
35-1-65. Temporary disabil ity — Amount of 
payments — State average week ly 
w a g e defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 662/3% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 1007c of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, tempo-
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of 
each year, the total wages reported on contribution 
reports to the department of employment security un-
der the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom. 
1981 
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disabil i ty — 
Amount of payments . 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability 
for work, the employee shall receive weekly compen-
sation equal to: 
(a) 66 2/3% of the difference between the em-
ployee's average weekly wages before the acci-
dent and the weekly wages the employee is able 
to earn after the accident, but not more than 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent children, but 
only up to a total weekly compensation that does 
not exceed 100% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of injury. 
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(2) The commission may make an award for tempo-
rary partial disability for work at any time prior to 
eight years after the date of the injury to an em-
ployee: 
^N ^Ytt^ fe 'gfay'ataaX t&Tt&Vttoit T%?M\\.\T\% {TORI 
the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under 
Section 35-1-98. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not ex-
ceed 312 week3 nor continue more than eight years 
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate 
vtrhen the disability ends or the injured employee dies. 
1990 
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of 
payments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impair-
ment as a result of an industrial accident and who 
files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-98 
rtiay receive a permanent partial disability award 
from the commission. 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue 
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured 
person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensa-
tion shall be 662/3% of that employee's average 
v/eekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 66%% of the state average 
v/eekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
tvQt less than a minimum of $45 oer week plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child 
ijnder the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four 
dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of the 
$tate average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week, to be paid in routine pay periods not to 
exceed four weeks for the number of weeks stated 
against such injuries respectively, and shall be in ad-
dition to the compensation provided for temporary 
total disability and temporary partial disability: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter 
amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above 
deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and 
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below 
elbow joint proximal to insertion of 
biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal 
to insertion of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or mid-
metacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at meta-
carpophalangeal joint 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or 
with resection of carpometacarpal 
bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or 
with resection of metacarpal bone ... .42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint. .18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or 
with resection of metacarpal bone ... .34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint. .15 
(6) Ring finger 
resection of metacarpal bone 17 
'(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 13 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint... 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or 
with resection of metacarpal bone 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint... 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pel-
vis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or 
less below tuberosity of ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional 
stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes am-
putation or below knee with short stump 
(three inches or less below intercondylar 
notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional 
stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Footatankle 88 
(h\ Foat nartial amnjitaJ&ux CGba-
part's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 
44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal 
bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal 
joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint ..12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal 
bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal 
joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal 
joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal 
joint 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing . 109 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall 
'be d^ e m^ equivalent toloss ol ftie member. Par-
tial 1QSS o r partial loss of use shall be a percent-
age of the complete loss or loss of use of the mem-
ber. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to 
the items listed in (B)(4). 
For any permanent impairment caused by an 
industrial accident that is not otherwise provided 
for in the schedule of losses in this section, per-
manent partial disability compensation shall be 
awarded by the commission based on the medical 
evidence. Compensation for any such impairment 
shall* ** closely as possible, be proportionate to 
the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this 
section. Permanent partial disability compensa-
tion nW not in any case exceed 312 weeks, 
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which shall be considered the period of compen-
sation for permanent total loss of bodily function. 
Permanent partial disability compensation may 
not be paid for any permanent impairment that 
existed prior to an industrial accident. 
The amounts specified in this section are all 
subject to the limitations as to the maximum 
weekly amount payable as specified in this sec-
tion, and in no event shall more than a maximum 
of 662/3% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in 
compensation be required to be paid. 1991 
35-1-66.1. Loss of hearing — Occupational hear-
ing loss due to noise to be compen-
sated. 
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to 
harmful industrial noise or by direct head injury 
shall be compensated according to the terms and con-
ditions of this chapter. 
(2) No claim for compensation for hearing loss for 
harmful industrial noise shall'be paid under this 
chapter unless it can be demonstrated by a profes-
sionally controlled sound test that the employee has 
been exposed to harmful industrial noise as defined 
in Section 35-1-66.2 while employed by the employer 
against whom the claim is made. 1991 
35-1-66.2. Harmful industrial noise defined. 
(1) Harmful industrial noise is defined as the 
sound emanating from equipment and machines dur-
ing employment exceeding the following permissible 
sound levels, dBA slow response, and corresponding 





















(2) Harmful industrial noise is also defined as 
sound that results in acoustic trauma such as sudden 
instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or im-
pact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound pressure 
levels. 
(3) The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Divi-
sion of the commission may conduct tests to deter-
mine the intensity of noise at places of employment. 
The administrative law judge may consider such 
tests, and any other tests taken by authorities in the 
field of sound engineering, as evidence of harmful 
industrial noise. 1991 
35-1-66.3. Loss of hearing defined. 
Loss of hearing is defined as binaural hearing loss 
measured in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1,000, 
2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz). If the aver-
age decibel loss at 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 cycles 
per second (Hertz) is 25 decibels or less, usually no 
hearing impairment exists. 1991 
35-1-66.4. Measuring hearing loss . 
(1) The degree of hearing loss shall be established, 
no sooner than six weeks after termination of expo-
sure to the harmful industrial noise, by audiometric 
determination of hearing threshold level performed 
by medical or paramedical professionals recognized 
by the commission, as measured from 0 decibels on an 
audiometer calibrated to ANSI-S3.6-1969, American 
National Standard "Specifications for Audiometers" 
(1969). 
(2) In any evaluation of occupational hearing loss, 
only hearing levels at frequencies of 500, 1,000, 
2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) shall be 
considered. The individual measurements for each 
ear shall be added together and then shall be divided 
by four to determine the average decibel loss in each 
ear. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in 
each ear, the average decibel loss for each decibel of 
loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by 1.5% 
up to the maximum of 100% which is reached at 91.7 
decibels. 
(3) Binaural hearing loss is determined by multi-
plying the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear 
by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in 
the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resultant fig-
ure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss. iwi 
35-1-66.5. Loss of hearing — Compensation for 
permanent partial disability. 
Compensation for permanent partial disability for 
binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multi-
plying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 109 
weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this 
chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims 
for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previ-
ously found to exist shall be deducted from any subse-
quent award by the commission. In no event shall 
compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% bin-
aural hearing loss exceeding 109 weeks of compensa-
tion benefits. 1991 
35-1-66.6. Loss of hearing — Time for filing 
claim. 
An employee's occupational hearing loss must be 
reported to the employer pursuant to Section 35-1-97 
within 180 days of the date the employee first suf-
fered altered hearing and knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known, that the 
hearing loss was caused by employment. 1991 
35-1-66.7. Loss of hearing — Extent of em-
ployer's Lability. 
An employer is liable only for the hearing loss of an 
employee which arises out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment for that employer. If previous 
occupational hearing loss or nonoccupational hearing 
impairment is established by competent evidence, the 
employer shall not be liable for the prior hearing loss 
so established, whether or not compensation has pre-
viously been paid or awarded. The employer is liable 
only for the difference between the percentage of 
hearing loss presently established and that percent-
age of prior hearing loss established by preemploy-
ment audiogram or other competent evidence. The 
date for compensation for occupational hearing loss 
shall be determined by the date of direct head injury 
or the last date when harmful industrial noise con-
tributed substantially in causing the hearing loss. 
1991 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount 
of payments — Rehabilitation. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability 
caused by an industrial accident, the employee 
shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. 
(b) Permanent total disability for purposes of 
this chapter requires a finding by the commission 
of total disability, as measured by the substance 
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of the sequential decision-making process of the 
Social Security Administration under Title 20 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. 
(c) The commission shall adopt rules that con-
form to the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Adminis-
tration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520(b), 
(c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation 
during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensa-
tion shall be 66 *h% of the employee's average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more 
than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less 
than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a de-
pendent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four such dependent minor children, but not ex-
ceeding the maximum established in Subsection 
(2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of 
the employee at the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum 
weekly compensation rate under Subsection 
(2Kb) shall be 36% of the current state average 
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease 
arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment on or before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is lia-
ble for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in 
Section 35-1-69 as in effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may 
not be required to pay compensation for any com-
bination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, 
35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7 in ex-
cess of the amount of compensation payable over 
the initial 312 weeks at the applicable perma-
nent total disability compensation rate under 
Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation 
shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insur-
ance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Re-
insurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensa-
tion from his employer, its insurance carrier, or 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combi-
nation of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of 
compensation at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate, the Employers' Re-
insurance Fund shall pay all remaining perma-
nent total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments 
aWA comments '-rcnTnfe&a'tfcty aSter tYi* feYwp\^«T 
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability 
under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease 
arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment on or after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is lia-
ble for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may 
not be required to pay compensation for any com-
bination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, 
35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7, in ex-
cess of the amount of compensation payable over 
the initial 312 weeks at the applicable perma-
nent total disability compensation rate under 
Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation 
spall be recouped by the employer or its insur-
ance carrier by reasonably offsetting the over-
payment against future liability paid before or 
after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate estab-
lished "in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by 
the employer* its insurance carrier, or the Employers' 
Reins111,811106 Fund, after an employee has received 
compensation fr°m the employer or the employer's 
insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities 
amountin§> to 312 weeks of compensation at the appli-
cable total disability compensation rate, shall be re-
duced* to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar 
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement ben-
efits received by the employee during the same pe-
riod. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent 
tfltal disability is not final, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) the commission reviews a summary of 
reemployment activities undertaken pursu-
ant to Title 35, Chapter 10, Utah Injured 
Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier 
submits to the commission a reemployment 
plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilita-
tion provider reasonably designed to return 
the employee to gainful employment or the 
employer or its insurance carrier provides 
the commission notice that the employer or 
its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; 
and 
(iii) the commission, after notice to the 
parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise 
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding re-
habilitation and to review any reemploy-
ment plan submitted by the employer or its 
insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the 
commission shall order the initiation of perma-
nent total disability compensation payments to 
provide for the employee's subsistence. The com-
mission shall order the payment of any undis-
puted disability or medical benefits due the em-
ployee. The employer or its insurance carrier 
ghall be given credit for any disability payments 
against its ultimate disability compensation lia-
bility under Chapter (1) or (2). 
(c) The commission may not order an employer 
or its insurance carrier to submit a reemploy-
ment plan. If the employer or its insurance car-
rier voluntarily submits a plan: 
(i) The plan may include retraining, edu-
cation, medical and disability compensation 
Vfetft&to, 5F>\> ?>\%tfeitfeiA. *«rm«&, t>t Ynren-
tives calculated to facilitate reemployment 
funded by the employer or its insurance car-
rier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of rea-
sonable disability compensation to provide 
for the employee's subsistence during the re-
habilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier 
shall diligently pursue the reemployment 
plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's 
failure to diligently pursue the reemploy-
ment plan shall be cause for the commission 
on its own motion to order a final finding of 
permanent total disability. 
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(d) If a preponderance of the evidence shows 
that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the 
commission shall order that the employee be paid 
weekly permanent total disability compensation 
benefits. 
(7) The period of benefits commences on the date 
the employee became permanently totally disabled, 
as determined by the commission based on the facts 
and evidence, and ends with the death of the em-
ployee or when the employee is capable of returning 
to regular, steady work. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or 
the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the em-
ployee has some loss of bodily function, the award 
shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by the commission, an employee 
is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the 
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or re-
employment plan under this title. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of 
the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both 
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such 
body members constitutes total and permanent 
disability, to be compensated according to this 
section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pur-
suant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 1994 
35-1-68. Employers' Reinsurance Fund — In-
jury causing death — Burial expenses 
— Payments to dependents. 
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund for the purpose of making payments for indus-
trial accidents or occupational diseases occurring on 
or before June 30, 1994. The payments shall be made 
in accordance with Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2. The 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability 
for industrial accidents or occupational diseases oc-
curring on or after July 1, 1994. This fund shall suc-
ceed to all monies previously held in the "Special 
Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second 
Injury Fund." Whenever this code refers to the "Spe-
cial Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Siec-
ond Injury Fund" that reference is considered to be 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. The state trea-
surer shall be the custodian of the Employers' Rein-
surance Fund, and the commission shall make provi-
sions for and direct its distribution. Reasonable costs 
of administration or other fees may be paid from the 
fund. 
(2) The state treasurer shall: 
(a) receive workers' compensation premium 
assessments from the State Tax Commission; and 
(b) invest the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to 
ensure maximum investment return for both 
long and short term investments in accordance 
with Section 51-7-12.5. 
(3) The commission may employ or retain counsel 
to represent the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in pro-
ceedings brought to enforce claims against or on be-
half of the fund. Upon request of the commission, the 
attorney general shall aid in representation of the 
fund. 
(4) The liability of the state, its departments, agen-
cies, instrumentalities, elected or appointed officials, 
or other duly authorized agents, with respect to pay-
ment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, 
medical expenses, or disbursement properly charge-
able against the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, is 
limited to the cash or assets in the Employers' Rein-
surance Fund, and they are not otherwise, in any 
way, liable for the operation, debts, or obligations of 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
(5) If injur}' causes death within a period of 312 
weeks from the date of the accident, the employer or 
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the 
deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and further 
benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(a) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at 
the time of the death, the payment by the 
employer or its insurance carrier shall be 66 
2h% of the decedent's average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week and not less than a minimum of $45 
per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, 
plus $5 for each dependent minor child under 
the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four 
such dependent minor children, but not ex-
ceeding the average weekly wage of the em-
ployee at the time of the injury, and not ex-
ceeding 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week. 
Compensation shall continue during depen-
dency for the remainder of the period be-
tween the date of the death and the expira-
tion of 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The payment by the employer or its 
insurance carrier to wholly dependent per-
sons during dependency following the expi-
ration of the first 312-week period described 
in Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be an amount 
equal to the weekly benefits paid to those 
wholly dependent persons during that initial 
312-week period, reduced by 50% of any 
weekly federal Social Security death benefits 
paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be sub-
ject to review by the commission at the end 
of the initial 312-week period and annually 
thereafter. If in any such review it is deter-
mined that, under the facts and circum-
stances existing at that time, the applicant is 
no longer a wholly dependent person, the ap-
plicant may be considered a partly depen-
dent or nondependent person and shall be 
paid such benefits as the commission may 
determine under Subsection (5Xb)(ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency deter-
mination, a surviving spouse of a deceased 
employee shall be conclusively presumed to 
be wholly dependent for a 312-week period 
from the date of death of the employee. This 
presumption shall not apply after the initial 
312-week period and, in determining the 
then existing annual income of the surviving 
spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of 
any federal Social Security death benefits re-
ceived by that surviving spouse. 
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at 
the time of the death, the payment shall be 
66 %h% of the decedent's average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week and not less than a minimum of $45 
per week. Compensation shall continue dur-
ing dependency for the remainder of the pe-
riod between the date of death and the expi-
ration of 312 weeks after the date of injury 
as the commission in each case may deter-
mine. Compensation may not amount to 
35-1-69 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION "354 
more than a maximum of $30,000. The bene-
fits provided for in this subsection shall be in 
keeping with the circumstances and condi-
tions of dependency existing at the date of 
injury, and any amount awarded by the com-
mission under this subsection shall be con-
sistent with the general provisions of this 
title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be 
partly dependent under Subsection (5)(a)(iii) 
shall be determined by the commission in 
keeping with the circumstances and condi-
tions of dependency existing at the time of 
the dependency review and may be paid in 
an amount not exceeding the maximum 
weekly rate that partly dependent persons 
would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments- under this section shall be 
paid to such persons during their depen-
dency by the employer or its insurance car-
rier, 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and 
also partly dependent persons at the time of 
death, the commission may apportion the bene-
fits as it considers just and equitable; provided, 
that the total benefits awarded to all parties con-
cerned do not exceed the maximum provided for 
by law. 1994 
35-1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsur-
ance Fund. 
If an employee, who has at least a 10% whole per-
son permanent impairment from any cause or origin, 
subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an 
accident arising out of and in the course of the em-
ployee's employment during the period of July 1, 
1988, to June 30, 1994, inclusive, and if the addi-
tional impairment results in permanent total disabil-
ity, the employer or its insurance carrier and the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment 
of benefits as follows: 
(1) The employer or its insurance carrier is lia-
ble for the first $20,000 of medical benefits and 
the initial 156 weeks of permanent total disabil-
ity compensation as provided in this title. 
(2) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of 
the first $20,000 shall be paid in the first in-
stance by the employer or its insurance carrier. 
Then, as provided in Subsection (5), the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse the 
employer or its insurance carrier for 50% of those 
expenses. 
(3) After the initial 156-week period under 
Subsection (1), permanent total disability com-
pensation payable to an employee under this title 
becomes the liability of and shall be paid by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
(4) If it is determined that the employee is per-
manently and totally disabled, the employer or 
its insurance carrier shall be given credit for all 
prior payments of temporary total, temporary 
partial, and permanent partial disability com-
pensation made as a result of the industrial acci-
dent. Any overpayment by the employer or its 
insurance carrier shall be reimbursed by the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (5). 
(5) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse 
the employer or its insurance carrier for the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund's share of medical 
benefits and compensation paid to or on behalf of 
an employee. A request for Employers' Reinsur-
ance Fund reimbursements shall be accompanied 
by satisfactory evidence of payment of the medi-
cal or disability compensation for which the re-
imbursement is requested. Each request is sub-
ject to review as to reasonableness by the com-
mission. The commission may determine the 
manner of reimbursement. 
(6) If, at the t ime an employee is determined to 
be permanently and totally disabled, the em-
ployee has other actionable workers' compensa-
tion claims, the employer or insurance carrier 
that is liable for the last industrial accident re-
sulting in permanent total disability shall be lia-
ble for the benefits payable by the employer as 
provided in this section and Section 35-1-67. The 
employee's entit lement to benefits for prior ac-
tionable claims shall then be determined sepa-
rately on the facts of those claims. Any previous 
permanent partial disability arising out of those 
claims shall then be considered to be impair-
ments that may give rise to Employers' Reinsur-
ance Fund liability under this section. 1994 
35-1-70. Additional benefits in special cases. 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been 
receiving the benefits of this title, at the termination 
of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and 
under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled 
to additional benefits, the industrial commission 
may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such bene-
fits; but the liability of the employer or insurance 
carrier involved shall not be extended, and the addi-
tional benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special 
fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section 
35-1-68. 1953 
35-1-71. Dependents — Presumption. 
The following persons shall be presumed to be 
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased em-
ployee: 
(1) Children under the age of 18 years, or over 
if physically or mentally incapacitated and de-
pendent upon the parent, with whom they are 
living at the time of the death of such parent, or 
who is legally bound for their support. 
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under 
Subsection 35-l-68(2)(a)(i), a surviving husband 
or wife shall be presumed to be wholly dependent 
upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the 
time of the employee's death. 
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in 
whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance 
with the facts in each particular case existing at the 
time of the injury or death of such employee, except 
for purposes of dependency reviews under Subsection 
35-l-68(2)(a)(iii). No person shall be considered as a 
dependent unless he or she is a member of the family 
of the deceased employee, or bears the relation of hus-
band or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother 
or sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall 
include a posthumous child, and a child legally 
adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half 
sisters shall be included in the words "brother or sis-
ter" as above used. 1967 
35-1-72. Repealed. 1993 
35-1-73. Benefits in case of death — Distribution 
of award to dependents — Death of de-
pendents — Remarriage of surviving 
spouse. 
The benefits in case of death shall be paid to such 
one or more of the dependents of the decedent for the 
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benefit of all the dependents, as may be determined 
by the commission, which may apportion the benefits 
among the dependents in such manner as it deems 
just and equitable. Payment to a dependent subse-
quent in right may be made, if the commission deems 
it proper, and shall operate to discharge all other 
claims therefor. The dependents, or persons to whom 
benefits are paid, shall apply the same to the use of 
the several beneficiaries thereof in compliance with 
the finding and direction of the commission. In all 
cases of death where the dependents are a surviving 
spouse and one or more minor children, it shall be 
sufficient for the widow or widower to make applica-
tion to the commission on behalf of that individual 
and the minor children; and in cases where all of the 
dependents are minors, the application shall be made 
by the guardian or next friend of such minor depen-
dents. The commission may, for the purpose of pro-
tecting the rights and interests of any minor depen-
dents it deems incapable of doing so, provide a 
method of safeguarding any payments due them. 
Should any dependent of a deceased employee die 
during the period covered by such weekly payments, 
the right of such dependent to compensation under 
this title shall cease. Should a surviving spouse, who 
is a dependent of a deceased employee and who is 
receiving the benefits of this title remarry, that indi-
vidual's sole right after such remarriage, to further 
payments of compensation shall be the right to re-
ceive in a lump sum the balance of the weekly com-
pensation payments unpaid from the time of remar-
riage to the end of six years or 312 weeks from the 
date of the injury from which death resulted, but in 
no event shall such amount exceed 52 weeks of com-
pensation at the weekly compensation rate the sur-
viving spouse was receiving at the time of such re-
marriage. If there are other dependents remaining at 
the time of remarriage, benefits payable under this 
title shall be paid to such person as the commission 
may determine, for the use and benefit of the other 
dependents, the weekly benefits to be paid at inter-
vals of not less than four weeks. 1977 
35-1-74. Increase of award to children and de-
pendent spouse — Effect of death, 
marriage, majority, or termination of 
dependency of children — Death, di-
vorce, or remarriage of spouse. 
In all cases where an award is made to, or in-
creased because of a dependent spouse or dependent 
minor child or children, as provided in this title, such 
award or increase in amount of the award shall cease 
at the death, marriage, attainment of the age of eigh-
teen years, or termination of dependency of such 
minor child or children or upon the death, divorce or 
remarriage of the spouse of the employee, subject to 
those provisions relative to the remarriage of a 
spouse as provided in Section 35-1-73. 1979 
35-1-75. Average weekly wage — Basis of com* 
putation. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, the 
average weekly wage of the injured employee at the 
time of the injury shall be taken as the basis upon 
which to compute the weekly compensation rate and 
shall be determined as follows: 
(a) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the year, the average weekly wage shall 
be that yearly wage divided by 52. 
(b) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the month, the average weekly wage 
shall be that monthly wage divided by 4 V3. 
(c) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the week, that amount shall be the aver-
age weekly wage. 
(d) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the day, the weekly wage shall be deter-
mined by multiplying the daily wage by the 
number of days and fraction of days in the week 
during which the employee under a contract of 
hire was working at the time of the accident, or 
would have worked if the accident had not inter-
vened. In no case shall the daily wage be multi-
plied by less than three for the purpose of deter-
mining the weekly wage. 
(e) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage shall 
be determined by multiplying the hourly rate by 
the number of hours the employee would have 
worked for the week if the accident had not inter-
vened. In no case shall the hourly wage be multi-
plied by less than 20 for the purpose of determin-
ing the weekly wage. 
(f) If at the time of the injury the hourly wage 
has not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the 
wage for the purpose of calculating compensation 
shall be the usual wage for similar services 
where those services are rendered by paid em-
ployees. 
(g) (i) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the output of the employee, the av-
erage weekly wage shall be the wage most 
favorable to the employee computed by di-
viding by 13 the wages, not including over-
time or premium pay, of the employee 
earned through that employer in the first, 
second, third, or fourth period of 13 consecu-
tive calendar weeks in the 52 weeks immedi-
ately preceding the injury. 
(ii) If the employee has been employed by 
that employer less than 13 calendar weeks 
immediately preceding the injury, his aver-
age weekly wage shall be computed as under 
Subsection (l)(g)(i), presuming the wages, 
not including overtime or premium pay. to 
be the amount he would have earned had he 
been so employed for the full 13 calendar 
weeks immediately preceding the injury and 
had worked, when work was available to 
other employees, in a similar occupation. 
(2) If none of the methods in Subsection (1) will 
fairly determine the average weekly wage in a partic-
ular case, the commission shall use such other 
method as will, based on the facts presented, fairly 
determine the employee's average weekly wage. 
(3) When the average weekly wage of the injured 
employee at the time of the injury is determined as in 
this section provided, it shall be taken as the basis 
upon which to compute the weekly compensation 
rate. After the weekly compensation has been com-
puted, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar. 1994 
35-1-76. Likelihood of increase to be consid-
ered. 
If it is established that the injured employee was of 
such age and experience when injured that under 
natural conditions his wages would be expected to 
increase, that fact may be considered in arriving at 
his average weekly wage. 1953 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or 
medical consultants — Discretionary 
authority of commission to refer case 
— Findings and reports — Objections 
to report — Hearing — Expenses . 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury by accident, or for death, arising out of 
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and in the course of employment, and if the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier denies liability, 
the commission may refer the medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel appointed by the com-
mission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon 
disability or death due to an occupational disease 
is filed with the commission, the commission 
shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, ap-
point an impartial medical panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more 
physicians specializing in the treatment of the 
disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an 
impartial medical evaluation of the medical as-
pects of a controverted case, the commission may 
employ a medical director or medical consultants 
on a full-time or part-time basis for the purpose 
of evaluating the medical evidence and advising 
the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-
finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the 
use of a medical director or medical consultants, 
they shall be allowed to function in the same 
manner and under the same procedures as re-
quired of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants shall make such study, take 
such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the 
commission, as it may determine to be necessary 
or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants shall make a report in writ-
ing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional find-
ings as the commission may require. In occupa-
tional disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of 
the claimant from performing work for remuner-
ation or profit, and whether the sole cause of the 
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, 
results from the occupational disease and 
whether any other causes have aggravated, pro-
longed, accelerated, or in any way contributed to 
the disability or death, and if so, the extent in 
percentage to which the other causes have so con-
tributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute 
full copies of the report to the applicant, the em-
ployer, and its insurance carrier by certified mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days 
after the report is deposited in the United States 
post office, the applicant, the employer, or its in-
surance carrier may file with the commission 
written objections to the report. If no written ob-
jections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and 
decision on the report of the panel, medical direc-
tor, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evi-
dence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the com-
mission may set the case for hearing to deter-
mine the facta and issues involved. At the hear-
ing, any party so desiring may request the com-
mission to have the chairman of the medical 
panel, the medical director, or the medical con-
sultants present at the hearing for examination 
and cross-examination. For good cause shown, 
the commission may order other members of the 
panel, with or without the chairman or the medi-
cal director or medical consultants, to be present 
at the hearing for examination and cross-exami-
nation. 
(D The written report of the panel, medical di-
rector, or medical consultants may be received as 
an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it U 
sustained by the testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the 
medical panel, medical director, or medical con-
sultants and the expenses of their appearance be-
fore the commission shall be paid out of the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund. 1994 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission 
to modify award — Authority to de-
stroy records — Interest on award — 
No authority to change statutes of limi-
tation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing. The commission, 
after notice and hearing, may from time to time mod-
ify or change its former findings and orders. Records 
pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive 
for ten years, other than cases of total permanent 
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as 
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion 
of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as mod-
ifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Ti-
tle 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. 
(b) The commission has no power to change 
the statutes of limitation referred to in Subsec-
tion (3)(a) in any respect. 1994 
35-1-79. Lump-sum payments. 
The commission, under special circumstances and 
when the same is deemed advisable, may commute 
periodical benefits to one or more lump-sum pay-
ments. 1953 
35-1-80. Compensation exempt from execution. 
Compensation before payment shall be exempt 
from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or 
execution, and shall be paid only to employees or 
their dependents. 1953 
35-1-81. Awards — Medical, nursing, hospital 
and burial expenses — Artificial 
means and appliances. 
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this 
chapter the employer or the insurance carrier shall 
pay reasonable sums for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services, for medicines, and for artificial means, ap-
pliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the in-
jured employee. 
(2) If death results from the injury, the employer or 
the insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses in 
ordinary cases as established by rule. 
(3) If a compensable accident results in the break-
ing of or loss of an employee's artificial means or ap-
pliance including eyeglasses, the employer or insur-
ance carrier shall provide a replacement of the artifi-
cial means or appliance. 
(4) The commission may require the employer or 
insurance carrier to maintain the artificial means or 
appliances or provide the employee with a replace-
357 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 35-1-92 
ment of any artificial means or appliance for the rea-
son of breakage, wear and tear, deterioration, or obso-
lescence. 
(5) The commission may, in unusual cases, order 
the payment of additional sums for burial expenses or 
to provide for artificial means or appliances as the 
commission considers just and proper. 1994 
35-1-82,35-1-82.51. Repealed. 1985, 1987 
35-1-82.52. Appointment of law judges — P o w e r 
and authority. 
(1) The commission shall appoint one or more ad-
ministrative law judges. 
(2) The commission or any administrative law 
judge may call, preside at, and conduct hearings and 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(3) (a) The commission and any administrative 
law judge may issue subpoenas. 
(b) Failure to respond to a properly issued sub-
poena may result in a contempt citation and of-
fenders may be punished as provided in Section 
78-32-15. 1987 
35-1-82.53. Review of administrative order — 
Finality of commission's order. 
(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with 
the order entered by an administrative law judge 
may seek review of that order with the commission by 
complying with the commission's rules governing 
that review. 
(2) The order of the commission on review is final, 
unless set aside by the Court of Appeals. 1988 
35-1-82.54,35-1-82.55. Repealed. 1988 
35-1-82.56. Notice to parties of order or award. 
All parties in interest shall be given due notice of 
the entry of any administrative law judge's order or 
any order or award of the commission. The mailing of 
the copy of said order or award to the last known 
address shown in the files of the commission of any 
party in interest and to the attorneys or agents of 
record in the case, if any, shall be deemed to be notice 
of such order. 1975 
35-1-83 to 35-1-85. Repealed. 1987 
35-1-85.1. Deposit ions of witnesses authorized. 
The commission or any party to a proceeding under 
this act may cause depositions of witnesses to be 
taken as in civil actions. 1965 
35-1-86. Court of Appeals may review commis-
sion's actions. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, 
reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to 
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any 
order. 1988 
35-1-87. Attorneys* fees. 
In all cases coming before the Industrial Commis-
sion in which attorneys have been employed, the com-
mission is vested with full power to regulate and fix 
the fees of such attorneys. 1953 
35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure be-
fore commission and hearing examiner 
— Admissible evidence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner 
shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory 
rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules 
of procedure, other than as herein provided or as 
adopted by the commission pursuant to this act. The 
commission may make its investigation in such man-
ner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain 
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out 
justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as 
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed mate-
rial and relevant including, but not limited to the 
following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented 
in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physi-
cians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the 
commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of 
time sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or 
diseased employee. 1965 
35-1-89. Injuries to minors. 
A minor shall be deemed sui juris for the purposes 
of this title, and no other person shall have any cause 
of action or right to compensation for an injury to 
such minor workman, but in the event of the award of 
a lump sum of compensation to a minor employee, 
such sum shall be paid only to his legally appointed 
guardian. 1953 
35-1-90. Void agreements between employers 
and employees . 
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights 
to compensation under this title shall be valid. No 
agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the 
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. Any 
employer who deducts any portion of such premium 
from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to 
the benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and shall be fined not more than $100 for each such 
offense. 1953 
35-1-91. Physical examinations. 
Any employee claiming the right to receive com-
pensation under this title may be required by the 
commission, or its medical examiner, to submit him-
self for medical examination at any time, and from 
time to time, at a place reasonably convenient for 
such employee, and such as may be provided by the 
rules of the commission. If such employee refuses to 
submit to any such examination, or obstructs the 
same, his right to have his claim for compensation 
considered, if his claim is pending before the commis-
sion, or to receive any payments for compensation 
theretofore granted, shall be suspended during the 
period of such refusal or obstruction. 1953 
35-1-92. Autopsy in death cases — Authority of 
commission — Certified pathologist — 
Public record — Attending physicians 
— Penalty for refusal to permit — Lia-
bility. 
On the filing of a claim for compensation for death 
within the provisions of this act where, in the opinion 
of the commission it is necessary to accurately and 
scientifically ascertain the cause of death, an autopsy 
may be ordered by a majority of the commission and 
shall be made by a person designated by the commis-
sion. The commission shall determine who shall pay 
the charge of the certified pathologist making the au-
topsy. Any person interested may designate a duly 
licensed physician to attend such autopsy, and the 
findings of the certified pathologist performing the 
autopsy shall be filed with the commission and shall 
be a public record. All proceedings for compensation 
shall be suspended upon refusal of a claimant or 
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claimants to permit such autopsy when so ordered. 
Where an autopsy has been performed pursuant to an 
order of a majority of the commission no cause of ac-
tion shall lie against any person, firm or corporation 
for participating in or requesting such autopsy. 1975 
35-1-93. Employee removing from place of 
treatment 
An injured employee who desires to leave the local-
ity in which he has been employed during the treat-
ment of his injury, or to leave this state, shall report 
to his attending physician for examination, notifying 
the commission in writing of such intention to leave, 
accompanying such notice with a certificate from the 
attending physician setting forth the exact nature of 
the injury, the condition of the employee, together 
with a statement of the probable length of time dis-
ability will continue. Thereafter, and with the writ-
ten consent of the commission, the employee may 
leave the locality in which he was employed; other-
wise no compensation shall be allowed during such 
absence. 1953 
35-1-94. Employer's records subject to examina-
tion — Penalty. 
All books, records, and payrolls of an employer 
showing, or reflecting in any way upon, the amount of 
his wage expenditure shall always be open for inspec-
tion by the commission, or any of its auditors, inspec-
tors, or assistants, for the purpose of ascertaining the 
correctness of the wage expenditure, the number of 
individuals employed, and such other information as 
may be necessary for the uses and purposes of the 
commission in its administration of the law. If an 
employer refuses to submit any books, records, or 
payrolls for inspection, after being presented with 
written authority from the commission, he is liable 
for a penalty of $100 for each offense. This penalty 
shall be collected by a civil action and paid into the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. 1994 
35*1-95. Repealed. 1984 
35-1-96. Interstate and intrastate commerce. 
The provisions of this title shall apply to employers 
and their employees engaged in intrastate and also in 
interstate and foreign commerce for whom a rule of 
liability or method of compensation has been or may 
be established by the Congress of the United States, 
only to the extent that their mutual connection with 
intrastate work may and shall be clearly separable 
and distinguishable from interstate or foreign com-
merce. 1958 
35-1-97. Reporting of industrial injuries. 
(1) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out 
of and in the course of employment shall provide noti-
fication to his employer promptly of the injury. If the 
employee is unable to provide notification, the em-
ployee's next-of-kin or attorney may provide notifica-
tion of the injury to his employer. 
(2) Any employee who fails to notify his employer 
or the commission within 180 days of an injury is 
barred for any claim of benefits arising from the in-
jury. 
(3) An employer's or physician's injury report filed 
with the commission, employer, or insurance carrier 
or the payment of any medical or disability benefits 
by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier 
constitutes notification of an injury. 
(4) (a) Each employer shall file a report with the 
commission within seven days after the occur-
rence of an injury, after the employer's first 
knowledge of the occurrence, or after the em-
ployee's notification of the same, on forms or by 
methods prescribed by the commission, of any 
work-related fatality or any work-related injury 
resulting in medical treatment, loss of conscious-
ness, loss of work, restriction of work, or transfer 
to another job. 
(b) Each employer shall file a subsequent re-
port with the commission of any previously re-
ported injury that later resulted in death. The 
subsequent report shall be filed with the commis-
sion within seven days following the death or the 
employer's first knowledge or notification of the 
death. No report is required for minor injuries, 
such as cuts or scratches that require first-aid 
treatment only, unless a treating physician files, 
or is required to file, the Physician's Initial Re-
port of Work Injury or Occupational Disease with 
the commission. 
(5) Each employer shall provide the employee with 
a copy of the report submitted to the commission. The 
employer shall also provide the employee with a 
statement, as prepared by the commission, of his 
rights and responsibilities related to the industrial 
injury. 
(6) Each employer shall maintain a record in a 
manner prescribed by the commission of all work-re-
lated fatalities or work-related injuries resulting in 
medical treatment, loss of consciousness, loss of work, 
restriction of work, or transfer to another job. 
(7) Any employer who refuses or neglects to make 
reports, to maintain records, or to file reports with 
the commission as required by this section is guilty of 
a class C misdemeanor and subject to citation under 
Section 35-9-9 and a civil assessment as provided un-
der Section 35-9-21, unless the commission finds that 
the employer has shown good cause for submitting a 
report later than required by this section. 
(8) All physicians, surgeons, and other health pro-
viders, excluding hospitals, attending injured em-
ployees shall comply with all the rules, including the 
schedule of fees, for their services as adopted by the 
commission, and shall make reports to the commis-
sion at any and all times as required as to the condi-
tion and treatment of an injured employee or as to 
any other matter concerning industrial cases they are 
treating. 
(9) A copy of the physician's initial report shall be 
furnished to the commission, the employee, and the 
employer or its insurance carrier. 
(10) Any physician, surgeon, or other health pro-
vider, excluding any hospital, who refuses or neglects 
to make any report or comply with this section is 
guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense, un-
less the commission finds that there is good cause for 
submitting a late report. 1994 
35-1-98. Claims and benefits. 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in 
nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's 
medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee 
does not incur medical expenses reasonably related to 
the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to 
his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a 
period of three consecutive years. 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total 
disability benefits, temporary partial disability bene-
fits, permanent partial disability benefits, or perma-
nent total disability benefits is barred, unless an ap-
plication for hearing is filed with the commission 
within six years after the date of the accident. 
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(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an 
application for hearing is filed within one year of the 
date of death of the employee. iwo 
35-1-99,35-1-100. Repealed. lses, 1990 
35-1-101. Attorney general and county attor-
neys — Duties. 
Upon the request of the commission the attorney 
general, or any county attorney, shall institute and 
prosecute the necessary actions or proceedings for the 
enforcement of any order of the commission or of any 
of the provisions of this chapter, or defend any suit, 
action or proceeding brought against the commission, 
or the members thereof in their official capacity. 1979 
35-1-102. Expenses in acquiring information au-
thorized. 
The commission may make necessary expenditures 
to obtain statistical and other information provided 
for herein. is«s 
35-1-103. Biennial report to governor. 
On or before the 1st day of December preceding the 
regular session of the Legislature the commission, 
under the oath of at least two of its members, shall 
make a report to the governor for the preceding bien-
nial period, which shall include a statement of the 
number of awards made by it, and a general state-
ment of the causes of accidents leading to the injuries 
for which the awards were made, a detailed state-
ment of the disbursements from the expense fund, 
and the condition of its respective funds, together 
with any other matters which the commission deems 
proper to call to the attention of the governor, includ-
ing any recommendations it may have to make; and it 
shall be the duty of the commission from time to time 
to publish and distribute among employers and em-
ployees such general information as to the business 
transacted by the commission as in its judgment may 
be useful. 1953 
35-1-104. Publ icat ion of orders, rules , and rates. 
The commission shall cause to be printed, in proper 
form for distribution to the public, its orders, classifi-
cations, rules, regulations and rules of procedure, and 
shall furnish the same to any person upon application 
therefor. The expense of such publication shall be au-
dited and paid as are other expenses of the commis-
sion. The director of finance shall publish the rates 
fixed by it for insurance in the Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund of Utah. 1986 
35-1-105. Injunction prohibited. 
No injunction shall issue suspending or restraining 
any order, award, or classification adopted by the 
commission, or any action of the state auditor, state 
treasurer, attorney general or the auditor or trea-
surer of any county, required to be taken by them or 
any of them by any of the provisions of this title; but 
nothing herein shall affect any right or defense in 
any action brought by the commission or the state in 
pursuance of authority contained in this title. 1953 
35-1-106. Partial invalidity — Saving c lause . 
Should any section or provision of this title be de-
cided by the courts to be unconstitutional or invalid 
the same shall not affect the validity of the title as a 
whole or any part thereof other than the part so de-
cided to be unconstitutional. 19SS 
35-1-107. U n i n s u r e d E m p l o y e r s ' F u n d . 
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' 
Fund. The fund has the purpose of assisting in the 
payment of workers' compensation benefits to any 
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is 
individually, jointly, or severally liable to pay the 
benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has 
appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have suffi-
cient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to 
cover workers' compensation liabilities. This fund 
succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default 
Indemnity Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay bene-
fits, the fund is liable for all obligations of the em-
ployer as set forth in Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with 
the exception of penalties on those obligations. 
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall 
be provided under Subsection 59-9-101(2). The state 
treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund, and the commission shall make provi-
sions for and direct its distribution. 
(3) Reasonable costs of administration or other fees 
may be paid from the fund. 
(4) The state treasurer shall: 
(a) receive workers' compensation premium 
assessments from the State Tax Commission; and 
(b) invest the Uninsured Employers' Fund to 
ensure maximum investment return for both 
long and short term investments in accordance 
with Section 51-7-12.5. 
(5) The commission shall employ counsel to repre-
sent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceed-
ings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of 
the fund. Upon the request of the commission, the 
attorney general, city attorney, or county attorney of 
the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or 
trial under this title is pending, or in which the em-
ployee resides or an employer resides or is doing busi-
ness, shall aid in the representation of the fund. 
(6) To the extent of the compensation and other 
benefits paid or payable to or on behalf of an em-
ployee or the employee's dependents from the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has 
all the rights, powers, and benefits of the employee or 
the employee's dependents against the employer fail-
ing to make the compensation payments. 
(7) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory 
successor of an insolvent employer is bound by settle-
ments of covered claims by the fund. The court with 
jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this 
section a priority equal to that to which the claimant 
would have been entitled in the absence of this sec-
tion against the assets of the insolvent employer. The 
expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be ac-
corded the same priority as the liquidator's expenses. 
(8) The commission shall periodically file with the 
receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent em-
ployer or insurance carrier statements of the covered 
claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated 
claims against the fund which shall prest^-ve the 
rights of the fund for claims against the assets of the 
insolvent employer. 
(9) When any injury or death for which compensa-
tion is payable from the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, the fund 
has the same rights as allowed under Section 35-1-62. 
(10) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' 
Compensation Division of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting 
its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting 
company, risk management company, insurance com-
pany, or other company that has expertise and capa-
bilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensa-
tion claims. 
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(11) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the 
commission, upon rendering a decision with respect 
to any claim for workers' compensation benefits in 
which an uninsured employer was duly joined as a 
party, shall order the uninsured employer to reim-
burse the Uninsured Employers' Fund for all benefits 
paid to or on behalf of an injured employee by the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund along with interest, 
costs, and attorneys' fees. The commission shall im-
pose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 
15% of the value of the total award in connection with 
the claim, and shall direct that the additional penalty 
be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards 
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter. 
(12) The liability of the state, the Industrial Com-
mission, and the state treasurer, with respect to pay-
ment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, or 
disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, 
is limited to the assets in the fund, and they are not 
otherwise in any way liable for the making of any 
payment. 
(13) The commission may make reasonable rules 
for the processing and payment of claims for compen-
sation from the fund. 
(14) In the event it becomes necessary for the Un-
insured Employers' Fund to pay benefits under this 
section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured 
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may as-
sess all other self-insured employers amounts neces-
sary to pay: 
(a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to 
an insolvency; 
(b) the expenses of handling covered claims 
subsequent to an insolvency; 
(c) the cost of examinations under Subsec<*on 
(15); and 
(d) other expenses authorized by this section. 
The assessments of each self-insured employer 
shall be in the proportion that the manual pre-
mium of the self-insured employer for the preced-
ing calendar year bears to the manual premium 
of all self-insured employers for the preceding 
calendar year. Each self-insured employer shall 
be notified of his assessment not later than 30 
days before it is due. No self-insured employer 
may be assessed in any year an amount greater 
than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual 
premium for the preceding calendar year. If the 
maximum assessment does not provide in any 
one year an amount sufficient to make all neces-
sary payments from the fund for one or more in-
solvent self-insured employers, the unpaid por-
tion shall be paid as soon as funds become avail-
able. All self-insured employers are liable under 
this section for a period not to exceed three years 
after the self-insured employer's voluntary or in-
voluntary termination of self-insurance privi-
leges within this state. This subsection does not 
apply to claims made against an insolvent self-
insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior 
to July 1, 1986. 
(15) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to 
notify the Industrial Commission of any information 
indicating that any self-insured employer may be in-
solvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its 
employees or the public. Upon receipt of that notifica-
tion and with good cause appearing, the Industrial 
Commission may order an examination of that self-
insured employer. The cost of the examination shall 
be assessed against all self-insured employers as pro-
vided in Subsection (14). The results of the examina-
tion shall be kept confidential. 
(16) In any claim against an employer by the Un-
insured Employers' Fund, or by or on behalf of the 
employee to whom or to whose dependents compensa-
tion and other benefits are paid or payable from the 
fund, the burden of proof is on the employer or other 
party in interest objecting to the claim. The claim is 
presumed to be valid up to the full amount of 
workers' compensation benefits claimed by the em-
ployee or his dependents. This subsection applies 
whether the claim is filed in court or in an adjudica-
tive proceeding under the authority of the commis-
sion. 
(17) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a 
sole proprietorship may not recover compensation or 
other benefits from the Uninsured Emplovers' Fund 
if: 
(a) the person is not included as an employee 
under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a); or 
(b) the person is included as an employee un-
der Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), but his employer 
fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate pay-
ment of direct compensation, which failure is at-
tributable to an act or omission over which the 
person had or shared control or responsibility. 
(18) For purposes of Subsection (17Mb): 
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of 
a sole proprietorship are presumed to have had or 
shared control or responsibility for any failure to 
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of 
direct compensation, the burden of proof being on 
any person seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a 
partner of a partnership or an owner of a sole 
proprietorship had or shared control or responsi-
bility for any failure to insure or otherwise pro-
vide adequate payment of direct compensation 
may only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary. 
(19) A director or officer of a corporation may not 
recover compensation or other benefits from the Un-
insured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is 
excluded from coverage under Subsection 
35-l-43(3)(b). 1994 
35-1*108. Managed health care — Health care 
cost containment. 
(1) Self-insured employers and workers' compensa-
tion carriers may adopt a managed health care pro-
gram to provide employees the benefits of this title, 
beginning January 1,1993. The plan may include one 
or more of the following: 
(a) (i) A preferred provider program may be 
developed so long as the program allows a 
selection by the employee of more than one 
physician in the health care specialty re-
quired for treating the specific problem of an 
industrial patient. If a preferred provider 
program is developed by an employer, insur-
ance carrier, or self-insured entity, em-
ployees are required to utilize preferred pro-
vider physicians and medical care facilities. 
If a preferred provider program is not devel-
oped, an industrial claimant may have free 
choice of health care providers. Failure of an 
industrial claimant to utilize a preferred 
health care facility as defined in Section 
26-21-2 as part of a preferred provider pro-
gram, or failure to initially receive treat-
ment from a preferred physician, may, if the 
claimant has been notified of the program, 
result in the claimant being obligated for 
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any charges in excess of the preferred pro-
vider allowances. 
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of 
Subsection (a)(i), a self-insured entity or 
other employer may have its own health care 
facility on or near its worksite or premises 
and may continue to contract with other 
health care providers, or the employer may 
operate a health care facility and require 
employees to first seek treatment at the pro-
vided health care or contracted facility. 
(iii) An employee of an employer utilizing 
a preferred provider program or having its 
own health care facility may procure the ser-
vices of any qualified practitioner 
(A) for emergency treatment if a phy-
sician employed in the program or at the 
facility is not available for any reason; 
(B) for conditions the employee in 
good faith believesare nonindustrial; or 
(C) when an employee living in a ru-
ral area would be unduly burdened by 
traveling to a preferred provider. 
(b) (i) Other contracts with medical care pro-
viders or medical review organizations may 
be made for the following purposes: 
(A) Insurance carriers or self-insured 
employers may form groups in contract-
ing for managed health care services 
with medical providers; 
(B) Peer review; 
(C) Methods of utilization review; 
(D) Use of case management; and 
(E) Bill audit. 
(ii) Insurance carriers may make any or 
all of the factors in Subsection (i) a condition 
of insuring entities in their insurance con-
tract. 
(2) As used in Subsection (1), "physician" means 
any health care provider licensed under Title 58, 
Chapter 5, Podiatrists; Title 58, Chapter 7, Dentists 
and Dental Hygienists Act; Title 58, Chapter 12, 
Practice of Medicine and Surgery and the Treatment 
of Human Ailments; and Title 58, Chapter 24a, Phys-
ical Therapists Practice Act. 
(3) Each workers' compensation insurance carrier 
writing insurance in this state shall maintain a des-
ignated agent in this state registered with the com-
mission. 
(4) In addition to managed health care plans, in-
surance carriers may require employers who have an 
experience modification factor of 1.00 or higher, as 
determined by the National Council on Compensa-
tion Insurance, or who may be determined by the car-
rier to have a three year loss ratio of 100% or higher, 
to establish a workplace safety program which may 
include: 
(a) a written workplace accident and injury re-
duction program that promotes safe and health-
ful working conditions, which is based on clearly 
stated goals and objectives for meeting those 
goals. The program should describe: 
(i) how managers, supervisors, and em-
ployees are responsible for implementing the 
program and how continued participation of 
management will be established, measured, 
and maintained; 
(ii) the methods used to identify, analyze, 
and control new or existing hazards, condi-
tions, and operations; 
(iii) how the program will be communi-
cated to all employees so that they are in-
formed of work-related hazards and controls; 
(iv) how workplace accidents will be in-
vestigated and corrective action imple-
mented; and 
(v) how safe work practices and rules will 
be enforced; and 
(b) a documented review of the workplace acci-
dent and injury reduction program each calendar 
year delineating how procedures set forth in the 
program are met. 
(5) The premiums charged to any employer who 
fails or refuses to establish a workplace safety pro-
gram pursuant to Subsection (4)(a) or (b) may be in-
creased by 5% over any existing current rates and 
premium modifications charged that employer. 1992 
35-1-109. Workers' compensation insurance 
fraud — Elements — Penalties — No-
tice. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-201(3). 
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(2). 
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(2). 
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in Sub-
section 76-1-601(8). 
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(3). 
(2) Any person who has intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly, devised any icheme or artifice to obtain 
workers' compensation insurance coverage, disability 
compensation, medical benefits, goods, professional 
services, fees for professional services, or anythingof 
value under this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act, by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and who intentionally, knowingly, or reck-
lessly communicates or causes a communication with 
another in furtherance of the scheme or artifice, is 
guilty of workers' compensation insurance fraud, 
which is punishable in the manner prescribed by Sec-
tion 76-10-1801 for communication fraud. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the of-
fense of workers' compensation insurance fraud un-
der the same conditions as those set forth in Section 
76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense 
under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total 
value of all property, money, or other things obtained 
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice 
described in Subsection (1), except as provided in 
Subsection 76-10-1801(l)(e). 
(5) Reliance on the part of any person is not a nec-
essary element of the offense described in Subsection 
(1). 
(6) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any 
offense described in Subsection (1) to permanently 
deprive any person of property, money, or anything of 
value is not a necessary element of this offense. 
(7) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compen-
sation insurance coverage includes any scheme or ar-
tifice to make or cause to be made any false written or 
oral statement or business reorganization, incorpora-
tion, or change in ownership intended to obtain insur-
ance coverage as mandated by this chapter or Chap-
ter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at rates that do 
not reflect the risk, industry, employer, or class codes 
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35-3-3. Legal nature of Workers' Compensation Fund. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund is a nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-pub-
lic corporation. It is an independent state agency and a body politic and corpo-
rate. It is a legal entity and may sue and be sued in its own name. All of its 
business and affairs shall be conducted in the name of the Workers' Compen-
sation Fund of Utah. 
^
8 t o r y ! c - 1953» 35-3-3, enacted by L. Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 279 repealed a former 
19S8, ch. 56, S 6. § 35-3-3, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 242, 
Repeals and Reenactmento. — Laws 1988, § 58, relating to the State Insurance Fund, ef-
cn. 56, § 6 repeals former $ 35-3-3, as enacted fective July 1, 1986, and enacted another for-
by Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 279, relating to the mer i 35-3-3. 
name and nature of the fund, effective July 1, 
1988, and enact* the present section. 
35-3-5. Board of directors. 
(1) There is created a board of directors of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund. The board shall be composed of five directors, to be appointed by the 
governor with approval of the Senate and one of which shall be the executive 
director of the Department of Administrative Services or his designee, who 
shall represent the state as a policyholder. The governor shall appoint two 
directors who are owners, officers, or employees of policyholders other than 
the state that have been insured by the Workers' Compensation Fund for at 
least one year prior to appointment. The governor shall appoint two directors 
from the public in general. At least three directors appointed by the governor 
shall have had previous experience in investments, risk management, occupa-
tional safety, casualty insurance, or law. Any director who represents a poli-
cyholder that fails to maintain workers' compensation insurance through the 
Workers' Compensation Fund shall immediately resign from the board. No 
person may be a director who has any interest as a stockholder, employee, 
attorney, or contractor of a competing insurance carrier providing workers' 
compensation insurance in Utah. 
(2) Any director appointed by the governor may, after notice and a hearing, 
be removed by the governor for neglect of duty, inefficiency, or malfeasance. 
(3) Directors shall post a bond in an amount specified by the director of the 
Division of Finance. The bond is considered an expense of the Workers' Com-
pensation Fund to be paid out of the Iryury Fund. 
(4) The term of office of the directors appointed by the governor shall be 
four years, beginning July 1 of the year of appointment. The directors shall 
hold office until the appointment and qualification of their successors. The 
terms of office for directors appointed by the governor shall be staggered so 
that one term shall expire each year on June 30. Vacancies on the board shall 
be filled by appointment of the governor for the remainder of any unexpired 
term. 
(5) Of the directors appointed to the board with terms beginning July 1, 
1988, one shall be appointed to a term ending June 30,1989, one appointed to 
a term ending June 30, 1990, one appointed to a term ending June 30, 1991, 
and one appointed to a term ending June 30, 1992. 
(6) The board shall annually elect a chairman and such other officers as 
needed from its membership. No additional compensation beyond travel ex-
penses and per diem allowance may be paid for these responsibilities. 
(7) The board shall meet at least quarterly at a time and place designated 
by the chairman. Three directors shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of 
transacting all business of the board. Each decision of the board requires the 
affirmative vote of at least three directors for approval. 
(8) Directors appointed to the board shall receive actual and reasonable 
travel expenses for meetings of the board. The directors appointed by the 
governor shall receive a per diem allowance and reimbursement for actual 
and necessary expenses incurred in carrying out official duties as provided 
under Section 63-1-14.5. Per diem and expenses may be paid for no more than 
20 days each year. Per diem allowance and expenses shall be paid out of the 
Injury Fund upon vouchers drawn by the chief executive officer in the same 
manner as the normal operating expenses of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund are paid. The executive director of the Department of Administrative 
Services, or his designee, shall serve on the board without a per diem allow-
ance. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-5, enacted by L. § 35-3-5, as enacted by Laws 1985, cb. 242, 
1988, ch. 56, 5 8. § 58, relating to the State Insurance Fund, and 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988, enacted another former § 35-3-5. 
ch. 56, § 8 repeals former § 35-3-5, as enacted Cross-References, — Appointment of direc-
by Laws 1986, ch. 204, 5 279, relating to liabil- tor of Division of Finance, $ 63-1-12. 
ity of officers and employees, effective July 1, Appointment of executive director of Depart-
1988, and enacts the present section.
 m e n t o f Administrative Services, 5 63-1-4. 
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Section 
35-3-1. Definitions. 
35-3-2. Establishment of the Workers* Compen-
sation Fund and the Injury Fund. 
35-3-3. Legal nature of Workers' Compensation 
Fund. 
35-3-4. Price of insurance — Liability of state. 
35-3-5. Board of directors. 
35-3-6. Duties of board. 
35-3-7. Powers and duties of chief executive offi-
cer. 
35-3-8. Liability limited. 
35-3-9. Repealed. 
35-3-10. Audits and examinations required. 
35-3-11. Adoption of rates. 
35-3-12. Withdrawal of policyholders. 
35-3-13. Cancellation of policies. 
35-3-14. Premium assessment. 
35-3-15. Interest and costs of collecting delin-
quent premium. 
35-3-16. Dividends. 
35-3-17. Availability of employers' reports. 
35-3-18. Workers' Compensation Fund exempted. 
35-3-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the board of directors of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund. 
(2) "Chief executive officer" means the chief 
executive officer appointed by the board. 
(3) "Director" means a member of the board. 
(4) "Fund" and "Workers' Compensation 
Fund" mean the nonprofit, quasi-public corpora-
tion established by this chapter. 
(5) "Injury Fund" means the premiums, re-
serves, investment income, and any other funds 
administered by the Workers' Compensation 
Fund as provided in this chapter. iwo 
35-3-2. Establishment of the Workers' Compen-
sation Fund and the Injury Fund. 
(1) (a) There is created a nonprofit, quasi-public 
corporation to be known as the Workers' Com-
pensation Fund of Utah, 
(b) The purpose of the fund is to: 
(i) insure Utah employers against liability 
for compensation based on job-related acci-
dental injuries and occupational diseases; 
and 
(ii) assure payment of this compensation 
to Utah employees who are entitled to it un-
ueT Tttte S5, CnapteTB \ and % 
(2) (a) There is created an Injury Fund, which 
shall be maintained by the Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund. 
(b) The Injury Fund shall consist of all assets 
acquired from premiums and penalties paid into 
the Injury Fund and interest and dividends 
earned on those assets. 
(c) The Injury Fund is the sole source of mon-
ies to: 
(i) pay losses sustained on account of the 
insurance provided; and 
(ii) pay salaries and other expenses of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund in accordance 
with this chapter. 1990 
$5-3-3. Legal nature of Workers* Compensation 
Fund. 
(1) The Workers' Compensation Fund is: 
(a) a nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public 
corporation; and 
(b) a legal entity, which may sue and be sued 
in its own name. 
(2) All of the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion shall be conducted in the name of the Workers* 
Compensation Fund of Utah. i9eo 
35-3-4. Price ol insurance — Liability of state. 
(1) The Workers' Compensation Fund shall provide 
porkers' compensation insurance at an actuarially 
sound price, which the board shall determine. 
(2) The state is not liable for the expenses, liabili-
ties, or debts of the Workers' Compensation Fund, 
and may not use any assets of the Injury Fund for any 
purpose. 1990 
35-3-5. Board of directors. 
(1) There is created a board of directors of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund. 
(2) The board shall consist of seven directors. 
(3) One of the directors shall be the executive di-
rector of the Department of Administrative Services 
or his designee. 
(4) One of the directors shall be the chief executive 
officer of the fund. 
(5) The governor, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, shall appoint: 
(a) three directors who are owners, officers, or 
employees of policyholders other than the state 
that have been insured by the Workers' Compen-
sation Fund for at least one year before their ap-
pointment; and 
(b) two directors from the public in general. 
(6) No two directors may represent the same poli-
cyholder. 
(7) At least four directors appointed by the gover-
nor shall have had previous experience in invest-
ments, risk management, occupational safety, casu-
alty insurance, or law. 
(8) Any director who represents a policyholder that 
fails to maintain workers' compensation insurance 
through the Workers' Compensation Fund shall im-
mediately resign from the board. 
(9) A person may not be a director if he: 
(a) has any interest as a stockholder, em-
ployee, attorney, or contractor of a competing in-
surance carrier providing workers' compensation 
insurance in Utah; 
(b) fails to meet or comply with the conflict of 
interest policies established by the board; or 
(c) is not bondable. 
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(10) After notice and a hearing, the governor may 
remove any director for neglect of duty, inefficiency, 
or malfeasance. 
(11) The term of office of the directors appointed by 
the governor shall be four years, beginning July 1 of 
the year of appointment. The appointments shall be 
staggered so that no more than two terms expire each 
year on June 30. 
(12) Each director shall hold office until his succes-
sor is appointed and qualified. 
(13) Any vacancy on the board shall be filled by 
appointment of the governor for the remainder of any 
unexpired term. 
(14) The board shall annually elect a chairman and 
other officers as needed from its membership. 
(15) The board may not provide or pay any com-
pensation except for these responsibilities as set forth 
in Subsection (20). 
(16) The board shall meet at least quarterly at a 
time and place designated by the chairman. 
(17) The chairman may call board meetings more 
frequently than quarterly and shall call additional 
board meetings if requested to do so by a majority of 
the board. 
(18) Four directors are a quorum for the purpose of 
transacting all business of the board. 
(19) Each decision of the board requires the affir-
mative vote of at least four directors for approval. 
(20) Directors appointed to the board shall: 
(a) receive actual and reasonable travel ex-
penses for meetings of the board; and 
(b) receive a per diem allowance and reim-
bursement for actual and necessary expenses in-
curred in carrying out official duties established 
by the director of the Division of Finance under 
the authority of Section 63A-3-106. 
(21) The fund shall pay the per diem allowance and 
expenses from the Injury Fund upon vouchers drawn 
in the same manner as the Workers' Compensation 
Fund pays its normal operating expenses. 
(22) The executive director of the Department of 
Administrative Services, or his designee, and the 
chief executive officer of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund shall serve on the board without a per diem 
allowance. 1983 
35-3-6. Duties of board. 
(1) The board shall: 
(a) appoint a chief executive officer to adminis-
ter the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(b) receive and act upon financial, manage-
ment, and actuarial reports covering the opera-
tions of the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(c) ensure that the Workers' Compensation 
Fund is administered according to law; 
(d) examine and approve an annual operating 
budget for the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(e) serve as investment trustees and fiducia-
ries of the Injury Fund; 
(f) receive and act upon recommendations of 
the chief executive officer; 
(g) develop broad policy for the long-term oper-
ation of the Workers' Compensation Fund, con-
sistent with its mission and fiduciary responsibil-
ity; 
(h) subject to Sections 31A-19-401 through 
31 A-19-420, approve any rating plans that would 
modify a policyholder's premium; 
(i) subject to Sections 31 A-19-401 through 
31 A-19-420, approve the amount of deviation, if 
any, from standard insurance rates; 
0") approve the amount of the dividends, if any, 
to be returned to policyholders; 
(k) adopt a procurement policy consistent with 
the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Pro-
curement Code; 
(1) develop and publish an annual report to 
policyholders, the governor, the Legislature, and 
interested parties that describes the financial 
condition of the Injury Fund, including a state-
ment of expenses and income and what measures 
were taken or will be necessary to keep the In-
jury Fund actuarially sound; 
(m) establish a fiscal year; 
(n) determine and establish an actuarially 
sound price for insurance offered by the fund; 
(0) establish conflict of interest requirements 
that govern the board, officers, and employees; 
and 
(p) perform all other acts necessary for the pol-
icymaking and oversight of the Workers' Com-
pensation Fund. 
(2) Subject to board review and its responsibilities 
under Subsection (IKe), the board may delegate au-
thority to make daily investment decisions. 1992 
35-3-7. Powers and duties of chief executive of-
ficer. 
(1) The chief executive officer shall: 
(a) administer all operations of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund under the direction of the 
board; 
(b) recommend to the board any necessary or 
desirable changes in the workers' compensation 
law; 
(c) recommend to the board an annual admin-
istrative budget covering the operations of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund and, upon ap-
proval, submit the administrative budget, finan-
cial status, and actuarial condition of the fund to 
the governor and the Legislature for their exami-
nation; 
(d) direct and control all expenditures of the 
approved budget; 
(e) from time to time, upon the recommenda-
tion of a consulting actuary, recommend to the 
board rating plans, the amount of deviation, if 
any, from standard rates, and the amount of divi-
dends, if any, to be returned to policyholders; 
(0 invest the Injury Fund's assets under the 
guidance of the board and in accordance with the 
provisions of Title 31 A, Chapter 18; 
(g) recommend general policies and procedures 
to the board to guide the operations of the fund; 
(h) formulate and administer a system of per-
sonnel administration and employee compensa-
tion that uses merit principles of personnel man-
agement, includes employee benefits and griev-
ance procedures consistent with those applicable 
to state agencies, and includes in-service train-
ing programs; 
(i) prepare and administer fiscal, payroll, ac-
counting, data processing, and procurement pro-
cedures for the operation of the Workers' Com-
pensation Fund; 
(j) conduct studies of the workers' compensa-
tion insurance business, including the prepara-
tion of recommendations and reports; 
(k) develop uniform procedures for the man-
agement of the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(1) maintain contacts with governmental and 
other public or private groups having an interest 
in workers' compensation insurance; 
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(m) within the l imitations of the budget, em-
ploy necessary staff personnel and consultants, 
including actuaries, attorneys, medical exam-
iners, adjusters, investment counselors, accoun-
tants, and clerical and other assistants to accom-
plish the purpose of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund; 
(n) maintain appropriate levels of property, ca-
sualty, and liability insurance as approved by the 
board to protect the fund, its directors, officers, 
employees, and assets; and 
(o) develop self-insurance programs as ap-
proved by the board to protect the fund, its direc-
tors, officers, employees, and assets to supersede 
or supplement insurance maintained under Sub-
section (n). 
(2) The chief executive officer may: 
(a) enter into contracts of workers' compensa-
tion and occupational disease insurance, which 
may include employer's liability insurance to 
cover the exposure of a policyholder to his Utah 
employees and their dependents for liability 
claims, including the cost of defense in the event 
of suit, for claims based upon bodily injury to the 
policyholder's Utah employees; 
(b) reinsure any risk or part of any risk; 
(c) cause to be inspected and audited the pay-
rolls of policyholders or employers applying to 
t t a Workers' CQm^ei&a&wv Furvd fat \x\svitaxvcfc\ 
(d) establish procedures for adjusting claims 
against the Workers' Compensation Fund that 
comply with Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, and de-
termine the persons to whom and through whom 
the payments of compensation are to be made; 
(e) contract with physicians, surgeons, hospi-
tals , and other health care providers for medical 
and surgical treatment and the care and nursing 
of injured persons entitled to benefits from the 
Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(f) require policyholders to maintain an ade-
quate deposit to provide security for periods of 
coverage for which premiums have not been paid; 
(g) contract with self-insured entities for the 
administration of workers' compensation claims 
and safety consultation services; and 
(h) with the approval of the board, adopt the 
calendar year or any other reporting period to 
report claims and payments made or reserves es-
tablished on claims that are necessary to accom-
modate the reporting requirements of the Insur-
ance Commission, Industrial Commission, State 
Tax Commission, or National Council on Com-
pensation Insurance. 1990 
35-3-8. Liabil i ty l imited. 
W> H o officeT OT employee oSt^e^oTVers' Compen-
sation Fund is liable in a private capacity for any act 
performed or obligation entered into when done in 
good faith, without intent to defraud, and in an offi-
cial capacity in connection with the administration, 
management, or conduct of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund or affairs relating to it. 
(2) Subject to the director's fiduciary responsibility 
as established by Section 35-3-5, no director of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund is liable in a private 
capacity for any act performed or obligation entered 
into when done in good faith, without intent to de-
fraud, and in an official capacity in connection with 
the administration, management, or conduct of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund or affairs relating to it. 
1990 
35-3-9. Repealed. i9*o 
35-3-10. Audits and examinations required. 
(1) The state auditor shall audit the Workers' Com-
pensation Yund annually. 
(2) (a) The insurance commissioner shall examine 
the Injury Fund according to the purposes and 
procedures provided in Sections 31A-2-203 
through 31A-2-205 at least once every five years. 
(b) The chief executive officer shall pay the 
necessary expense of this examination from the 
Injury Fund. 1990 
35.3-II. Adoption of rates. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund shall adopt the 
rates approved by the insurance commissioner under 
Titl£ 31A, Chapter 19, Part IV. The chief executive 
officer, with t ne approval of the board, may file with 
the insurance commissioner a resolution to deviate 
from the rates approved by the insurance commis-
sioner in order to provide workers' compensation in-
surance at the lowest possible cost to policyholders 
consistent with maintaining the actuarial soundness 
of the Injury Fund. 1988 
35.3-12. Withdrawal of po l i cyho lders . 
Any policyholder may, upon complying with Sec-
tion 31A-22-1002, withdraw from the Workers' Com-
pensation Fund by providing an advance written no-
tice of his intent to cancel. The policyholder shall re-
main liable for any unpaid premium for periods of 
coverage prior to cancellation. 1988 
35-3-13. Cance l la t ion of po l ic ies . 
The Workers' Compensation Fund may cancel a 
policy prior to the conclusion of the policy period only: 
(1) by agreeing to the cancellation with the 
policyholder and sending notice of the cancella-
tion to the industrial commission; 
(2) for nonpayment of premium, after 30 days' 
notice to the Industrial Commission and to the 
policyholder; or 
(3) for failure on the part of the policyholder to 
comply with the contractual provisions of the pol-
icy, after 30 days' notice to the industrial com-
mission and the policyholder. 1988 
35-3-14. P r e m i u m a s s e s s m e n t . 
The Workers' Compensation Fund is liable for the 
premium assessment provided by Subsection 
59-9-101(2) to the same extent as private workers' 
compensation insurance companies. 1994 
35-3-15. Interest and costs of collecting delin-
quent premium. 
If the Workers' Compensation Fund commences a 
legal action for collection of delinquent premium, it is 
entitled, in addition to the unpaid premium, to inter-
est on. the. uxupaid ^ TCTCIULTCI at tbA &&m& tate. as, U thaa 
being charged by the United States Internal Revenue 
Service for delinquent taxes from the due date of the 
unpaid premium, and for all costs of collection includ-
ing reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. The 
remedies of the Workers' Compensation Fund under 
this section do not affect or diminish, and may be 
exercised in addition to, its right to cancel policies 
under Sections 35-3-12 and 35-3-13. 1988 
35-3-16. D iv idends . 
The board may declare a dividend to policyholders 
if it determines that a surplus exists in the Injury 
Fund at the end of a fiscal period after the payment of 
all claims, administrative costs, and the establish-
ment of appropriate reserves for future liabilities. In 
making this determination, the board shall require a 
certified audit and actuarial report of the financial 
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condition of the Injury Fund. The board shall estab-
lish uniform eligibility requirements for such divi-
dends. In determining the amount of dividend to be 
paid to policyholders, the board may establish a pro-
cedure which takes into consideration the claims loss 
experience of policyholders as an incentive to encour-
age safe working conditions for employees. The 
Workers' Compensation Fund may use dividends to 
offset amounts due or owing by policyholders or for-
mer policyholders. 1988 
35-3-17. Availability of employers' reports. 
The Department of Employment Security shall 
make the employers' annual reports provided for in 
Section 35-1-41 available to the Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund, to the same extent they would be available 
to private insurers. 1988 
35-3-18. Workers* Compensation Fund ex-
empted. 
(1) The Workers' Compensation Fund is exempt 
from the provisions of: 
(a) Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act; and 
(b) Title 63, Chapter 1, Parts 1 through 9, 
Utah Administrative Services Act. 
(2) The board may specifically exempt the 
Workers' Compensation Fund from any provisions of 
Title 67, Chapter 19, Utah State Personnel Manage-
ment Act, and Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procure-
ment Code. 
(3) The provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Admin-
istrative Procedures Act, do not govern the initial 
determination of any person's eligibility for benefits 
under Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, 
and Title 35, Chapter 2, Occupational Disease Dis-
ability Compensation. 1991 
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v. ENRIOUE JIMENEZ £T AL. , Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No, R-81-161. Decided June 2, 1982. 
1. INJUNCTION - ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS -
PROCESS IN GENERAL, 
A petition for injunction shall be 
processed under Rule 57.1 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 
2. ID* - SATORE AND GROUNDS IN GENERAL -
NATURE AND FORM OF REMEDY - WHEN PROPER. 
IN GEUZKhL - ABSENCE OF FACTUAL CON-
TROVERSY - MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
An injunction may be issued without 
hearing when, absent a factual controversy, 
the case is adjudicated through summary 
judgment. 
3. CORPORATIONS - INCORPORATION AND ORGANIZATION -
NATURE OF INCORPORATION - IN GENERAL, 
The Puerto Rico Telephone Company is 
a public-private corporation that 
cannot deny its condition as such 
just because it was incorporated as 
— a private corporation in the State 
Of Delaware, 
4. ID. - ID. - KINDS AND CLASSES OF CORPORATIONS -
PUBLIC-PRIVATE CORPORATION'S. 
The provision of art. 9 of Act No, 25 
of May $, 1974, to the effect that 
nothing in that act shall bo construed 
as to grant to the Puerto Rtco 
Telephone Company the status of a 
public corporation, does not prevent 
that it be considered as a public-
private corporation. The preservation 
of private company status would simply 
ensure the taxability of the interests 
paid in excess of the soney in debentures. 
5, PUBLIC OfFICEKS AND EMPLOYEES - IN GENERAL -
APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION AND TENURE -
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYMENTS, AND POWER TO 
APPOINT AND REMOVE - IN GENERAL -
PERSONNEL ACT. 
The merit principle that governs the 
rules of the public service personnel 
JUN-04-Se IB:09 FROM. ID) PAGE 
78 
ID 
system applies to the Telephone 
Authority and its subsidiary 
Puerto Rico Telephone Company, 
even though they are organised 
as private corporations* 
. - ID. - ID, - ID. - ID. - ID, 
The intent of the 1975 Public Servj.ce 
Personnel Act wa9 to extend the 
benefits of a personnel administratis: 
based on the merit principle, to the 
greatest number of public employees. 
, STATUTES, CUSTOMS AND EQUITY - ENACTMENT, 
REQUISITES, AND VM-IDITY - APPROVAL 
OP BILLS BY THE EXECUTIVE - APPROVAL 
Or REGULATIONS FOR APPLICATION OF 
ACTS - DISCIPLINE REGULATIONS OF THE 
PUERTO RXCO TELEPHONE COMPANY* 
Rule «1 of the Discipline Regulations 
of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company 
is not valid because it allows for 
removal of employees without hearing• 
UOGMENT of Carmen Scnla 2*yas, Judge (San Juan), 
which found for plaintiff in a complaint 
for injunction. Affirmed. 
Daniel R. Porcf nguez "for appellants'. 




IN THE SUPREME C0U31T OF PUERTO RICO 
Aurea E. Torres Ponce, 
Plaintiff-appellee 
v. No. R-81-161 Review 
Enrique Jim4nez et al., 
Defendants^appe Hants 
MR. JUSTICE DAVILA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
San Juan, Puerto Hico, June 2, 1982 
Appeal is taken from the judgment ordering that 
plaintiff be reinstated in her position and that she 
receive back pay from the date she was disffissed, plus 
any other benefits to which she is entitled. The 
following finding* of fact made by the trial court are 
not in controversy- Plaintiff started working for the 
Puerto Rico Telephone Co, in April 1972. She wcricsd 
there for seven consecutive years and was continually 
promoted for her work. Plaintiff is not a member of 
Exhibits 2" and 3 - A copy of the personnel 
record reveals the dates of the promotions and 
the corresponding periodical salary raises. 
Exhibit 4 - Letter dated June 7, 1975, 
from the Corporation's President thanking 
plaintiff for the extraordinary zeal dis-
played in her work* 
Exhibit 3 - Letter datsd May 27, 1977, 
from the Corporation's President thanking 
plaintiff for her continuous commitment, to 
her worK, raising her salary to .$7,809.00. 
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the Union that represents the Telephone Co^s employes 
because her position does not fall within the appropriate 
unit. She is part of the management. When she was 
dismissed, she was a regular employee. She had passed 
the probationary period* She held a position as accountant, 
on October 9, 1918, she; was summarily dismissed without 
hearing. She went to court* 
On October 30, 1978, after receiving a petition for 
injunction, the court set a hearing for November 29, 1973. 
Notice was served as provided by law, On November 2:8, 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The parties met in 
chambers. Both parties offered several documents in 
evidence. The minutes reveal that they were granted a 
thirty-day tern to file their briefs, and defendant was 
given ten dAys, after notice of plaintiff1* brief was 
served, to answer the complaint. 
(1) Section 678 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, 
32 L.P.R.A. 5 3524(3) ,2 provides that a petition for 
injunction Shall be processed under Rule 57.1 o£ Civil 
*To restrain the application or 
enforcement of any statute of the 
Legislature of Puerto Rico, or the 
performance by a public officer, a 
public corporation, or a public agency, 
or by any employee or officer of such 
corporation or agency of any act 
authorized by law of the Legislature 
of Puerto rlico, unless it has been 
determined by finalr firm, unappealable, 
and unreviewable judgment that such 
statute or act authorized by law is 
unconstitutional or invalid. 
"Provided, however, that the court 
may issue said temporary restraining 
order, preliminary or permanent 
injunction subject to the terms o£ 
Bul« 57 of Civil Procedure: . , . .* 
R-81-161 (Translation) 
Procedure. Rule 57,1 provide* that no preliminary injunction 
shall be issued without notice to the adverse party and 
that the hearings for a preliminary and a permanent 
injunction may be consolidated. Rule 57.1 is equivalent 
to Rule 65 {al of the Federal Rulea of Civil Procedure. 
This rule has often been construed in the federal juris* 
diction. It is clear that the purpose of the hearing 
is to receive evidence to elucidate tha facts in con-
troversy. 7 Moore's federal Practice, sec. 65.04(3], at 65-59/ 
and cases therein cited. 
In Securities and Exch. Coro'n v. Murphy, 625 ?.2d 
633 (1980), defendant alleged that the trial 
court erred when it issued a preliminary injunction, 
without holding an evidentiary hearing, upon granting 
a Tnotion for summary judgment. The appellate court 
affirmed this decision. After considering all the cir-
cumstances, it concluded that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission had clearly established the absence of a genuine 
"**' Notice. No preliminary injunction 
shall be issued without notice to the 
adverse party. 
* <b) Consolidation of hearing with 
trial on_ merits. Before or after the 
commencement of the hearing of an 
application for a preliminary injunction, 
the court may order the trial of the 
action on the merits to be consolidated 
with the hearing of the application. 
Even when this consolidation is not 
ordered, any evidence, received in the 
hearing of an application tor preliminary 
injunction which would be admissible 
upon the trial on the merits becomes 
part of the record of the case and need 
not be repeated upon the trial.* 




factual controversy. Since the purpose of a hearing la 
to listen tc all parties and recaive evidence on the facts 
in controversy, absent such controversy, the injunction 
could be issued without hearing- See: Sims v. Greene, 
161 F.2d 87 (1947); Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. 
v. National Farners Org, Inc., 446 F.2d 353, 356 
.'19715; Socialist Workers v. 111. State Bd. of 
Election;, SS6 P.2d 586 (1977). 
In the case Corujo Collaso v* Viera Martinez, 111 
O.P.ff, 552 (1981), we held that petitions for injunction 
must be decided under Rule 57 of the Rui.es of Civil 
Procedure, and that ail other rules are supplementary 
thereto as long as they do not altar the summary character 
of the action. 
In the case at bar, defendant filed a motion to dis-
miss. He alleged aa a question o£ law that an injunction 
did net lie because the Puerto Rico Telephone Co, was 
net a public instrumentality, He deemed that the com-
plaint should be dismissed because it did not allege a 
sufficient cause on which to grant relief. It is evident 
that the trial court acted pursuant to Rule 10,2 of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure and considered the motion to 
dismiss as a motion for Summary Judgment. The parties 
4 
" • . . the following defenses 
fr.ay at the option of the pleader 
be made by motion: . • . (5) failure 
to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted; (6) . . . . if, 
on a motion asserting the defense 
numbered (5), matters outside the 
pleading being attacked ^r^ presented 
to and net excluded by the court/ 
the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary Judgment and dis-
posed of as provided in Rule 36 until 
its final disposition, and all parties 
ft-$l~L61 (Translation) 
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raised no objection thereto. The minute* cf that day 
show that, while in their in-cha^ibers meeting, they agreed 
to file their briefa. The note handwritten by the judge 
on the record states that the case was taken under advise-
ment. The defendant never questioned the facts alleged in 
the cojnplaint. He could have questioned them while 
in-chambers but did not do so. Neither iid he deny them 
during the ten-day term granted by the court to answer the 
complaint after being served with notice ef plaintiff's 
brief. He filed several briefs on whether or net the 
5 
Puerto Rico Telephone Company wee a public corporation. 
He had the opportunity to request a hearing and did not 
do so. All his acts reveal that he knew that the controversy 
was one of law and not of facts. He stay not allege now 
that due process of law was not followed. 
[2} The case at bar ia similar to Securities and Excfr. 
Com'n v. Murphy, supra* An injunction may be issued without 
hearing when, absent a factual controversy, the case is 
adjudicated through summary judgment. 
We will now examine tne core of the appeal. 
shall be given reasonable opportunity 
to present all material pertinent to 
such motion under said rule." 
Motions of February 12, 1979, February 16, 
1979, October 15, 1979, and April 11, I960, 
In Jacobson & Co., inc. v. Armstrong Cor ft Co. , 
548 F.2d *"JB(1977)/ tne edurE—decided 
that defendant could not complain that a hearing 
was not conducted when it had had the opportunity 
to request it in order to offer evidence before 
the injunction was issued, and did not do so. 
J U N - 0 4 - 3 8 16=11 FROM* ID« PAGE 10 
R-31-161 (Translation) 
Q\ 
After World War I there was a need to develop publ ic 
corporations to meet the new and numerous tasks faced 
toy Western nat ions . Whereas, previously, governments only 
regulated the operation of some industr ies , now they 
vera forced to carry out by themselves certain economic 
a c t i v i t i e s . 7 Per instance , during the war, the United 
Scates too* over ra i lroads , telephones, and te legraphs. 
In an age of cap i ta i s carc i ty and high taxation of p r o f i t s , 
where investment r isks were great , public corporations were 
es tab l i shed in those econonic sec tor* that private enter-
prise would not touch. 8 In d i f f e r e n t countries th i s 
development was seldom the product of systematic and 
del iberate l e g i s l a t i o n . In most cases , the determining 
motive behind their creation was a blend of p o l i t i c a l and 
pract ica l f a c t o r s . From th* i n f i n i t e variety of public 
corporations, three part icular types can be d i s t inguished . 
1} Government departments or agencies . 
I) The public corporations proper es tabl i shed by 
statute* 
3) The jo int stock conpauriies controlled t o t a l l y or 
partially by the Government, e s tab l i shed under the laws that 
govern private corporations. 
7 L i l i e n t h a l , The Conduct of Business 
Enterprises by the Tederai Government, 54 
H*gv,'L. R»v /145 . 547 (lft4U . the frolic 
Corporation, A Comparative Synpoaium S4; 
CW.Friedmann e d . , Carsweli Company, Canada 1954). 
^The Public Corporation, k Comparative 
Symposium, s_upca at 542. 
9 I £ . at 545. 
1 0 I d . at 547. 
Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations, 
21 Va. L. Rev. 351(19353 . ~~ 
R-91-161 translat ion) 
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lr. the United States, many corporations of the third 
type have been incorporated under the general incorporation 
12 law* of Delaware. Therein, as well as in other 
countries, many of those created under private corporation 
laws underwent great modifications. 
Adoption of corporate form has been seen to have 
several advantages, among them, avoidance of traditional 
and rigid regulation* in furtherance of managerial efficiency 
13 
and originality. 
The public-private corporate form allows for independent 
operation. It need not wait for annual appropriations 
of funds for its operation. It produces and raises its 
own capital. It may reinvest the surplus, save or drop 
consumer prices, as convenient. The financial statements 
shall be under the responsibility of the agencies provided by law, 
through periodical reports prepared by public and private auditors. 
The fact that such a corporation does not operate for profit 
but for public benefit does not justify managerial disregard 
for Its successful operation. On the contrary, by reason' 
of its special status it has a greater obligation to 
14 
appraise costs and report its operations. Regarding 
its personnel policy, it is axiomatic that 
business efficiency requires selection, promotion, and 
IS 
retention of employees on a purely merit basis. Generally, 
l2Id. at 3€4. 
13Lilienthal, supra at 563. 
l4Lilienthal, supra at 565; The Public 
Corporation, supra at 5904 
The Public Corporation, supra at 590. 
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in government agencies and departments, recruitment and 
tenure s£ employees will be based on their political 
qualifications. But the type of corporation under our 
consideration has enough, freedom to ignore political 
factors and to work out it* own solution to problems of 
employee compensation, work, schedule, incentives, tenure, 
and labor relations. The quality of the relations between 
^anagenent and employees can become the chief asset of 
a corporation. The personnel in these corporations 
must be imbued with the ideal of the public service, 
notwithstanding that they are not part of the personnel 
central system. Up to what point these employees should fczzn 
part of this system is strongly determined by traditions, 
by the desire for security and other considerations which 
16 
vary frcn country tc ccuntry* 
The most important prohlero faced by each country 
ts that of striking an adequate balance between the 
corporation's managerial autonomy and the political 
responsibility of offering an adequate public direction. 
Notwithstanding that its status is similar to that of 
a legal private person, this characteristic may not 
prevail over the public responsibilities entailed by lr.a 
organization. The combination of public law controls, 
en the one hand, and private law on the other, is still 
a difficult matter to accept for the legal pursuit but 
it is absolutely essential in the existing soeio-historical 
circumstances. 
The Public Corporation, supra at 563-5G5* 
17Id, at 591-593. 
R-31-161 {Translation} 
[3! Appellant alleges that the Puerto Fico Telephone Co. is a 
private corporation, since i t was incorporated and ho Ids a private 
corporation status under the Delaware Corporation Lav. It meets the 
requirements of a private corporation. But, as we have seen, this 
Is not a reason for denying the fact that i t is a public-pri-vate 
corporation. Althou^l i t is Incorporated as a private corporation 
under the Delaware Corporation la*, the Telephone Authority, a public 
corporation of the Ganmonwaalth of Puerto Rico, owns 100% of its shares. 
It has a dual public-private personality inter-ced to offer better 
public services and to achieve certain purposes. Act No. 25 of flay 6, 
1974 (27 L.P.R.A. S 4 0 5 ) i S allowed the Telephone Authority, 
AQ
 "The Authority i s hereby empowered 
to acquire the System or a l l of the issued 
and outstanding shares of the common stock 
of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company (the 
"Company"5 for such price and upon such 
terms and conditions*as the Authority shal l 
determine are in the best i n t e r e s t s of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, i t being pro-
vided that the Authority as we l l as the 
Company and i t s parent companies rcay 
negot iate the transaction free ly and 
without the intervention cf third par t i e s , 
including the Public Service Commission. 
In connection with the acquis i t ion of 
the System the Authority may in i t s d i s -
cret ion assume the payment of principal 
and i n t e r e s t of any or a l l of the bonds 
of the company• and assume any at a l l 
of the debts and obl igat ions of the 
Company/ and provide for the assignment 
to the Authority, or i t s designee, of 
any or a l l of the outstanding contracts 
and intangible r ights and i n t e r e s t s of 
the Company. In the event that the 
Authority acquires a l l cf the common 
stock of s&ii Company a l l the mairJbers 
of the Governing Board sha l l cons t i tu te 
the Board of Directors of the Company, 
i t being further provided that the 
Executive Director of the Authority 
sha l l hold the pos i t ion of President of 
t h e Puerto Rico Telephone Company, The 
Authority nay, in i t s d i s c r e t i o n , con-
tinue to operate the System through the 
Company, or disaul^e the Company, or 
cause a l l or any part of the *s*phs, 
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a public corporation created under t h i s same act , 27 L.P,R.A. 
$ 402, to acquire the system or all the common shares issued by the 
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. I t provided that a l l the members 
of the Board of Government of the Telephone Authority 
would c o n s t i t u t e the Board of Directors of the Puerto Rico 
Telephone Co., and that the Executive Director of the 
Authority would fee the President of the Company. I t granted 
the Authority the discretionary power to dissolve or continue operating 
the telephone system through the Company. Art ic le 3 (27 L.P,R.A. 
19 $ 403(a)(b)) s tated that i t s purpose was to improve and 
r ights and interests ' of the Company 
to be assigned or otherwise transferred 
to the Authority or to any subsidiary 
corporation of the Authority, or other-
wise exerc ise a l l of the r ights and 
powers conferred by law upon shareholders 
of the Company. Nothing herein s e t forth 
s h a l l be deemed to l imi t or preclude the 
r ight of the Authority to acquire the 
System or any part thereof through the 
exerc i se of the power of eminent domain.** 
19 
"It ia herebv resolved and declared that! 
"(a* an efficient communications 
system ia essential to the operations 
of the government of the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico and to the continuation 
of the development of the economy 
of Puerto Rico far the benefit ar.d 
general welfare of the inhabitants 
of Puerto Rico; 
"(b) in order to improve and 
expand the Communication facilities 
in Puerto Ri^o to provide additional 
and more efficient service to the 
public . . . ." 
R-81-16I (Translation) 
expand communication facilities in order to give the 
public additional and more efficient services. Article 11 
of the law exempts it from paying taxes or excise taxes, 
an exemption usually granted to public instrumentalities. 
(4] Finally, appellant alleges that the Puerto Rico 
Telephone Co. is not a public corporation, since art. 9 
(27 L.P.R.A. S 409}20 provides that "nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed as to grant to the Puerto Rico 
Telephone Company or any company whose stock is acquired 
by the Authority, the status of a public corporation 
of the Coanmonvealth of Puerto Rico." The joint 
report of ..the Committees on Government, Finance, 
"The Authority is hereby empowered 
to create by resolution such subsidiary 
corporations as It shall deen convenient 
to carry out the purposes of this chapter 
and to lend or give funds and transfer 
any of its properties to such subsidiary 
corporations* Such subsidiary corporations 
shall be wholly-owned public corporations 
of the Authority, and shall have sucii 
powers and duties vested to the Authority 
by the provisions of this chapter ds 
shall be assigned to them by the Governing 
Board; Provided, however, That nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed as to 
grant to the Puerto Pico Telephone 
Company or any company whose stock is 
acquired by the Authority, the status 
of a public corporation of the Ccinmon-
wealth of Puerto Rico. The Governing 
Board shall appoint the members of the 
Board of Directors of any and all such 
subsidiary corporations, provided that 
at least a simple majority of the members 
of each such Board of Directors shall 
be members of the Governing Board. All 
rights, privileges, imnmnities and 
exemptions conferred on the Authority 
by this chapter are hereby conferred 
on such subsidiaries in carrying out 
the powers and duties assigned to 
them by the Governing Board." 
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Socioeconomic Developing and Planning, Industry 
and commerce, Consumer Affairs and Civi l Law 
—afser considering S,B. 737 of March 15, 1974, l a ter 
enacted as Act No. 25 of May 6, 1974—states , on p« 39, 
that the acquis i t ion of a l l common stock of the Puerto 
Rico Telephone Co* ia contemplated "as" a private 
corporation subsidiary to the Authority, The company's 
private s tatus would ensure the t a x a b i l i t y cf the 
i n t e r e s t s paid in excess of 9120 millions in debentures. 
Once the Company's debt was due or cancel led , the Authority 
could d i s s o l v e i t . I t would a l s o allow for a f l e x i b l e 
p;anning and organization of the Telephone Company, I t 
l e thus expressed in the report cf February 6, 1974, 
sec t ion e i g h t , p, 1, presented tc the Governor of 
Puerto Rico by the Coirar.ittae on the Acquisit ion of the 
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. 
the b i l l which la ter became Act tfo* 25, supra, was 
discussed on April 26, 1974. The minutes of the House 
cf Representatives for that day reveal that Representative 
Del Valle Escobar, who drafted the b i l l , sairt that the Puerto fUco 
•telephone Canpany would continue as the Authority's subsidiary private 
The Secretary of J u s t i c e ' s opinion No, 4 
of 1975 said that the 'Telephone Company" did not 
have to be reg i s tered at the State Department, 
as would be required of a private corporation, 
s ince the company was created and operated 
"AS a public corporation" bestowed with the 
powers granted by Act No. 25 of May 6, 1974. 
The Region 24 National Labor Relation Board's 
Decision and Order of February 20, 1975, 
case No. 24-RG-5524, Puerto Rico Telephone 
Company and Jnldn de Troncuistas de Puerto Rico, 
Local 9c l , e t c . , dismissed the request to 
transmit the record to the Federal sphere 
because i t deemed that upon acquiring the 
Puerto Rico Telephone Company, the l a t t e r 
became a p o l i t i c a l subdivis ion of nhe Gcvecnnenc 
and so i t had no jur i sd ic t ion over the same. 
*-81-161 (Translation) 
corporation s ince H t h i i ' s ta tus 1 would ensure the t a x a b i l i t y 
of the i n t e r e s t s paid in excess of one hundred and twenty 
i r l l i i cn dol lars in debentures." Also, Representative Jarabo camanted 
on art . ^ of the Act and pointed out that subdivision (a) 
es tabl i shed as f i r s t pr ior i ty the e f f i c i ency of the 
communications system and that s-ubdivi9ion (bj s e t forth 
that the system would be owned by the government. 
It was believed that in five years the totality of Puerto Pico's 
telephone system could be uufled, \j>,dex tiie supervision of the Board of 
Government of the Telephone Authority, which would in turn be zhc 
Board of Directors of the P'jerto Rico Telephone Corrpany. The lawmakerrs 
in tent i s c l e a r . The Puerto Rico Telephone Company was 
acquired to be part of the public corporations system 
which would give telephone service. I t would operate as the 
type of public corporation organized under the laws of 
private corporations, to operate as a private corporation 
for the reasons already mentioned. Hence, the company 
w i l l be considered a public or a private corporation, 
for certain legal purposes , depending on the part icular 
case. 
[5-6] Act No• 5 of October 14, 1975 (3 L.P.R.A. 5 1301 et seg_,) , 
che Public Service Personnel Ace in ics *rt. 2.1 (3 L.P.ft.A. 
22 $ 1311(2)} , provides that a l l public ertp:oye*s, whether 
22 
"To the end of afcsurihg the 
extension and strengthening of the 
merit principle to ail sectors of 
the Puerto JUcan public service, all 
public employees, whether they are 
commonwealth or municipal employees 
with the exception of those excluded 
in section 1338 of this title, snail 
be covered by a single personnel system, 
established to enforce the merit; prin-
ciple, which shall be known as the 
Public Service Personnel System.11 
^ , * V W . 1 » ID> PAGE IB 
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government, municipal or other, w i l l be under a s i n g l e 
personnel system, established co enforoe the marit principle, whidi 
sha l l be known as the Public Service Personnel System, 
Section 10.S (3 L.P.R.A. $ 1338 (3 )<4 ) ) 2 3 s e t s forth that 
the previsions of this chapter shall not apply to those er^loyees of 
agencies or instnmentalities operating as private business or enter-
prises or to those employees of enterprises or instrumentalities entitled 
to collective bargaining through special laws. These groups shall adopt, 
with, t ie advice of the Personnel Offioe arid within the next 120 days 
after the act is approved, a personnel regulation system incorporating 
th.e merit principle that shall govern those employees not covered 
by c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements. In Normative Letter 
No. 1-80 Qt July $, 1930, addressed to the d i f f erent heads 
of departments and agencies , the Director of tha Central 
Office of Personnel Administration informed that thti 
Puerto Rico Telephone Authority was excluded from the 
Personnel Act and should adopt, as provided by law, a 
personnel regulat ion system incorporating the merit 
"(3) Employees of government agencies 
or ins trumenta l i t i e s operating as private 
enterprises or businesses 
"(4) Employees of government agencies 
Or ins trumenta l i t i e s e n t i t l e d to bargain 
c o l l e c t i v e l y through spec ia l laws and 
''Agencies or ins trumenta l i t i e s excluded 
hereby under subsections- (3) and (4) sha l l 
adopt/ with the advice of the o f f i c e of 
Personnel, a personnel regulation embodying 
the merit pr inc ip le which sna i l govern 
the personnel standards of those employees 
not covered by c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agree-
ments within 120 days following the 
approval of th i s ac t . Copies of the 
regulations thus adopted sha l l be sens 
to the Legis lature of Puerto Rico." 
R-51-1S1 (Translation) 
principle, to cover those employees not protected by 
collective bargaining agreements. The Ports Authority 
was also classified in this category. In ft*ye3 Coreano 
v. Director Ejecutivo, 110 D.P.R* 40 {1930), we held 
that the merit principle was applicable to the Ports 
Authority, It is evident that, grounded on the same 
reasons, the merit principle also applies to the Telephone 
Authority and its subsidiary, the Puerto Rico Telephone 
Company, despite its private corporate form, in ehe 
light of the existing public policy, the analysis in 
Reyes Coreano, supra, still holds. The clear intent of 
the law is to extend the merit principle to the greatest 
possible number of public employees. It imposed the 
obligation of managing nonunion personnel according zo 
the merit principle, although, attending to its particular 
circumstances, such personnel was effectively excluded 
from other statutory provisions. When we discussed the 
advantages of public-private corporations, we saw that one cf 
the assets of this type cf corporation if. its public 
policy. This has also been established ir. other countries. 
it propitiates a better and more efficient service. 
In Delgado Rivera v. Alcalde de Carolina, 309 D.P.?~ 5 
(1979), and in Delbrey v. Municipio de Carolina, 111 D.P.R. 
492 (1981); we held that whenever eh* municipalities' 
regulations do not comply with the fundamental purpose of 
guaranteeing strict application cf the merit principle in 
cases of employee's removal, the provisions of the Act 
and the Personnel Regulations shall be applied. 
[7] Let us ttien examine whether the Regulations cf the Puerto Ri^ n 
Telephone Co. guarantee the rights granted by the merit principle as 
established in the Personnel Act. The letter of dismissal 
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that appears of record, dated October 9, 1978, and addressed 
to plaintiff, justifies the dismissal based on Rule No. 41 
cf the Disciplinary Regulations (Threatening Acts) which 
entails Immediate dismissal without hearing. Therefore, on 
this same date she was dismissed without hearing, Soction 4.6 
of Act Mo. 5 of October 14, 1375 (3 L.P.R.A. J 1336(4)) ,24 provides that 
the appointing authorities may remove any career employee 
for just cause and upon prior preferment of charges in 
writing, after holding an administrative hearing, if the 
25 
employee so requests. Upon dismissing plaintiff, the 
Puerto Rico Telephone did not comply with the basic 
principle of the merit system: a hearing prior to dismissal, 
a-^ ie 41 of the Regulations of the Puerto Rico Telephone 
26 Cc. is not valid. 
In view cf the foregoing, the appellee's dismissal is set aside 
and a hearing sha l l be held as required by law. 
24 
"The appointing authorities may 
remove any career employee for good 
cause and upon previous preferment of 
charges, in writing, and upon prior 
holding of an administrative hearing, 
if the employee so requests." 
25Act NO. 1 Of July 17, 1979 (3 L.P.P.A. (Supp.) 
I 1336(4) ) , amended this Section and eliminated 
"and upon prior holding of an administrative 
hearing, if the employee so requests.* Since the 
dismissal in the Instant case was effected in 
19 73, the law then in force is the one applicable. 
26In Bisjicg v. wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), a 
career employee was oTsroissed without hearing. 
He was charged with conduct uns*uited for the 
police corps. A city ordinance permitted the 
dismissal of career employees at the will and 
pleasure of the city. It was held that the 
statute did not warrant him a property interest 
and that knowledge of the sa:ne prevented hiju 
from having sufficient expectation of continued 
employment. Therefore, due process was not 





 (Translation) 9^ 
Mr. Chief Justice Trias Monge and Mr, Justice Dl&z 
Cruz took no part in this decision. 
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I I company from trying to see if this is a valid claim 
J 2 or not That's what we did 
13 When they realized that there had been 
1 4 possible fraud, they referred this information to 
1 5 Dr. Chung, who said, "My gosh, this woman wasn't 
J ^ entirely truthful with me. I didn't know all these 
I 7 things. It looks like this is not entirely 
1 % attributable to October the 12th pulling on the 
i 9 cord. There may be other problems." 
JlO But the argument that Workers' 
III Compensation Fund exceeded the scope of its granted 
112 authority falls apart in light of the language of 
|13 that first page, which is a blanket authorization to 
|l4 release all medical records. That should be 
|15 dispositive. And the fact that later, when a lie had 
|l6 been discovered, this was referred to the Attorney 
117 General's Office for a possible criminal prosecution, 
118 should not invalidate that, because under the 
|19 Workers1 - Workers' Compensation Fund — pardon me, 
bo Insurance Fraud Code, Section 31A-31-104, that kind 
bl of information can be released to an investigative 
m agency to see if there should be prosecution. If an 
03 insurance company finds fraud, they can't just --
B4 they don't have to sit quietly. They should be able 
[25 to speak out, which is what they did. 
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11 So, on those points, I disagree with 
2 Counsel's argument and ask that this motion be 
3 denied. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gardner. 
[5 The motion's denied. I'm finding that 
16 the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah is not a state 
[ 7 agency and that Miss Ellingsworth knowingly and 
18 voluntarily signed a complete release with the 
19 understanding that a full investigation would be done 
BO in order to validate or invalidate her claim. 
11 You'll do findings and an order, 
12 Mr. Gardner, although they certainly don't need to be 
13 done until trial is over. 
M MR. GARDNER: I see. I'll do that. 
15 THE COURT: Next motion? 
N MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, why don't we 
17 address the third motion, which is the motion to 
M suppress statements made to state representatives. 
M And I think the allegation is that after July 11th, 
p) '95, which was the first IME performed by Dr. Chung, 
11 whatever statements made by Miss Ellingsworth to 
P Workers' Compensation Fund should be suppressed. 
P THE COURT: Is that okay with you, | 
1* Ms. Ah Ching? It's your motion. ! 
£ MS. AH CHING: That's fine, Judge. 
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1 MR. GARDNER: This is one where there 
2 wasn't an arrest There wasn't a custodial 
3 interview. I'm not quite sure if I have the burden 
4 of proof on this one or — or if Counsel should go 
5 forward on that one. 
6 MS. AH CHING: It doesn't matter; I can. 
7 Your Honor, we'd call Miss Paola 
8 Valente. 
9 THE COURT: Before we start with the 
10 testimony, it appears to me, Counsel, that we're not 
11 going to start seating our jury certainly not before 
12 maybe a quarter to 12:00, and it would be silly to 
13 start and break at noon. Any objection to my sending 
14 word downstairs to release them and ask them to come 
15 back at 1:30? 
16 MR. GARDNER: That would be best, Judge. 
17 MS. AH CHING: I don't have an objection, 
18 Judge. 
19 THE COURT: I just have to let you both 
20 know, that's one reason I've been pushing 
21 Ms. Ah Ching so hard, I just feel terrible the way we 
22 treat jurors a lot of times. These motions should 
23 have been noticed up. They should have been in the 
24 file. They should have been noticed up earlier. We 
25 should have taken care of them when we're not making 
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1 these folks sit downstairs. 
2 Would you let Jane know that we - yeah, 
3 tell them we're working hard on the case. We don't 
4 mean to waste their time, but the morning's been used 
5 up on these other matters and that they should come 
6 back at 1:30. 
7 MS. AH CHING: You'd stipulate to 
8 everything foundational-wise, that Miss Valente 
9 works -
10 MR. GARDNER: I will, Your Honor. 
11 PAOLO VALENTE, recalled as 
12 a witness on behalf of the Defendant, after having 
13 been duly sworn, testified as follows: 
14 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
15 BY MS. AH CHING: 
16 Q. Miss Valente, you had some contacts 
17 conversation-wise with Miss Ellingsworth at separate 
18 times during the pendency of this case; is that 
19 right? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And some of these were recorded; is that 
22 right? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q. What was the first conversation that was 
25 recorded? 
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I decision, her being the immediate manager of the 
I claims; but, yes, that definitely was... 
j Q. All right. I think you've already ~ 
i pardon me. Paola said - let me ask you. Are you a 
I member of the law enforcement community? 
> A. No, I am not. 
f MR. GARDNER: Thank you, 
I No other questions. 
i THE COURT: Anything further, 
I Ms. Ah Ching? 
MS. AH CHING: I have no further 
i questions, Judge. 
i THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Mann. 
i Argument? 
i MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, the issue of 
, whether or not these people are law enforcement 
people keeps coming up, and I think, number one — 
and I'm trying to find the case in the Annotations. 
I didn't pull it out because I didn't think it would 
be an issue, but that's what I'll do over the lunch 
hour -- that Workers' Compensation Fund is a state 
agency and, therefore, falls under that umbrella. 
This is akin to cases where a snitch is sent in to 
get information from an individual. The snitch works 
for the police department, is paid by the police 
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1 this type of information provided by 
2 Miss Ellingsworth is information that is obtained 
3 under coercion. It's a violation of 
4 Miss Ellingsworth's Fifth Amendment rights and 
5 Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Gardner? 
7 MR. GARDNER: I simply can't understand 
8 how this information is obtained improperly. These 
9 are not law enforcement people. This is not a 
10 custodial interrogation. The purpose of suppressing 
11 evidence is to punish improper police conduct — 
12 misconduct. That's not what happened here. We have 
13 a private insurance company trying to find out, "Is 
14 this claim legit or have we been hoodwinked?" 
15 There's no difference whether these people were an 
16 investigator and adjuster with the State Farm 
17 Insurance Company or Farmers' Bureau or Allstate or 
18 Workers' Compensation Fund. They call in Brenda, 
19 they invite her in, she's free to leave. They say, 
20 "Brenda, have you had any prior injuries? Anything 
21 else that we don't know about?" And when she insists 
22 again and again, "No, I've never had any other 
23 injuries," they say, "Well, at this point, Brenda, 
24 we've got to tell you, our information says that you 
25 had quite a bit." That's not coercion. That's an 
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\l department; and I believe that there is case law, and 
2 I'll try to find it, that if a person works for a 
3 police agency or for an arm of the state and obtains 
U information illegally, that it's subject to the 
jS constitutional requirements of the Utah and United 
ft States Constitution. 
This is a case where several interviews, 
jt specifically the February 1995 interview and the 
March 1995 interview, took place with an investigator 
with criminal prosecution in mind. Miss Ellingsworth 
was misled to believe that she was giving a statement 
to determine whether or not she qualified for 
benefits. Miss Valente has testified that benefits 
I were already suspended at the time, that the purpose 
I for the interview is to obtain information as to 
f whether or not Miss Ellingsworth should be 
prosecuted. 
They already had information to the 
J contrary - the hospital records, the police report 
They did not disclose this information to 
Miss Ellingsworth. They basically asked her 
questions so that she would answer them in a certain 
way without disclosing to Miss Ellingsworth that they 
had information to the contrary. 
I would indicate or would contend that 
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1 investigator trying to find out what's going on. 
2 And like Mr. Mann testified, this woman's 
3 benefits have been reinstated once before by the IME 
4 doctor. And had these conflicting information 
5 matters been explained adequately, they could have 
6 reinstated the benefits again. They've got to have a 
7 chance to talk to the claimant and find out what's 
8 happening. That is not a custodial interview. It is 
9 not coercion. It's an investigator trying to find 
10 out, "Are we paying properly our contractual 
11 obligations or are we being duped?" 
12 So, in that sense, I disagree with 
13 Counsel, and I submit that this motion to suppress 
14 for the face-to-face interview should be denied. The 
15 other telephone interviews hardly can be construed as 
16 custodial interrogation. There's no basis for 
17 suppressing those. That's all, Judge. 
18 THE COURT: Ms. Ah Ching, anything else? 
19 MS. AH CHING: No, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. I will be pleased to 
21 read any case that you find that's pertinent to the 
22 issue, but - and subject to reversing myself; but 
23 I'm going to go ahead and deny the motion; same basis 
24 as the last one, I don't think this is a state 
25 agency. I think this is essentially a private 
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j jasurance company and what happened is no different 
l than if it had happened with Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
I of Utah. And, in fact, Miss Ellingsworth*s actions 
\ were in her legitimate attempt to qualify for 
I insurance benefits. She provided information that 
j was requested. I don't see how this could possibly 
• be in the nature of a law enforcement interview. 
; That's the reason for the ruling. 
> Let's move to the last motion. That's 
i the motion in limine regarding felonies. 
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, if I'm not 
: mistaken, Mr. Gardner, if Miss Ellingsworth 
testifies, intends to bring in - there's a 1988,1 
think, conviction for Attempted Uttering of a Forged 
Script 
Is that correct? Or are there-or do 
you want to bring in all of the other misdemeanors? 
MR. GARDNER: I'm not so worried about 
this in itself. I am concerned about the 1988 
forging of the prescription. 
That is correct, Your Honor; I did intend 
to utilize that if the Defendant elected to testify. 
MS. AH CHING: With the State's 
stipulation, then, that they won't try to use any 
other convictions, I'll just talk about the one Class 
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1 Class A Misdemeanor?" If Miss Ellingsworth answers, 
2 "No," he cannot use the court docket. He needs a 
3 certified copy of the conviction. 
4 Secondly, the Court needs to make a 
5 determination as to whether bringing in that 
6 conviction would be more prejudicial than probative. 
7 And that's where our argument is, is that bringing in 
8 an Uttering or Attempted Uttering of a Forged Script 
9 in a case where the State is alleging that she is 
10 using the Workers' Comp funds to obtain medication in 
11 a drug-seeking type behavior, I think, makes that 
12 type of a conviction even more prejudicial, because 
13 then what we're left with is the Jury looking at that 
14 conviction and using it for more than what the - the 
15 law allows the State to use it for. 
16 I'll just quickly go through the factors 
17 that are listed in Saunders that the Court needs to 
18 look at to weigh whether or not the conviction is a 
19 more prejudicial than probative. 
20 Number one, the Court needs to look at 
21 the nature of the crime. The nature of this crime 
22 involves something that's very close to what the 
23 State is alleging that Miss Ellingsworth did. And 
24 the purpose for the State bringing in the Attempted 
25 Uttering of a Forged Script is to try and convince 
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1 A, the Forged Script. 
2 In our motion we've indicated that — 
3 well, first of all, even though the conviction - and 
4 the conviction happened in 1988, is not quite ten 
5 years old, we'd argue to the Court that it is close 
6 enough - this is 1997 - that the Court ought to not 
7 allow the State to use i t 
8 Secondly, I think the case law - and 
9 there's numerous cases on 609 motions - would 
10 indicate that where a prior conviction is for the 
ell l same type or similar type of crime involved in the 
*12 matter under present consideration, then the 
13 probative value of the evidence as affecting the 
1
14 party's credibility will rarely outweigh the results 
15 of prejudice to the jury - or prejudice on 
16 Miss Ellingsworth's part, 
|17 This is - the State has provided me with 
|l8 a copy of a court docket that, number one, the 
|19 statute provides that the State needs to get a 
B20 certified copy of the conviction. So, I would think 
U2i that the court docket is not appropriate in this 
H22 case. 
a23 Now, I would agree that if 
M24 Miss Ellingsworth gets on the stand, Mr. Gardner may 
& be able to ask her, "Have you been convicted of a 
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1 the Jury that because she has this conviction, she is 
2 eight or nine years later still trying to obtain 
3 medications under false pretenses. 
4 "B. The recentness or remoteness of the 
5 crime." As I indicated to the Court, the conviction, 
6 I believe, according to the court docket, happened in 
7 1988. 
8 "C, the similarity of the prior crime to 
9 the charged crime insofar as the close resemblance to 
10 the - between the two crimes," that may lead the 
11 Jury to punish Miss Ellingsworth based on that crime 
12 as opposed to this crime. And I think I've already 
13 indicated to the Court that - that given the State's 
14 theory of the case and what they intend to present to 
15 the Jury, that allowing that conviction to come in 
16 would be — the similarity is great. 
17 "D. The importance of credibility 
18 issues in determining the truth in the prosecution." 
19 This is the instance where it's more important for 
20 the Court to maybe keep out a prior conviction if 
21 this - this case comes down to who believes who. 
22 And I think that's - in this case, it is one of 
23 those cases. Miss Ellingsworth is probably the only 
24 witness that the Defense has to present to contradict 
25 the information that the State would have witnesses. 
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has art controlled by statute, passed by the 
legislature. And given that and the case that I've 
indicated to the Court, we would ask the Court to 
reconsider suppressing this information. 
The second piece of information that I 
would like to point out to the Court is that under 
the statute that Miss Ellingsworth has been charged 
with, and I've provided a copy to the Court -- the 
reason there's two copies, Judge, is one was the 
statute that became effective July 1st, 1997. I 
don't think there are any major differences, but I 
included that quote anyway for the Court's 
information. But, anyway, 35-1-109(9) indicates 
specifically in the statute that - that Workers' 
Comp or anybody — employer or anybody of that sort, 
a person providing insurance, must - or it says: 
"It shall provide notice on any 
documentation that it prints, 
reproduces or furnishes to any person 
that applies for insurance coverage or 
that reports or makes a claim on an 
accident, injury or death, or 
otherwise reports or gives notice of 
anything in regards to such matters, 
that the agency or the insurer, (such 
VOL I, TRIAL, 5-6-97 
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1 would recall, indicates specifically not that the 
2 stuff could be used to bring a prosecution for 
3 providing false information, but that it would be 
4 only used to see if she qualifies. So, it's actually 
5 misleading. The statute is pretty clear that this 
6 warning needs to be put on there. And rather than 
7 putting the warning on there, they actually put on a 
8 statement that is actually - that is misleading to 
9 the person signing the statement. 
10 So with this additional information, Your 
11 Honor, we would ask the Court to reconsider and to 
12 suppress all the medical records that were obtained 
13 pursuant to - obtained pursuant to the release that 
14 Miss Ellingsworth signed. 
15 THE COURT: The ruling will stand. I 
16 think you can argue this to the Jury, if you want, 
17 Miss Ah Ching. But it's just beyond any concept of 
18 reasonability that somebody without hearing this 
19 warning would think it was okay to present fraudulent 
20 information to the Insurance Fund in order to get 
21 benefits. I don't think it precludes the State 
22 Insurance Fund, and I think the Walhberg case holds 
23 just the opposite you've just cited. I think it 
24 draws a clear distinction between the Industrial 
25 Commission and either the State Insurance Fund or any 
Page 82 
as Workers' Comp,) shall cause to be 
printed or displayed in comparative 
prominence with other contents of the 
k statement, the admonition that any 
5 person who knowingly presents false or 
k fraudulent information" and so on, 
I that "The statement must be proceeded 
I by the words, 'For your protection, 
I Utah law requires the following to 
appear on this form.'" 
And as the witness testified on the 
medical records, there was not that admonition as 
required by statute. It wasn't placed on that form. 
It appears to be the only form, if not one of the 
only forms, if not the only form, that 
Miss Ellingsworth signed in regards to providing 
information to Workers' Comp. 
It would be our contention that Workers' 
Comp violated the conditions of the statute, and 
specifically the statute that Miss Ellingsworth is 
charged under; and therefore, they could not use that 
information that they obtained, i.e., the medical 
records that were obtained pursuant to the release of 
information that was given. 
In fact that release. Judse. if vou 
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1 other insurance carrier, which it tends to lump 
2 together, which is the way I see it. 
3 So let's go ahead with our jury trial. 
4 MR. GARDNER: Excuse me, Judge. I need 
5 to make one point, that Section 35-1-109(9) went into 
6 effect May 1st of 95, months after this case 
7 occurred. So I don't think that Counsel should be 
8 allowed to argue that to the Jury. I think the 
9 effective date is several months after this all went 
10 down. 
11 THE COURT: I was just noticing, as 
12 Ms. Ah Ching was arguing, that it says that the 1994 
13 amendments were effective July 1,1994. That is not 
14 correct with respect to this particular crime? 
15 MR. GARDNER: I thought it was May 1 st 
16 of '95. 
17 THE COURT: It's just what the statute 
18 says. I'm not verifying for the accuracy of what's 
19 in the - what months did it cover. 
20 MS. AH CHING: And that's why we copied 
21 the two statutes, Judge, is that this was the '94 one 
22 that was in effect when Miss Ellingsworth was 
23 charged 
24 THE COURT: Let's go ahead. 
25 Dick, would you bring the Jury in? 
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Q. Okay. And that was two days after your 
Blynco accident; right? 
'A. Yes. 
Q. When you say you had other insurance that 
could have paid for the Blynco injury? 
A. I didnft do it that way because I wasn't 
advised to. 
Q. But two days after that, you said that 
you were self-insured; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's go back to the first part of your 
testimony. You said that when you pulled on the this 
|Q pulley -
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. - that you talked this over with Sharon 
It Rowley, and she knew it had happened because she 
|? mentioned it to you before? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did you hear her testimony on Tuesday two 
pD days ago? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Do you remember her words where she 
fe testified under oath sitting right where you are 
m sitting that these blinds had never been caught 




1 couldn't understand how this could have happened? 
2 A. Pulling on a blind cord once again, is 
3 what she testified to, is what I heard. 
4 Q. And you were pulling on the cord of this 
5 blind; is that right? 
6 A. No, I was — the pulley, to raise the 
7 blind, to put the slat through. 
8 Q. And the pulley to raise the blind--
9 A. Uh-huh. 
10 Q. - what is that, not a cord, but a piece 
11 of metal? 
12 A. No, it is like a (Indicating) -- it is 
13 about this wide, and it is like a rope thing. You 
14 pull it like this (Indicating). 
15 Q. Uh-huh? 
16 A. And it raises it up so that you can... 
17 Q. Okay. Well, she testified - this is my 
18 recollection, and the Jury will give this the weight 
19 that they deem it deserves. She said that this had 
20 never happened before. Is it your testimony that she 
21 lied or misled the court? 
22 A. I don't believe she used those specific 
23 words. She said, "By pulling on a blind cord," to 
24 the best of my knowledge. That's all I believe she 
25 said. 
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- A. No, I didn't hear those specific words. 
Q. If we have the court reporter play back 
S those words for you, would that refresh your 
4 recollection as to Sharon Rowley's testimony on that 
|5 point? 
A. Yes. 
MR. GARDNER: okay. Your Honor, I am not 
sure if that's possible, if we can pull that up? 
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I think what 
fe we could do is have the Jury — I mean, the Jury was 
p here. They can remember if that was said or not. 
MR. GARDNER: That's fine. That might be 
|S simpler. Let's go by that means. 
Ma'am, do you remember — you said you 
B did not remember Sharon Rowley testifying to that; is 
f that correct? 
A. No, that isn't what I said. I said I 
don't remember her testifying to those specific 
| words. 
Q. Do you remember her saying that there had 
never been an accident like that before? 
A. She said by pulling on a blind cord. 
Q. Okay. 
A That isn't how I was injured. 
Q. Well, did you hear her testify that she 
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1 Q. All right. And your testimony also was 
2 that Debbie Cleverly, your - the overall supervisor, 
3 told you to maybe go home and rest and then go to the 
4 hospital later if you didn't feel good; is that 
5 right? 
6 A. That's correct. 
7 Q. My recollection is that she testified 
8 that she was concerned that if you might possibly 
9 have been hurt, to go to St. Mark's. It's a little 
10 bit different... 
11 MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, objection. 
12 Mr. Gardner is now testifying about what was said or 
13 was not said. And he can ask questions of the 
14 witness but not testify unless he wants to take the 
15 witness stand. 
16 THE COURT: It is cross-examination. He 
17 can go ahead. 
18 MR. GARDNER: Ma'am, do you remember 
19 Debbie Cleverly testifying to that, that she was 
20 concerned about you, she thought you might be hurt, 
21 she wanted you to go to St. Mark's? 
22 A. Yes, I recall her testifying to that. 
23 But I also sat for a long period of time in the break 
24 room before she even bothered to come in there to see 
25 how I was doing. So I don't see... 
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1 : Q. But your testimony is that she simply 
N * wanted you to go home and rest and then maybe if you 
H 3 still hurt afterwards go to the hospital. That's a 
Hi little bit different. 
| < A. Yes, that's what she told me. 
H. Q. So is it your testimony that what really 
B - happened is different from what she testified to? 
| | j A. Maybe she doesn't recall exactly or I 
H 9 don't recall exactly the specific words that we 
Hi; used. I mean, it has been since '94. It is quite a 
U\. long time to remember. 
iji: Q. All right. Do you have a clear 
||i: recollection of everything that happened on October 
U\i 12th both at Blynco and at the hospital? 
Hi 5 A. Yes, I do. 
LL Q. Okay. You testified a few minutes ago 
| r that at St. Mark's you were told that if you are not 
| b feeling better you could go to a doctor of your 
ita choice. Do you remember testifying to that a few 
lb: minutes ago? 
lei A. Yes. 
1422 Q. And yet you specifically mentioned that 
l b you called Dr. Borne1 s office? 
| p A. Yes. 
I p Q. So you were told, weren't you, that you 
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H ! were being referred me Dr. Michael Borne? 
H 2 A. If I chose to see Dr. Borne. They didn't 
t] 3 tell me that I had to go see Dr. Borne. 
[14 Q. But you were given the name of 
B 5 Dr. Michael Borne; weren't you? 
H 6 A. They referred me to Dr. Borne. 
rj 7 Q. Okay. And were you given a paper that 
I 8 also had Dr. Borne1 s name on it? 
tj 9 A. Yes, that's how I got the number to call 
iJ:o him. 
I p Q. Okay. So his name and his address and 
i J12 his phone number was on that? 
i p A. Yes. 
I 4 Q. Okay. Now, do you remember Paola 
i p Valente's testimony that Dr. Borne's office expected 
i p you on October the 17th? 
I P A. Yes. 
I p Q. So they had an appointment for you on 
I :9 that day; didn't they? 
||20 A. Yes. 
I 2l Q. Okay. And instead of going to 
1 p Dr. Borne's office, you went to Dr. Seeman's office? 
1 23 A. Yes. 
1 p4 Q. Okay. And you went to Dr. Seeman's 
1 [25 office - or, pardon me, a few minutes ago you 
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1 testified that Dr. Borne's office couldn't get you in 
2 on October 17 and that's why you went to Dr. Seeman; 
3 is that right? 
4 A. As I recall. 
5 Q. But they had an appointment for you that 
6 same day; isn't that correct? 
7 A I don't remember. 
8 Q. Okay. And Dr. Borne's appointment for 
9 you was on the same day as Dr. Seeman's; is that 
10 correct? 
11 A I don't remember. 
12 Q. Okay. You also testified that you told 
13 Dr. Seeman, when you saw him on October the 17th, 
14 about this assault that happened three days earlier? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q. Did you hear him testify repeatedly that 
17 he knew nothing about that until this case was 
18 convened? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q. He isn't lying? 
21 A I don't believe — 
22 MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, objection. 
23 She can't comment on the credibility of another 
24 witness. 
25 MR. GARDNER: But she can comment about 
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1 what's going here. Her testimony is one way and 
2 someone else is - pardon me. She is saying she lied 
3 under oath, is what she is saying. 
4 THE WITNESS: No. 
5 THE COURT: Don't answer that, 
6 Miss Ellingsworth. 
7 MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I think she 
8 can say that she's saying something different, but 
9 she can't say, "Yes, he's lying." I mean, it may be 
10 inadvertent on Dr. Seeman's part. I think it is 
11 inappropriate for one witness to comment on the 
12 credibility of another. 
13 THE COURT: I think that's what the whole 
14 trial is about. 
15 She can answer. 
16 MR. GARDNER: Do you need me to repeat 
17 that question? 
18 A No, I understood. 
19 No, I don't believe that Dr. Seeman was 
20 lying. But towards the end, Dr. Seeman was having 
21 health problems and he had had strokes and stuff and 
22 he wasn't keeping track of things in the office like 
23 he should have been. So he could have forgotten, or, 
24 you know, I am not saying he was lying. 
25 Q. Did you see him look at his notes that he 
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^ be in effect throughout the trial . 
We are in recess . 
(Recess) 
THE COURT: Now that you are formal ly 
5 sworn in, we are about to start the trial . Eve ry 
6 time we take a break, whether it is overnight or 
7 lunch or a short break, I ' m going to t ry to r emember 
g to ask you to please not talk about the case unt i l 
! 9 the trial is over and it lands in your lap for final 
•0 decision. But w e d o n ' t wan t any pre l iminary 
;i deliberations going on o r any other investigation 
|i2 into the case or even any discussion of the evidence 
13 that you wil l have heard b y that p o i n t 
14 We are going to start now. Mr. Gardner 
15 is going to give an opening statement, I suspect , and 
16 Miss Ah Ching wil l also give one, and then w e wil l 
17 move into the evidence. 
18 Each attorney - if it's Mr. Gardner's 
19 witness, he ' l l do direct exam, and then M i s s A h Ching 
20 will do cross-examinat ion. A n d he m a y do redirect, 
21 and she m a y do recross. Essent ia l ly , they wi l l ask 
22 questions unti l they bel ieve that they 've extracted 
23 all the information that the wi tness has that wil l be 
24 valuable to you in deciding what the facts are. 
25 W e m a y have a couple of bench 
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1 Venetian b l inds that go into residential homes . A n d 
2 so wha t the workers wou ld do, is that they wou ld pu t 
3 one slat on the support, pull the strings through it 
4 and get it organized, lift it up and do another slat 
5 unti l it w a s long enough that it w a s completed. 
6 Wel l , on October 12th of 1994, the 
7 Defendant w a s work ing at Blynco . She had about 11 
8 co-workers a round her. She pul led on the string of 
9 the bl ind. A n d then she turned and said to someone , 
10 "I think I hurt myself." There were 11 people 
11 around her. No one saw any problems. In fact, you 
12 are going to hear the supervisor , Debbie Cleverly, 
13 and a co-worker , Sharon Rowley , come in and tell y o u 
14 wha t happened. They are even going to br ing in one 
15 of the b l inds that they pu t together. They cou ldn ' t 
16 believe that this w o m a n had been injured. 
17 They have the Defendant go to St. Mark's 
18 Emergency Room, and she was seen b y a Phys ic ian ' s 
19 Assis tant named Rebecca Dickinson, and Rebecca is 
20 going to testify. She examined the Defendant , heard 
21 the Defendant's story. She couldn't see anything 
22 wrong . So she diagnosed her as being a musc le 
23 strain, told her to go on light duty for maybe one 
24 day, told her to take some aspirin, put some ice 
25 packs on the injured par t of her shoulder but light 
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1 conferences. That is when I ask the lawyers to c o m e 
2 up here. The bo t tom line on that is that w e are 
3 talking about things that w e don ' t wan t you to hear. 
4 The reason w e are doing that is usual ly that the 
5 subject mat ter is something that might have an 
6 improper effect on your role in court and wha t y o u 
7 are to decide on. So don't worry about what we are 
8 talking about. It 's usually just a little legal 
9 argument about some point or other. 
10 I think that's all you need to do. 
11 Let's go ahead, Mr. Gardner. 
12 MR. GARDNER: Thank you, Your Honor . 
13 M a y it please the Cour t and Counsel . 
14 Ladies and Gent lemen of the Jury , this is a case 
15 about Workers Compensa t ion fraud. There is a 
16 one-felony count information against Brenda 
17 Ell ingsworth, the Defendant in this case. A n d the 
18 evidence is going to show that on October 12th of 
19 1994 Brenda - I 'm going to call her the Defendant 
20 from now on — was working at a blind manufacturing 
21 shop. It was called Blynco Manufacturing. It is 
22 down here about 60th South State Street. She had 
23 been work ing there for about t w o weeks . A n d what 
24 this company did was, they would actually put 
25 together the slats and the strings to manufac ture the 
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1 duty the next day. 
2 The Defendant never returned to work. 
3 And on that one so-called, work-related injury, she 
4 has received almost $5,000 in money and in medical 
5 benefits. 
6 The state of Utah alleges that that claim 
7 and the benefits that the Defendant received were 
8 received as a result of fraud. This is why... 
9 When the supervisor, Debbie Cleverly, 
10 submitted the claim to Workers Compensation fund for 
11 the Defendant there was a box on the form that says: 
12 "Do you have any doubts whether this is a valid 
13 injury?H And she checked "yes." And she sent a 
14 letter to Workers Comp Fund with the claim. And the 
15 letter said this woman had only been working here for 
16 two weeks. She had only worked maybe 59 hours during 
17 that two weeks. And she called in and complained 
18 repeatedly of illnesses and other problems. In 
19 addition there were 11 co-workers around her, no one 
20 saw an injury, no one saw any problem. 
21 Nevertheless, the Workers Compensation 
22 Fund accepted the claim. And on October 17th, five 
23 days after this happened, the adjuster, Paola 
24 Valente, contacted the Defendant and took a statement 
25 from her. "What happened? How were you injured? Do 
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1 you have any other back problems?" A n d the Defendant 
2 said, , f No, n o , n o , I have n o other back prob lems . M y 
3 back hurts." A n d based on the written c l a i m from 
4 Blynco Manufacturing and this f o l l o w - u p phone 
5 conference b e t w e e n Paola Va lente and the Defendant , 
6 Workers C o m p e n s a t i o n Fund o f Utah accepted the c l a i m 
7 and began pay ing monetary and med ica l benef i ts to the 
8 Defendant. 
9 What no one k n e w w a s this: T w o days 
10 after the Defendant pul led o n the b l ind there at 
hi Blynco and said she injured herself, Defendant w a s a 
12 victim of a rather savage domestic v iolence assaul t 
13 She w a s beaten badly . Beat around the face , the 
14 neck, thrown against a wa l l . A n d she w a s taken b y 
15 ambulance o n a stretcher w i t h a neck brace back to 
16 St. Mark's emergency hospital (sic) . A n d she w a s 
17 treated b y a medica l doctor there. A n d she c l a i m e d 
18 of back pain to both the pol ice officer - and y o u 
19 are go ing to hear S teve Anjewierden from the 
20 Sheri f fs Office testify. He was the officer on the 
hi case. He made a report. He' l l testify that she told 
22 him she had been beaten repeatedly and injured in the 
23 face and j a w and the upper back. She told the 
24 ambulance driver, Cal Kunz - he w a s with Gold Cross 
25 Ambulance Service, the same thing. A n d y o u are going 
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1 to hear h im testify because he made a report, as 
2 well. She said, "I got hit repeatedly in the face, 
3 the j a w and hurt m y back; lots o f pain in m y back." 
4 And she arrived at St. Mark's emergency hospital on a 
5 stretcher w i t h a neck brace. T h e y treated her for 
6 back injury, n e c k pain , face pain. I be l i eve that 
7 the report says s o m e bruis ing. T h e y released the 
8 Defendant after she w a s treated. 
9 Three days later, o n October 17th, the 
10 same day the Defendant talked to Paola Valente b y 
II phone and said, "I have n o other prob lems except w h a t 
12 happened at B l y n c o , " on October 17th, the Defendant 
13 went and saw a doctor, Dr. Eugene Seeman. A n d she 
14 said, "I'm vomiting. I 've got migraine headaches. I 
15 have got upper back pain . I have got shoulder pain , 
16 all caused by pull ing the cord on the blind at B lynco 
17 Manufacturing." A n d Dr. S iemons wi l l testify, he 
18 made notes , the Defendant sa id nothing at all about 
19 the intervening domestic violence assault. She told 
20 no one, no one knew. A n d for the next several 
21 months , the Defendant cont inued to rece ive treatment 
22 by a number o f doctors, medications, including 
23 hydrocort isone, Loritabs, and s o m e other pain ki l lers 
24 and she received monetary benefits. 
\p On January 11th, the insurance adjuster, 
_ _ 1 
1 Paola Valente, met with the Defendant again, because 
2 Brenda, one , w a s not getting better. There w e r e 
3 ongoing complaints of pain to the back. A n d the 
4 adjuster thought, "She pulled on a blind. She should 
5 be doing fine by now. What's wrong?" A n d on January 
6 11th, Paola Va lente talked to Defendant and asked her 
7 to sign a release, an authorization to g ive medical 
8 records, all o f her medica l treatment, to Workers 
9 Compensa t ion Fund. T h e Defendant s igned the release, 
10 dated it January 11th. A n d on the next page she w a s 
11 asked to wri te d o w n all o f the doctors that had 
12 treated her. A n d as best she can remember, she wrote 
13 down five. A n d she said, "I think that's all o f 
14 them." Paola Valente thought, "This can't be 
15 right." A n d s o she sent the request for records out 
16 to all the hospitals in the Salt Lake Area. 
17 In two weeks , she began to get lots of 
18 medical records back; lots and lots and lots. She 
19 got medical records back from Cottonwood Emergency, 
20 St. Mark's , Holy Cross, pharmacies, Dr. Seeman, 
21 Dr. Hebertson, many, many more people. A n d the 
22 records she got s h o w e d that the Defendant had been to 
23 these hospitals about 2 0 0 t imes. A n d w e are only 
24 going to focus, really, on what happened in 1994, 
25 onwards. But w e are going to have some of the 
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1 doctors w h o treated her in January and February and 
2 March and M a y o f 1994. They wi l l c o m e in here and 
3 are going to testify because you' l l see charts of all 
4 o f the various t imes that the Defendant w e n t to these 
5 doctors and all the various medications she was 
6 receiving f rom them. But in January o f ' 9 4 , 
7 Dr . Bruce A r g y l e treated her for back pain and back 
8 injuries. February o f ' 9 4 he treated her again for 
9 back injuries. March o f '94 , Doctor - let m e make 
10 sure that I 've got the exact n a m e - Dr. Robert 
11 Gannon at H o l y Cross E m e r g e n c y treated the Defendant 
12 for upper right back pain. M a y of 1994, Dr. Ronda 
13 Smi th at H o l y Cross E m e r g e n c y treated the Defendant 
14 for upper back pa in - pardon m e , back pain . 
15 Five different t imes — pardon me , four 
16 different t imes in 1994 alone, the Defendant was 
17 be ing treated b y var ious doctors for back pain and 
18 back injuries. 
19 O n January 11th, the s a m e day that Paola 
20 Valente met wi th the Defendant and her signed this 
21 release, this authorization to get medica l records, 
22 o n that s a m e day, the Workers ' Compensat ion Fund had 
23 a different doctor, a specialist, examine the 
24 Defendant A n d his name is Dr. Jeff Chung. He did 
25 an independent medical examination. And the purpose 
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was to see if all these injuries that Brenda had 
complained about were caused by the October 12th, 
1994 work injury when she pulled on the blind. And 
Dr. Chung will tell you that on January 11th the 
Defendant told him, "I have had no previous back 
injuries. I have no other problems. And she also 
neglected to mention the October 17th domestic 
violence attack where she was badly beaten. And 
based on information she gave him Dr. Chung said, 
"Well, it doesn't seem right, but let's put her on a 
work-hardening program for a couple of weeks, let's 
give her the benefits, you know, from December into 
January and let's see if we can get her better." 
After - after Paola Valente had sent out 
the request for records and she got all these records 
back, she sent those to the doctor, Dr. Chung. And 
in February of 1995, he did a different records 
check. And he'll testify that he did not know about 
all the other times that the Defendant had been in 
the hospital, all of the other times she had been 
there for back treatment, back injury treatment, or 
all of the other things that she had received. And 
based upon that, he then will testify that he changed 
his diagnosis. 
Now, Paola Valente is also going to tell 
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1 Then Brett told her, "Wait, we have 
2 records now that show you were the victim of a 
3 domestic violence assault, you have had all these 
4 previous reports from the hospital for various 
5 treatments. What about those, Brenda?" And the 
6 Defendant began to change her story, equivocate. But 
7 she still hung onto her story that, "All of the 
8 problems that I have had were caused by what happened 
9 on October 12th when I pulled on the blind." 
10 Ladies and Gentlemen, with the witnesses 
11 from Blynco, with the documents that we are going to 
12 show you, where the doctors and the adjusters and the 
13 Workers' Compensation Fund were misled into believing 
14 all these problems stemmed from what happened at 
15 Glenco, even though that was a little bit bizarre, 
16 and with the later information that was uncovered 
17 about the October 15th - pardon me, October 14th, 
18 the domestic violence attack and all of the other 
19 medical records about the problems that the Defendant 
20 had before this ever happened, the evidence is going 
21 to show beyond a reasonable doubt that this woman, 
22 the Defendant, committed a Workers' Compensation 
23 Insurance fraud by which she obtained medical 
24 benefits and treatment, medical prescriptions and 


























you, with a chart, she is going to list all the money 
that Workers' Compensation Fund paid between October 
of f94 and late January of f95; about four months. 
And they paid with $2,100 for monetary benefits and 
they paid about $2,800 for various medications and 
medical treatments. The total amount was just barely 
under $5,000. I think Paola has a chart which says 
$5,100. That is little bit off the mark, and so we 
are going to correct that. But the total amount 
received by the Defendant was about $4,950. 
When, all of these records had come to 
light, Paola Valente, the adjuster, and Brett Mann, 
who was the investigator with Workers Compensation 
Fund, sat down and met with the Defendant. And Brett 
Mann will tell you, he asked the Defendant six 
different times: "Have you had any other back 
injuries besides what happened on October 12th when 
you pulled on this cord on the blind at Glenco?" And 
six different times the Defendant insisted, "I've had 
no other back injuries. I have had no other injuries 
at all." And then - pardon me, I stand corrected. 
The Defendant mentioned she had a minor knee injury 
sometime years and years ago. She didn't mention the 
domestic attack on October 17th, and she denied 
stating that she had any back problems. 
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1 misrepresentations and omissions. And the insurance 
2 company was paying for her injuries when, in fact, 
3 they did not originate on October 12th, a 
4 work-related accident when she pulled on the cord; 
5 but, instead, they stem from October 14th when she 
6 was beaten badly and they extend from other problems 
7 that she had before this ever began; but the 
8 Defendant wasn't truthful and the insurance company 
9 Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah was victimized 
10 into paying several thousand dollars' worth of 
11 benefits and money that this woman did not deserve. 
12 And based upon that evidence, I am going to ask you 
13 at the end of this trial to bring back a conviction 
14 of guilt; one count of Workers' Compensation Fraud, a 
15 third degree felony. 
16 Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very 
17 much. 
18 THE COURT: Miss Ah Ching. 
19 MS. AH CHING: Thank you, Your Honor. 
20 May it please the Court, Mr. Gardner and 
21 Mr. Webster, Miss Ellingsworth, Ladies and Gentlemen 
22 of the Jury, I suppose after hearing Mr. Gardner's 
23 opening, I might as well sit down and say - and call 
24 it quits, because according to his opening, Brenda 
25 has done all these bad changes that are prohibited by 
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j i she had been struck. 
2 Q. H o w could you tell? 
: A. There was some discoloration and 
4 swelling, but it w a s n ' t severe as it had been 
5 relatively recently. 
$ Q. Deputy , I k n o w this happened in October 
? of '94. But as you describe this , I ' l l j u s t inform 
l you that you were gesturing wi th you r left hand b y 
9 the left side of your j a w . D i d that relate to wha t 
o you were told b y Brenda of wha t happened on October 
! the 14th? 
:2 A. Y e a h Again , in reading m y report to 
3 refresh m y m e m o r y for this case, she said she w a s 
4 struck in the j a w and also in the ear on both s ides 
J ;5 of her head (Indicating). 
|;6 Q. Just n o w you were gesturing wi th y o u r 
| :7 right hand by the right s ide of your j a w ; is that 
! ;i what she also showed you had happened? 
M9 A. A s I recall , yes . 
20 Q. Wha t happened as a result of those 
ll complaints b y Brenda El l ingsworth? 
'22 A. I forwarded the case to the Detect ive 
23 Division. I don ' t k n o w what the ou tcome was or if 
'?4 charges, if any, were filed. 
25 Q. Let m e ask this: W a s medical care 
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1 center, I suppose you'd call i t But I recognize my 
2 n a m e and m y depar tment assigned an identification 
3 number . A n d I remember that incident as I read the 
4 text 
5 Q. Al l right. Does it also have the 
6 victim's name "Brenda Ellingsworth" and the location 
7 where you were sent? 
8 A. It does. 
9 Q. Does those things t rack wi th the 
10 information that is in S-l — or, pardon me, S-3? 
11 A. Yes , they do. 
12 Q. Does that also track with your 
13 recollection of what happened? 
14 A. It does. 
15 Q. Deputy , is that a fair and accurate 
16 record of what happened on October 14th as told to 
17 you b y the Defendant? 
18 A. It does, yes . 
19 MR. GARDNER: Your Honor , at this t ime, I 
20 would offer into evidence as State's Exhibit 3 the 
21 Sheriffs Office report identified by Deputy Sheriff 
22 Anjewierden. 
23 THE COURT: Miss A h Ching? 
24 MS. AH CHING: Your Honor , I wou ld 
25 object. I think the Rules are pret ty clear a police 
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1 furnished for Brenda, the v ic t im? 
2 A. Oh, yes . When I arr ived at the scene, 
3 the fire depar tment and ambulance c rew were al ready 
4 there. A n d as I read m y report, I recall that she 
5 had been t ransported to the hospital b y the ambulance 
6 crew. 
7 Q. Al l right. W h y w a s she t ransported to 
8 the hospital b y ambulance? 
9 A. Because she was compla in ing of injuries 
10 and pain, and I suppose that the fire personnel 
11 believed that that w a s in her best in t e res t 
12 Q. Al l right. Officer, several t imes y o u 
13 have said that you had to refresh your recollection 
14 b y looking at you r report. 
15 M a y I approach the wi tness , Y o u r Honor? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 MR. GARDNER: r d like to show you w h a t ' s 
18 marked for identification as State's Exhibit 3. 
19 D o you recognize that two-paged 
20 document? 
21 A. Yeah, it appears to be my initial report 
22 prepared for that incident 
[23 Q. How can you identify that as your initial 
24 report? 
125 A. We phone the reports in to a transcribing 
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1 officer can testify about his report bu t they are not 
2 evidence to be admit ted into evidence. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Gardner? 
4 MR. GARDNER: On this thing where the 
5 Officer has to refresh his recollection, we can have 
6 h i m read the report . I thought this might be 
7 simpler. 
8 THE COURT: I wil l sustain the objection. 
9 MR. GARDNER: Okay. 
10 Deputy , let m e ask this: Looking down, 
11 can you read exact ly what the Defendant told you as 
12 reported in your report? 
13 A. Yeah. 
14 Q. Pardon m e . Let m e clarify that. What 
15 Td like to ask is what injuries the Defendant 
16 reported that she had suffered. W e don ' t need the 
17 other mat te r about the rest of the domest ic 
18 violence. 
19 A. Okay . In the second paragraph here, it 
20 reads -
21 Q. Brenda stated that? 
22 A. Correct . Brenda states that Ronnie began 
23 to pull her hair, and then hit her in the right eye 
24 wi th his right hand. She states that he -
25 correction, she states that he began to push her 
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iround the apartment, and then he hit her on the left 
• side of the jaw and in the left ear. Brenda states 
; that she was hit at least ten times during the 
. assault 
Q. You can stop there. 
; Were the injuries that you saw on the 
• victim's eye, face and body consistent with what she 
"! told you had happened? 
; A. They were. 
Q. And after the Defendant was taken by 
: ambulance, did you have any more contact with her? 
: A. Not in regards to this report. 
j Q. Let me ask this: Do you know which 
.4 hospital the victim was taken to? 
j A. I don't know that. 
i Q. Do you know which ambulance company 
;? transported her? 
j A. Yeah, Gold Cross Ambulance, the only one 
3 in the Valley. 
3 Q. By any chance, do you know the names of 
U the personnel who transported her in the the Gold 
2 Cross Ambulance Service? 
3 A. No, I don't 
24 Q. Does that information that you read 
25 accurately track the Defendant's — the Defendant's, 
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l in this case, statements to you on October 14th? 
2 A. As I recall them, yes. 
13 Q. All right. At any time did the 
4 Defendant, victim of that domestic violence case, 
15 tell you that she had been injured two days earlier 
6 at work? 
7 A. No, I don't recall that 
8 Q. All right. Did you have any record in 
9 your report about such a complaint by the Defendant, 
10 Brenda Ellingsworth? 
11 A. No, there is no record of that 
12 Q. Everything which you have described to us 
13 happened in the West Valley City Area of Salt Lake 
14 County, State of Utah? 
15 A. It is the unincorporated area of Salt 
16 Lake County. 
17 Q. All right But it is Salt Lake County, 
18 Utah; isn't it? 
19 A. It is, absolutely. 
20 MR. GARDNER: Deputy, thank you* 
21 I have no other questions. 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BYMS.AHCHING: 
Q. Officer Anjewierden, this report that 
Mr. Gardner has talked about is the only report that 
you filled out in this? 
A. I believe that is the case, yes. 
Q. There are no other reports or notes 
anywhere else? 
A. I made notes at the time. I have no idea 
where they would be. 
Q. And this report that you filled out, this 







was told you as you could put in the report; is that 
right? 
A. I believe so. That was certainly my 
intent. 
Q. And everything that you felt was 
important about what Brenda told you, you put in the 





















A. Yeah. As it pertained to the case, I 
believe so. 
Q. And when Brenda was telling you what her 
injuries were, you looked at her face to determine 
whether it matched with what she said; is that right? 
A, Yes. 
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Q. And when Brenda told you that she was hit 
in the right eye area with ~ by her - by Ronnie, 
you looked at her face; is that right? 
A. That's correct 
Q. You indicated that you saw that she had 
some swelling about her face but it wasn't severe; is 
that right? 
A. That's correct 
Q. You also indicated that she said that he 
had pushed her around the apartment, and then hit her 
on the left side - left-hand side of her jaw; is 
that right? 
A. I believe that's the case. 












A. That's correct 
Q. You looked at her face and saw some 
slight brusing in the mouth area? 
A. I don't think I saw bruising, but just 
red marks that I felt coincided with her statement of 
the assault 
Q. And then she also indicated that she was 
hit on her left ear? 
A. Yeah, that's stated in the report. 
Q. Okay. Brenda indicated to you that she | 
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1 was hit at least ten times during the assault; is 
2 that right? 
! 3 A. T h a t ' s correct . 
j 4 Q. N o w , when you spoke to Brenda, was she 
5 sitting down, s tanding up , wha t was she doing; do y o u 
6 recall? 
7 A. I don't think I do recall that. 
8 Q. Okay . When you c a m e to the apar tment , 
9 was the fire depar tment and ambulance already there? 
10 A. They were on the scene, bu t they wai ted 
11 outside to ensure that it 's safe to go inside. So 
12 they were at the scene of the apartment . 
13 Q. So your conversat ion wi th Brenda then 
14 took place inside the apar tment ; is that r ight? 
15 A. That 's correct. 
16 Q. She was not in the ambulance already; is 
17 that right? 
|l8 A. Yeah. I mean t inside the apartment . 
19 Q. N o w , in your report that you have 
20 reviewed for today's hearing there is no indication 
21 in the report that Brenda told you that she was 
22 th rown against a wal l ; is that right? You can look 
23 at your report? 
24 A. N o , that is not documented. I 
[25 Q. A n d there ' s n o indicat ion in your report 
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1 that Brenda told you that she had an injury on her 
2 back; is that right? 
3 A. I don't recall that, no. \ 
4 Q. Is there indication in your report? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. The injuries or the areas that were hit , 
7 Brenda told you about was in the face area; is that 
8 right? 
9 A. A s I specifically documented them, yes . 
10 Q. Okay . N o w , Mr . Gardner asked you if 
11 Brenda told you that she was injured on the job two 
12 days before. D i d you ask her if she w a s j u s t injured 
13 on the j o b two days before? 
14 A. N o , I wou ld have had n o w a y of knowing if 
15 that was the case. 
16 Q. W o u l d you rout inely ask people, in 
17 domest ic violence cases , whether they 've been injured 
18 at work? , 
19 A. No, I don't know that. 
20 Q. Did you routinely, in domestic violence 
21 cases, ask people whether they 've had any surgery? 
22 A. I don't, no. I 
23 Q. So unless there is a reason to , y o u -
24 you want find out what happened on just that 
[25 occasion; is that right? 
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j 1 A. Yeah. For the most part, yes. 
2 Q. So it wouldn't be unusual for Brenda not 
t 3 to bring up the subject that she was injured two days 
4 prior at work; is that right? 
5 A. Th ink it wou ld be unusual . 
6 MS.AHCHING: No further quest ions. 
7 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. GARDNER: 
9 Q. Deputy , did this w o m a n seem injured in 
10 any other w a y other than this domest ic violence 
j 11 attack that she had j u s t suffered? 
12 A. N o t to m e . 
13 MS. AH CHING: Your Honor , this man is 
14 not a physician. He didn't - I mean, all he can 
115 testify to is what she told him and what he saw on 
16 her face. He did not examine her. 
117 THE COURT: That is a correct statement, 
18 Mis s A h Ching, bu t I th ink the answer does l imit 
19 itself to that scope. 
20 MR. GARDNER: That w a s the only question 
21 I had. Thank you. 
72 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Deputy. 
23 Does the Jury have any questions for the 
24 Deputy? 
25 W e are done. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you, Deputy. No 
2 further questions. 
3 MR. GARDNER: I'll call Mr. Cal Kunz. 
4 CAL KUNZ, called as a 
5 witness on behalf of the State, after having been 
I 6 duly sworn, testified as follows: 
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. GARDNER: 
9 Q. Mr. Kunz, would you please tell us your 
10 full name and spell your last name? 
11 A. Cal Byron Kunz, K-u-n-z. 
12 Q. Mr. Kunz, I understand that you worked 
13 with Gold Cross Ambulance Service back in 1994? 
14 A. I did, yes, sir. 
15 Q. Were you working with that Gold Cross 
16 Ambulance Service on October 14th of 1994? 
17 A. I actually was. I don't have a copy of 
18 the report, though, if I could see that? 
19 Q. Okay, let me first of all ask this: How 
20 long have you been working with Gold Cross Ambulance 
21 as of October? 
22 A. In what year was that? 
23 Q. 1994. 
24 A. Okay, I worked there total for about four 
25 years. I - that would have been about two or three 
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L fa^ being as I was a finisher and worked on a 
pulley, there was nothing light duty that I could do 
p there. 
Q. Okay. And what did she tell you about 
what you needed do if you came back to work? 
A. She told me that I could not come back to 
work until I was basically all the way better because 
1% of the type of work it is. 
Q. Okay. Now, at some point you went and 
|i0 saw Dr. Seeman; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
U2 Q. Do you recall the date that you went to 
hj see Dr. Seeman? 
L A. Not exactly. No, I don't. 
B5 Q. Why is it that you went and saw 
B6 Dr. Seeman? 
b7 A. Because I was having problems with my 
B8 shoulders still and up in here (Indicating). 
D9 Q. Okay. And when you went to see 
DO Dr. Seeman, what did you tell them or what did you 
pi tell Dr. Seeman specifically about what had happened, 
m what injury you had? 
B3 A. I told him that I injured myself at work, 
B4 pulled on the pulley and what had happened and it had 
p hurt my shoulder, and stuff, up in here 
TM VOL III, TRIAL, 5-8-97 
Page 548 
1 A. He did my therapies sometimes. 
2 Q. Okay. Did you have conversations with 
3 Steven? 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. Okay. And did you have conversations 
6 with Steven about the assault of October 14th? And 
7 we want to know just what you told Steven. 
8 A. Yes. As I recall, I also mentioned that 
9 to Dr. Seeman, too. 
10 Q. And what did you tell Dr. Seeman about 
11 the assault of October 14th? 
12 A Well, I was at my son's house because I 
13 didn't return back to where I was living after not 
14 going to work that day. So - and I was standing in 
15 the kitchen with my back to the front door. And I 
16 thought the door was locked. Well, it wasn't. And 
17 my husband came in and assaulted me. 
18 Q. Do you recall when it was that you told 
19 Dr. Seeman this? 
20 A. I believe it was the first time I seen 
21 him. 
22 Q. Okay. And was anybody else there besides 
23 you and Dr. Seeman? 
24 A. Steve. 
25 Q. Okay. Now, you saw Dr. Seeman for about 
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11 (Indicating). 
12 Q. Okay. Now, was there anybody else at 
3 Dr. Seeman*s office that you talked to or that you 
4 dealt with? 
5 A. Yes, there was. 
6 Q. And who was that? 
7 A. His assistant, Steve. 
8 Q. Okay. And what involvement did Steve 
9 have in your treatment? 
Bo MR. GARDNER: Your Honor -
pi THE WITNESS: Sometimes he did my 
B2 therapy -
B3 MR. GARDNER: Excuse me. Your Honor -
V* THE COURT: You have got to stop when you 
•5 hear an objection. 
&6 MR. GARDNER: This i s g o i n g t o ge t i n t o 
7 hearsay. I don't think we ought to get into this 
8 Steven. I am not sure who this is. If this is going 
B9 into hearsay testimony, I am going to anticipate — 
BO make an anticipatory objection. 
I 1 THE COURT: Hearsay objection will be 
B2 sustained. 
p Go ahead, Miss Ah Ching. 
I 4 MS. AH CHING: what involvement did 
|tt Steven have with your treatment? 
fARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464 
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1 a year; is that right? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. Are you familiar - are you aware 
4 of what the status is of Dr. Seeman rs office right 
5 now? In other words, if it is open still or closed? 
6 A. It is closed. 
7 Q. Do you recall how often you saw 
8 Dr. Seeman through that year? 
9 A. Sometimes once a week, sometimes twice a 
10 week. 
11 Q. And during that time, was it all to see 
12 Dr. Seeman or was it for therapy or what was - what 
13 — give me a flavor of what the appointments were 
14 about? 
15 A. They were doing therapy on my upper right 
16 shoulder here with — like that ultrasound thing 
17 (Indicating) and heat, radiation-type therapy. 
18 Q. Okay. Now, you provided certain 
19 information to Miss Valente; is that right? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q. Okay. What kinds of information did you 
22 bring Miss Valente; do you recall? 
23 A. To the best of my knowledge, what she 
24 asked for. 
25 Q. Okay. Was there any information that 
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I ^ Valente asked y o u for that y o u didn't provide 
J 2 her to your recollection? 
J j
 K No, there i s n ' t 
II Q. Okay. Let's talk about the release of 
15 information that you filled out. Do you remember 
h doing that? 
i t A. Yes. 
| l Q. Okay. Do you remember when you filled 
15 that information out? 
1)0 A. I don't recall. 
III Q. Prior to filling out that release o f 
Ji2 information, had y o u had any other discuss ions with 
|I3 Ms. Valente about the filling out o f the release o f 
§14 information? 
|15 A. I don't recall it has been s o long, long 
lie ago. 
•17 Q. Had you received any paperwork similar to 
l is that to get you to release information? 
319 A. I don't bel ieve so . 
DC Q. Okay. On the day that y o u went into sign 
Cl this release of information, do y o u remember that 
122 day? 
123 A. Vaguely. 
|24 Q. Okay. D o y o u remember what happened that 
p5day? 
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11 A. Yeah, I went in and she asked m e to sign 
12 the release of information to release m y medical 
13 records. 
| 4 Q. Okay. D i d y o u talk to her about what the 
15 release was about? 
16 A. I don't bel ieve so. I bel ieve she just 
17 told me that it w a s to release m y medical records. 
18 Q. Okay. D id she discuss with y o u what — 
19 you know, where the release was going to go or what 
IK type of people were going to look at the 
111 information? 
p A. No. 
B3 Q. Did you read the release of information? 
|M A. Yeah, I looked at it and I thought I 
115 understood it. 
p Q. Okay. And did you sign the release of 
p" information? 
p A. Yes. 
p Q. Now, do you remember the back side of the 
po release or the second page of the release of 
pi information? 
P A. I - 1 only remembered signing one 
fc release paper. 
P4 Q. Okay. There's - you've heard discussion 
g5 about Page No. 2 where you list the doctor and the 
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1 hospital — J 
2 A. Oh, I see what y o u mean now. 
3 Q. D o y o u remember that sheet? 
4 A. Y e s . 
5 Q. W a s there any discussion about that sheet 
6 o f the release? 
7 A. I don't bel ieve so . 
8 Q. Okay. When y o u filled in that release, 
9 what w a s your understanding o f what you needed to do 
10 to complete that portion o f the release? 
11 A. T o just fill out and specify that I 
12 didn't have any injuries to this area (Indicating) 
13 that I had injured at work. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. I felt that other injuries were 
16 irrelevant. 
17 Q. Okay. W h y did y o u think that other 
18 injuries were irrelevant? 
19 A. They didn't specify any difference until 
20 afterwards. Then they explained it to me. 
21 Q. Okay. When y o u talked with Mis s Valente 
22 about the different places that you 'd been — 
23 A. Y e s . 
24 Q. — did y o u remember every place that y o u 
25 had been? | 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Okay. The release o f information that 
3 y o u signed, do y o u recall doing anything else that 
4 day for M i s s Valente? 
5 A. N o , I don't. 
6 Q. D o you recall going to Dr. Chung's 
7 office? 
8 A. Y e s , I do. 
9 Q. W a s — w a s it the same day or w a s it a 
10 different day; do y o u recall? 
11 A. It was a different date, I bel ieve. 
12 Q. H o w m a n y t imes did y o u see Dr. Chung? 
13 A. Once. 
14 Q. H o w long w a s the one t ime that y o u saw 
15 Dr. Chung? 
16 A. I bel ieve it w a s - it w a s briefly, about 
17 20, 30 minutes. 
18 Q. Okay. A n d when y o u saw Dr. Chung, what 
19 kind o f treatment or what kind of things did he do 
20 with your body or with your back when y o u saw him? 
21 A. H e had m e put on a hospital gown, and he 
22 had m e raise and lower. A n d he pushed on m y shoulder 
23 area and m y neck and the upper part right here 
24 (Indicating). 1 
25 Q. Okay. D i d he ask y o u questions? 
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[|; A. Yes. 
H : Q. Okay. Did he ask you about any prior 
n . 5 ^ problems that you'd had? 
Ij 4 A. I don't — not when he said, "Back 
II < problems," in my mind this injury is (Indicating) 
[J
 ? here, you know, not (Indicating) the other part of my 
U ? back. 
H $ Q Okay. When doctor - when Dr. Chung and 
N * you talked about any prior back injuries — 
lljo A. Uh-huh. 
til' Q- - you had, did you know at the time that 
h i: you had had prior back injuries? 
r}{3 A. Well, to the lower back of my back, and 
| M stuff, yes. But I didn't think that, you know, that 
r 1:5 it mattered. I thought he meant just because of the 
r Ii6 work-related injury. 
rip Q. Did you tell Dr. Chung that you had 
1 is injuries on your lower back? 
I 19 A. I don't recall. 
r to Q. Okay. Who was it that recommended to you 
| : i the work-hardening program? 
| :: A. Dr. Chung. 
[ 23 Q. Was it at that interview or at that 
I p session that you had with him? 
1 p A. No. I believe he mentioned something 
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1 i about it. But it was a couple of weeks after that, 
f 2 or something, that he wanted me to get right into a 
[ 3 work-hardening program. It was, I believe, like 
[ 4 eight-hour days of work hardening. 
[ 5 Q. How were you notified that you had to go 
[ 6 to this work-hardening program? Did they call you on 
M 7 the phone, did they write a letter? 
8 A. I think she called. 
[ 9 Q. Who's "she"? 
[10 A. Paola. 
[11 Q. And when — who made the appointment at 
[ 12 the site, was it you that made the appointment at the 
13 site? 
14 A. I don't believe so. 
I 15 Q. Okay. But you were notified of the day 
16 to go to the site; is that right? 
17 A. I don't recall. 
H Q. Okay. Now, did you go to the 
19 work-hardening site? 
20 A. No, I did not 
21 Q. Why didn't you go? 
22 A. At that time, Dr. Seeman had told me that 
23 he -
24 MR. GARDNER: Well, why don't we get 
I [25 Dr. Seeman back. This is hearsay again. 
1
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THE COURT: It is sustained. 
MS. AH CHING: YOU did not go to a 
work-hardening program; is that right? 
A. No, I did not 
Q. And you did not — was the reason you 
didn't go because of your own choice? 
A. NO, it was because of the advice of my 
physician. 
Q. Did you relay that information to Paola? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Mann, Brett Mann, talked about 
these interviews that they had with you; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you heard him and what he said 
happened on those interviews; is that right? 
A. Yes, I heard what he said happened on 




Q. Now, when he asked you whether you had 
any former injuries, what did you believe that to be? 
A. I thought that he meant to the same part 





















Q. Okay. When he asked you if you had any 
injuries subsequent to your October 12th injury, what 
did you take that to mean? 
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A. To that same area. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever see any of the 
records, the hospital records, that Mr. Mann had? 
A. No, I did not. I don't even recall the 
interview because I had just been released from the 
hospital. And, you know, I was in the hospital for 
about a month before that. 
Q. Okay. Which interview are you referring 
to now, the February one or the March one? 
A. The February one. J 
Q. Okay. And the February one that happened J 
on the 27th of 1994? 
A. I believe that's the date. 1 
Q. How long had you been out of the hospital 
when you went in for that interview? J 
A. Only one or two days. 1 
Q. Okay. And was the inter - did you go to 








did you go to the interview? j 
A. I went to the interview because I was J 
asked to go. 
Q. Were you contacted - did you have any 
contacts with Workers' Compensation Fraud while you 
were at the hospital? 1 
A. I believe Paola had requested a meeting I 
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11 with me, and I called her to let her know that I had 
• ^ had to have stomach surgery, and stuff, and that I'd 
3 , k there for awhile. And then I called them to let 
y
 4 tfctn know that I was home, I believe, before I... 
|< Q. Okay. Just to clarify: You said you 
i * were at the hospital for almost a month; is that 
I - right? 
I t A. Yes. 
He Q. And it was for stomach surgery? 
jfe A. Yes. 
§i: Q. Now, do you recall when it was that your 
Hi: benefits from Workers' Comp were terminated? 
[jl? A. They never really were steady payments. 
Hi; They were always giving me a hard time about 
tji: something, so I don't really recall. 
Hjr Q. Okay. Let me put it this way: When you 
|jr went in for the February interview, 1994, were you 
H]> still getting checks from Workers' Comp? 
|I|9 A. No, I was not. 
Ip Q. Okay. When you went in for the interview 
it: in March of 1994, were you still getting checks from 
|b: Workers' Comp? 
l b A. No, I was not. 
1124 Q. Then what was your intention of going in 
Ip to do these interviews if you weren't getting checks? 
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Hi A. To clear up any discrepancies that they 
It 2 may have thought that there was, because I didn't 
II3 want there to be any misunderstandings. 
[14 Q. Okay. Now, let's talk about the assault 
I 5 that happened on December 14th. What happened at the 
H 6 assault? Tell us where you were hit? 
117 A. In — mostly in the face and in the jaw, 
[18 and stuff. He pulled my hair. As I recall, he 
| | 9 kicked me in the lower part of the back a couple of 
llio times. 
IJii Q. Okay. 
1 J»2 A. I did file a police report. 
1 p Q. Okay. Who called the ambulance? Do you 
I 4 know? 
|i5 A. I don't recall. 
116 Q. Did you call the ambulance? 
| p A. I know that I called the police, I 
118 believe. I believe that the police may have called 
119 the ambulance. I don't recall. 
120 Q. Okay. Did you want to go to the hospital 
I pi that day? 
Ip A. No. 
123 Q. Why did you go to the hospital? 
| p4 A Because I was assaulted. 
1 fe Q. Why didn't you disclose to Miss Valente 
Page 560 ] 
1 or Mr. Mann that you had been assaulted on October 
2 14th prior to your interview?. 
3 A. I didn't feel that, you know, the fact 
4 that my husband hit me in my private life was 
5 information that would benefit them in any way 
6 because it wasn't to the same area that I was injured 
7 at work. 
8 Q. Okay. When you told Mr. Mann and 
9 Miss Valente that you didn't have prior back 
10 injuries, what was your intent? What were you 
11 thinking? 
12 A. That I didn't have any injuries to that 
13 area where I was injured at work (Indicating). 
14 Q. Okay. Did you at any time plan to 
15 deceive Miss Valente or Mr. Mann? 
16 A. No, I did not. 
17 Q. At the time that you were injured at 
18 Workers' Comp — or at Blynco and at the time that 
19 you went to the hospital — 
20 A. Uh-huh. 
21 Q. — did you have any other way of paying 
22 for your medical bills? 
23 A. Yes, my - as I recall, I think my 
24 ex-husband had insurance, still. 
25 MS.AHCHING: Okay. I have no further | 
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1 questions of Miss Ellingsworth. 
2 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Gardner. 
3 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. GARDNER: 
5 Q. Ma'am, I think you testified a few 
6 minutes ago at the beginning of your testimony that 
7 your husband was out of work when — 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. — you had this happen at Blynco? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. So your last statement, that you could 
12 pay these medical bills with your ex-husband's 
13 medical insurance, what insurance was that? 
14 A. He was in the Roofers' Union. 
15 Q. Okay. So what insurance was that? 
16 A. I believe it was through American 
17 Administrators at that time. And at that time I was 
18 also applying for medical and food stamps and things 
19 from the State to help. 
20 Q. Did you make a claim to that insurance 
21 company? 
22 A. From the assault? 
23 Q. From the assault? 
24 A. No, I didn't. When it was marked on 
25 there, I put "self pay." 
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\ \! took the very day that he saw you on October the 
L : nth? 
t\x A. I did not look at his notes, no. 
1 j 4 Q. Did you hear him testify that he made 
115 notes almost immediately after he met with you on 
\\] October the 17th? 
1 : A. Yes. 
f h Q. Okay. And he later wrote a letter to 
f Q Workers' Comp Fund based on those notes. Did you 
1 ; hear that testimony? 
I ; A. Yes. 
[ :: Q. Did you hear him testify from the letter 
1.3 that he knew nothing at all about this domestic 
II A violence assault? 
H;< A. Yes. 
I b Q. After Dr. Seeman had seen you on October 
( :" the 17th, you kept seeing him for the next 13 months; 
I :s is that right? 
1 b A. That's correct. 
I p Q. Until about November of 1995? 
I :i A. That's correct. 
1 b Q. And you knew he was having these problems 
[ p but you kept going to him; is that right? 
1:4 A. Yes. 
1 p Q. Okay. You also testified that you told 
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I ! Paola Valente, when you talked to her by phone on 
i 2 October 17th, about the domestic violence assault 
1 h that happened three days earlier; is that your 
I 4 testimony? 
1 5 A. I don't recall. I don't remember saying 
[ 6 those specific words. 
1 7 Q. Do you remember telling the Jury that you 
IJ 8 told Paola Valente all the information she asked you 
I 9 for? 
j o A. Yes. But Paola Valente didn't come out 
1 :i and say, "Has your - does your husband beat you?" 
1 :2 That's not something - you know, "Had you been 
I p assaulted?", you know, she didn't ask me anything 
I p like that, no. 
I p Q. Okay. But when you talked to her on the 
I p phone on October the 17th, you didn't tell her about 
I p the fact that three days earlier you had been 
I p assaulted; did you? 
I p A. I felt that it was irrelevant because it 
1-3 wasn't to the same area that I was hurt at work. 
[i:i Q. Okay. A few minutes ago I thought I 
1-2 heard you testify that you told Paola Valente about 
1-3 this assault. Did I misunderstand you or did your 
1 -< testimony change? 
1 ^ A. I may have misunderstood you. I don't 
[CARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464 
Page 572 1 
1 know. 
2 Q. But on October the 17th, you did not tell 
3 Paola; is that your testimony? 
4 A. On October the 17th? 
5 Q. That's right. 
6 A. I don't think that I even spoke to Paola 
7 Valente on October 17th. 
8 Q. When is your recollection that you spoke 
9 to her? 
10 A. Toward the end of October when my 
11 benefits began. 
12 Q. Okay. Let me ask this: When those 
13 benefits began coming, didn't you receive a series of 
14 checks from Workers1 Compensation Fund? 
15 A. No, I received one check at that time. 
16 Each time I had to take in a doctor's thing. 
17 MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, may I please 
18 see Exhibit 8? 
19 May I approach the witness, Your Honor? 
20 THE COURT: Yes. 
21 MR. GARDNER: Miss Ellingsworth, I would 
22 like to show you this exhibit which is now in 
23 evidence. I am going to stand over here so you can 
24 see it. I would like you to take your time. 
25 Do you recognize what these are? 
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1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. Xeroxed copies of the checks Workers' 
3 Compensation Fund sent to you? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. I'd like you to look at this first check 
6 for $286 dated October 31 st of 1984? 
7 A. That is the first check I received. I 
8 Q. Is that your signature on the back of 
9 that? 
10 A. Yes, it is. 
11 Q. There are other checks here. I'd like 
12 you to look at them. The next one is another check 
13 for the same amount dated November the 18th. Do you 
14 see that? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And Td like you to see the signature on 
17 back of that. Is that your signature? 
18 A. Yes, it is. 
19 Q. There are more checks, same amount? I 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Okay. So the November the 28th and then 
22 another one for December the 2nd. Are these the J 
23 other checks that you received? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And are these your signatures on those 
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A. It would have been — it would have been 
close to the time that her benefits were terminated, 
towards the end of January. 
Q. Okay. Her benefits were terminated the 
end of January? 
A. Correct. Right. January 24th. 
Q. Okay. And you sent the letter at about 
the same time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then after that was when the February 
and March interview that was tape-recorded took 
place; right? 
A. Correct. 
MS. AH CHING: I have no further 
questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gardner. 
MR. GARDNER: I have no other questions, 
Your Honor, and no other rebuttal witness. 
THE COURT: okay. Thank you, 
Miss Valente. 
Any rebuttal for the Defendant? 
MS. AH CHING: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: okay. So we are through with 
the evidence. 
We will take a brief recess now while we 
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1 wan t And because you have them, if you don't 
2 understand, if I — as I read through them, you'll be 
3 able at the look at them and fill in the gaps 
4 yourselves. 
5 (Judge reads instructions.) 
6 THECOURT: That's the end of the 
7 instructions. You will have two verdict forms in the 
8 jury room, a verdict of guilty and one that says not 
9 guilty. And we'll bring the evidence in when the — 
10 when you retire. 
11 Now, we will have the closing argument. 
12 Because the State has the burden, Mr. Gardner will go 
13 first, and he will also have the final argument. 
14 Ms. Ah Ching will argue for the Defendant in between. 
15 Mr. Gardner? 
16 MR. GARDNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
17 May it please the Court and Counsel, 
18 Ladies and Gentlemen, as attorneys we are only 
19 allowed to talk to you face to face during the jury 
20 voir dire, the opening statement and the closing 
21 statement. The reason for that is because the Court 
22 hopes, meaning they expect you to pay attention to 
23 the witness and listen to exactly what they say and 
24 see the demeanor on the stand. We, the attorneys, 
25 can only participate in eliciting the testimony from 
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1 prepare the jury instructions. We are almost to the 
2 point 
3 (Outside the presence of the Jury.) 
4 THECOURT: Before we leave the record, I 
5 believe we have a stipulation between Counsel that 
6 exceptions to the instructions can be made timely 
7 after instruction and argument and the Jury is out? 
8 MR. GARDNER: That's correct, Your Honor. 
9 MS. AH CHING: That's all correct, Your 
10 Honor. 
11 THECOURT: Okay. Thank you. And as 
12 soon as the instructions are ready, we'll instruct 
13 the Jury and have closing arguments. 
H (Recess). 
15 THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the 
16 Jury, at this point you have heard all the evidence. 
17 You will be able to take the exhibits that have been 
18 received into evidence with you into the jury room. 
19 And I am about to read you the instructions which are 
20 the law that applies to the case. 
21 Each of you has a set of these 
22 instructions sitting in front of you on the counter. 
23 You don't have to read along if you don't want to. 
|24 You don't have to look at them in the jury room if 
25 you don't want to. But you can study them all you 
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1 them so that you can hear what actually happened. 
2 Now, I tried to convince all eight of you 
3 unanimously that a Workers' Compensation fraud was 
4 committed by the Defendant in this case between 
5 October 12th, when she says she was injured at 
6 Blynco, and the end of January when the medical 
7 records began to come back and the Workers' 
8 Compensation Fund realized that they had been badly, 
9 badly mislead and that they had made a mistake in 
10 giving the benefits when in reality the injury, 
11 apparently, and I suggest to you, did come from other 
12 things besides what happened on October 12th of 
13 1994. 
14 Now, for two and a half days we brought 
15 out a lot of evidence. It has been IS witnesses, 
16 almost. And it might be confusing to follow 
17 everything that everyone has said So I would like 
18 to simplify this case as best I can. This case boils 
19 down to credibility. The Defendant says she was 
20 injured on the job on October 12th by pulling on a 
21 pulley or a cord (Indicating). And she alleges, she 
22 says that all of her injuries, all of her problems 
23 after that with her back and shoulder and neck, 
24 stemmed from what happened at Blynco Manufacturing on 
25 October 12th. And she stated that story. And I 
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1 suggest to all of you that that is a falsehood. She 
1 has fabricated to try to justify getting the money 
I xnd the medical benefits and the prescription drugs 
I , from that incident. 
I . You are going to have to decide if you 
I . believe the Defendant, who has been contradicted by 
I • every other witness who has come. And I suggest to 
1 , you that the Defendant's credibility at this point is 
I . so thin as to be invisable. She has simply lied and 
1 lied and lied, trying to get the money, trying to get 
1 the medical benefits and then cover up everything 
1 ; else that happened which showed that her problems 
I : stem from November the 14th — October the 14th, 
I : being badly beaten in domestic violence and the 
1 f previous problems. 
1 . Let me begin sequentially, if I can. 
1 • Well, pardon me, "chronologically" is the word that 
1 i I'm looking for. October 12th, the Defendant has 
1 i been at work for about two weeks. She claims that 
1;; while pulling on a cord or a pulley, she injured 
I:: herself and it jarred her shoulder badly. Please 
12 remember that when she talked to the very first 
1 j person who's next to her, Sharon Rowley, Sharon says, 
1:; "I can't believe that happened. I can't believe 
1:5 that you injured yourself like that." And Sharon 
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1 I says to the Defendant, "Show me." And the Defendant, 
1 2 as best Sharon remembers with her right hand, lowers 
1 3 the blind and raises it again without any pain or 
1 4 discomfort. Sharon still can't believe it, but talks 
1 5 to Debbie, or Debbie Cleverly is informed, and they 
1 6 have the Defendant rest. And then Debbie says, "I 
1 7 was concerned about my employees. I wanted her to go 
J 8 to the emergency room of St. Mark's." 
1 9 The Defendant testified Sharon Rowley 
1 '10 knew this happened because it had happened before. 
J,il Well, Sharon Rowley testified that this had never 
I ji2 happened before. So that's a witness that 
113 contradicts the Defendant. And the Defendant says, 
114 "Well, there were a couple of different words 
J |15 used." "No. Pulling on a pulley or a cord and 
116 injuring yourself is unusual, extremely unusual." 
117 Sharon Rowley said it never happened before. So the 
18 Defendant is saying Sharon Rowley is deceptive. It 
19 did happen before. She knew it happened before. 
20 She's covering up. Debbie Cleverly said, "I was 
[ pi concerned about my employee. I wanted her to go to 
122 the hospital and be checked." Well, the Defendant 
23 said, "No, no, no. She wanted me to go home and 
24 rest And maybe if it hurt, then afterwards go to 
[25 the hospital." Well, again, there's a redefinition. 
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1 The Defendant is changing what her supervisor is 
2 saying, trying to make her look a little bit like she 
3 is not so good. No. Debbie Cleverly is very, very 
4 clear, saying, "I wanted her to go to the hospital." 
5 When the Defendant goes to the hospital, 
6 she is seen by Rebecca Dickinson, who says, "Minor 
7 strain, long" — pardon me, I am not quite sure of 
8 the name — "rhomboid muscle or trapezius muscle." 
9 She said it was a strain. And she said, "Released to 
10 work the next day, light duty. Do some ice. Do some 
11 Tylenol and a couple of Lortabs tonight." You can 
12 see the medical record yourself. No neck pain is 
13 what's in Rebecca's Dickinson's report. It seemed to 
14 be a minor injury, very minor, if it happened at 
15 all. But the Workers' Compensation Fund, when they 
16 found out about it, they begin to take responsible 
17 actions. They began to make sure that medical 
18 benefits were provided to the Defendant and also 
19 monetary benefits. 
20 When the claim form is telephoned into 
21 Workers' Comp, one of the questions that is asked 
22 Debbie Cleverly is: "Did you have a question about 
23 this?" And Debbie writes a letter. And you are 
24 going see that in Exhibit 1. She said in two weeks 
25 that the Defendant had been on the job, repeatedly 
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1 she called in sick, she complained, she acted like 
2 she wanted to get out of this job. Those were the 
3 words under oath of Debbie Cleverly. In two weeks 
4 she only worked 59 hours. Debbie was very, very 
5 skeptical about what happened. She said there were 
6 11 people working in the vicinity, 11 people. None 
7 of them saw what happened. 
8 Based upon that I suggest there is real, 
9 real reservations whether anything at all happened on 
10 October the 12th. 
11 But two days later when the - pardon 
12 me. When the Defendant goes to St. Mark's Hospital, 
13 she is released, walks out. She is referred to 
14 Dr. Michael Borne. She's given a written letter with 
15 an appointment time, his address and he's right next 
16 door to St. Mark's Hospital. Right next door to 
17 St. Mark's, 39th South at 13th East. The Defendant 
18 stated she lived at 39th South and Seventh West. 
19 It's 20 blocks away. 
20 Two days later the Defedant is badly 
21 beaten in a domestic violence assault, hit in the 
22 face and jaw. And she told Dr. Steven Minnaugh she 
23 was thrown against the wall and her upper back was 
24 injured. That's what she told the doctor, and he 
25 made careful notes. 
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Three days after that, she does not go to 
: sec Dr. Michael Borne, who is ju s t 20 blocks away 
; from her house. Instead she goes all the w a y 
; downtown to Dr. Seeman, who is at Eighth South and 
•: about 650, 700 East. She goes miles out of her way 
* to see a different doctor that she is not referred 
• to, one who ' s much farther away from her house, one 
, whom the Defense has shown has now had his license 
; investigated and is about to be taken for improper — 
and let me make sure I have got the exact language of 
: the stipulation. I think it was improper use of 
; controlled substances and medications. Why would 
;. this Defendant go all the way to a different doctor 
j she wasn' t referred to when the first doctor is much , 
.5 much closer to her house? I ' d like you to think 
.5 about that question as you go through the rest of the 
; evidence, Ladies and Gentlemen. Because she goes to 
.5 Dr. Seeman, and his records are that he — she tells 
j him, T v e got headaches. I am vomiting. I 've got 
:o back pain. I have got shoulder pain caused by 
:i October 12th pulling on the bl ind at Blynco," his 
sworn testimony, and he told it repeatedly based on 
:3 notes that he kept right then. He did not know and 
:4 he was not told that she had been severely beaten in 
.5 a domestic violence incident three days earlier. She 
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1 arrangements for her to go to the doctors. A n d I 
2 think they authorized five different treatments by 
3 this doctor, and they begin to pay monetary 
4 benefits. 
5 Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, between 
6 October the 17th and the next seven months , this 
7 woman gets check after check after check. It is not 
8 a lot; about $286 every couple of weeks, but it is 
9 enough to Tielp her get along. But the insurance 
10 company believes in good faith she was hurt on the 
11 j o b and they were trying to help her. A n d on each of 
12 these checks right above the signature of the 
13 Defendant you ' l l see a warning cautioning her, plus 
14 Paola testified that Workers ' Comp Fund sent a 
15 warning to the Defendant saying, "This compensation 
16 is only for people who are really injured on the 
17 j o b . If you are not injured on the j ob , you can be 
18 prosecuted for Workers ' Compensation Insurance 
19 fraud. The Defendant told you on cross-examination 
20 that she understood that, and she acknowledged it. 
21 She d idn ' t say she got the warning, but she said she 
22 saw that warning on every check and she understood 
23 what it meant . 
24 Well , Ladies and Gentlemen, going on to 
25 the period in January: By January of ' 9 5 , we are now 
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1 did not tell h im. 
2 The very, very same day, October 17th, 
3 Paola Valente contacted the Defendant, asks what has 
4 happened. She doesn ' t tell her about the domestic 
5 violence. In fact, the Defendant 's account was , "I 
6 didn't even talk to Paola Valente that day. I talked 
7 to her at the end of October." Well , that s imply is 
8 not true because Paola Valente made careful notes, 
9 tape-recorded the conversation, had it transcribed, 
10 had it dated, October the 17th. The Defendant 's 
n memory is either not quite clear, or she 's not 
12 telling the truth. A n d I suggest to you that i t ' s 
13 the latter. 
|i4 But on October 17th, Dr. Seeman is 
15 visited the very next day — pardon me, I think it is 
16 October 19th, Paola calls Dr. Borne and says, "What 
17 happened, did the Defendant go to your hospital?" 
18 They tell her she never showed up . October 20th, 
19 Dr. Seeman calls and says, "Can you authorize this 
20 treatment?" Well , Paola Valente authorized it. This 
21 is an insurance company, Workers ' C o m p Fund, which 
22 has tried to help this woman recover. The incident 
23 is a little unusual . She doesn ' t go to the doctor 
24 she is referred to, but nevertheless they accept the 
25 claim, they start benefitting her by making 
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1 three months , November , December, January, three 
2 months after this injury, and the woman is still 
3 being treated by Dr. Seeman. And you heard his 
4 testimony. He would prescribe two different pain 
5 medications at once. Why? Because he was afraid one 
6 medication alone would not stop the pain. And the 
7 woman, according to the reports from Dr. Seeman to 
8 Paola Valente, complained again and again of 
9 inability to return to work, severe pain and migraine 
10 headaches. Those are serious things, Ladies and 
11 Gentlemen. 
12 By January, Paola Valente is wondering, 
13 "What ' s going on? This does not seem to be that 
14 serious an injury. W h y is she getting so much 
15 treatment? W h y is she in so much pain? Why is she 
16 unable to return to work from pulling on the cord at 
17 work?" A n d she asked for the independent medical 
18 examination. 
19 During this t ime, there 's also test imony 
20 that repeated prescription drugs are being prescribed 
21 to the Defendant And some of those bills are coming 
22 to Workers ' Compensation Fund; even two different 
23 prescriptions by different doctors for the same drug 
24 at the same t ime. A n d again Paola Valente is very, 
25 very cautious. 
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| | l In January, when Paola Valente - pardon 
1 j 2 me, January 11th, when the independent medical 
1' 3 examination is done by Dr. Chung, he too is wondering 
1 j 4 what is happening. And he asked the Defendant 
1! 5 carefully: "Have you had any prior medical problems 
1; 6 with your back or any subsequent problems?" His 
117 testimony was that the Defendant denied everything. 
I 8 She said, "I never had any problems except for a knee 
119 injury, except for something minor like that" — 
I iio pardon me, "Something different like that." No 
JH prior, no subsequent back problems. They were 
1 12 shoulder problems, her neck problems. 
1 13 Dr. Chung, his testimony also contradicts 
1 14 the Defendant. She said, "I told everyone." Well, 
1 is she didn't. You have seen and you have been able to 
1 16 witness the demeanor of these people, Paola Valente, 
1 17 Dr. Chung, Brett Mann. You even were able to see 
1 18 Dr. Seeman. And I suspect that one of you had your 
I 19 heart skip a beat at one point in his testimony when 
I 20 he identified you as the Defendant. Well, it's 
] 21 true. These witnesses were not able to remember the 
1 22 Defendant and point her out because their treatment 
1 23 happened years ago. But the doctors each kept 
1 24 careful notes about what happened. Each of them have 
1 25 consistently said that they heard the same thing from 
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J I the Defendant, "I have had no other problems. No 
1 2 previous, no subsequent." 
1 3 In independent medical examinations done 
J 4 by the doctors, January 11th, he reluctantly 
1 5 concludes, "Well, with no other explanation, we have 
1 6 to attribute Brenda's medical problems to what 
1 7 happened on October 12th. Let's get her into a 
1 8 work-harding program because if there is malingering 
I 9 going on, she is going to be in a program eight hours 
I 10 a day, five days a week. People can see that. But 
J n the Defendant doesn't go. 
1 12 And she testified, "Well, Dr. Seeman told 
1 13 me — advised against it. And I told Paola 
I 14 Valente." Well, Paola said, "No, she did not. She 
1 15 just didn't show up"; again a contradiction there, 
1 16 But then when the medical records are 
J 17 obtained, that's when all - the avalanche of data 
J 18 comes forward. And it becomes clear, very, very 
J 19 clear, this Defendant has had major problems before 
J 20 and after this October 12th incident. 
J 21 Now, when Brett Mann interviews the 
1 22 Defendant on February 27th, he asked her - and you 
J 23 heard me go down through the transcript ten different 
J 24 times - "Have you had any prior injuries before 
J [25 October 12th? Any injury at all?" Ten different 
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1 times the Defendant says, "No, not that I know of. 
2 No, I have not had any prior injuries; no, no, no." 
3 Ten times. And on cross-examination suddenly it is 
4 "Well, I just can't remember. I can't remember 
5 anything that happened to me because I had just 
6 gotten out of the hospital. And I asked, "Well, 
7 didn't he ask you if you had been in the hospital 
8 recently?" And you heard Brett Mann testify that he 
9 asked that specific question, "Have you been in the 
10 hospital recently?" And the Defendant said, "No," 
11 twice. She said, no, she had not been hospitalized 
12 recently. Well, today she said, "I got out of the 
13 hospital just one or two days before, and I had been 
14 in there for a month." 
15 Ladies and Gentlemen, if you are in the 
16 hospital for a month to have some major work done on 
17 your stomach and you just get out of the hospital one 
18 or two days earlier and you are meeting with someone 
19 that says, "Have you been in the hospital?", I 
20 suggest that each one of you would say, "Well, yes, I 
21 have. I just got out. I have been in for a month." 
22 But not the Defendant. She denied repeatedly that 
23 she had ever been in the hospital. And I suggest 
24 that that's part of the pattern that the Defendant 
25 was trying to use to keep Workers' Compensation in 
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1 the dark and keep the money coming and keep the 
2 medical benefits coming and keep the drugs coming. 
3 Ladies and Gentlemen, when a suspect in a 
4 criminal case — and that's what the Defendant is 
5 here. When she repeatedly lies, omits to tell the 
6 insurance company and the adjusters about medical 
7 problems when she is specifically asked about them, 
8 when she denies previous and subsequent medical 
9 problems which are very, very directly applicable to 
10 what her medical claim is and when it happens so many 
11 times that there's no mistake, that this is not an 
12 accident, then you have an ongoing plan, you have an 
13 ongoing pattern, you have a scheme, you have an 
14 artifice to defraud. And the Judge has read you 
15 definitions of a scheme or artifice. 
16 The only way I can prove to all of you 
17 that the Defendant formed - intentionally and 
18 knowingly formed a scheme or artifice is to show you 
19 her actions. And again and again and again, it is 
20 clear that this Defendant was going to the hospital, 
21 getting treatment for her back. And then on October 
22 the 12th, when she pulls on a blind, she goes there 
23 and then - pardon me. She said she injured 
24 herself. And when she goes to the hospital, she I 
25 exaggerates that injury so that she receives almost | 
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S5,000 worth of benefits over the next several months 
and stays off work for four months. She actually 
• received $2,200 in money and in medication and about 
; $2,700 more she attempted to get by the treatment 
5 rendered to her by Dr. Seeman and the other doctors 
. and the bills that were being sent to Workers' 
• Compensation Fund. 
5 But that time they said, "Wait Now we 
• know what is really going on. We arc not going to 
: pay it" 
The law says that the amount of money, 
; the value of the goods, property, things obtained or 
} sought to be obtained are the basis for the degree of 
i a crime. And here we have shown beyond any doubt 
f that the value of the money and benefits that the 
.? Defendant obtained or sought to obtain by means of 
; these false representations, material omissions or 
.$ other miscommuncations was far greater than $1,000 
.9 and just barely less than $5,000. It places this 
:: offense squarely in the field of a Third Degree 
:i Felony. 
2 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am also very 
3 concerned and I'd point out to you that when the 
:4 Defendant is questioned by Brett Mann, when she 
:5 finally begins saying, "Well" - she sees the 
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1 some ice on it and go back to work the next day, 
2 released to work, light duty and then two days later 
3 you are so badly beaten that you have to be taken by 
4 ambulance on a stretcher with a C-collar and neck 
5 brace into the same emergency room and then you are 
6 wheeled out on a wheelchair and you complain on 
7 October 14th, "I've been punched ten times, I have 
8 been thrown against the wall, I have got pain in my 
9 face, my jaw and my upper back," I suggest to you 
10 that the pain after the domestic violence is going to 
11 be worse than what happened two days ago earlier by 
12 pulling on the cord. But that's not what the 
13 Defendant says. "The pain was less after I got 
14 beaten up." That is simply incredible and you should 
15 not believe that 
16 The Defendant then kept trying to tell 
17 Brett Mann, "Well, all the previous problems I had 
18 were my lower back." She said that about four times 
19 during the February 27th interview. "They were all 
20 to my lower back." And on March 3rd, a week after 
21 that, again, shefs trying to make him think these 
22 previous problems were lower back because she told 
23 him that again and again. That's why we brought in 
24 Dr. Argyle, who treated her on January 30th and then 
25 again on February 11th. That's why we have in 
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sheriffs report on the table. She says, "I know 
what you are talking about." She then begins to 
admit, and the evidence is irrefutable, "Yes, on 
October 14th I got beaten up by my husband." But she 
tries to minimize that. Again, this is part of the 
pattern showing a scheme or artifice to defraud. The 
Defendant exaggerates her injuries on October 12th, 
minimizes her injuries on October 14th, and also 
totally denies the injuries before then. You 
remember when Brett Mann testified, "I asked this 
Defendant, 'Can you quantify on a scale of one to ten 
what the pain was like in your back after October 
12th?'" And the answer was, she said, "On a scale of 
one to ten, it was about an eight and a half." 
Okay. "Did you ask her how bad the pain was on 
October 14th after the domestic violence assault?" 
"I did." What did she say?" "She said, 'On October 
14th, the pain was about an eight/" Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I suggest to you that that is simply 
incredible and you should not believe that for a 
moment 
If you pull on a pulley or a cord at work 
and you have a minor strain, if you have that at all, 
you walk into the hospital, you are treated, they see 
a minor strain, they release you and tell you put 
Page 617 
1 evidence his reports, Exhibit 15, which show upper 
2 back problems, headaches, neck pain. That's why we 
3 brought in Dr. Robert Gannon, who treated this woman 
4 on March 16th, '94. She came into Holy Cross for 
5 treatment for back pain, upper back pain. That's 
6 highlighted on his report, Exhibit 16. And that's 
7 why we brought in Dr. Rhonda Smith. And I think she 
8 testified regarding Exhibit 17. 
9 May 18th of '94, again, Defendant comes 
10 into Holy Cross to be treated for upper back pain. 
11 In fact, Dr. Argyle even remembered the Defendant 
12 reaching over her shoulder and touching her right 
13 trapezius muscle, I think he testified. Well, that 
14 evidence is simply overwhelming. Three doctors 
15 testified that on four times the same year that the 
16 woman has been in to see them in the hospital for 
17 upper back injuries. And yet when she's questioned 
18 by the Workers' Comp adjuster, investigator, she says 
19 again and again, "No, no. It is a different pain, 
20 different part of my body. Lower back." Ladies and 
21 Gentlemen, that is part of the scheme or artifice. 
22 The woman is simply — call a spade a spade. She is 
23 lying. 
24 The Defendant says, "I was so badly under 
25 the influence of medications, I can't remember what 
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happened." That simply should be held in great 
caution and disregarded by you for this reason: 
Again and again when the witness testified in her own 
behalf she can remember clearly what she said. And 
then when the Defense Attorney tried to bring out 
parts of this transcript that were exculpatory, "Oh, 
I didn't mean this and didn't intent to defraud you," 
the Defense wants you to believe that the Defendant 
was very lucid. But when I tried to cross-examine 
her and she says, "Well, I can't remember anything," 
the Defense will have you believe that she can't 
remember anything. Well, it doesn't work that way. 
The woman was either lucid or she wasn't. The 
testimony from Brett Mann was that they went over 
»this again and again ten times trying to explain to 
• her what happening to see what is going on -- pardon 
* me, to get the truth from her about what happened, 
j Trying to wrap up, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
; At the end of the March 3rd, 1994, conversation by 
; Paola, there was some things that happened that were 
:: pretty revealing. I'd like you to think very 
2 carefully about these things: After all the records 
:;• had been received, after the evidence is 
:* unmistakeable that two days after October 12th the 
:: Defendant was badly beaten in a domestic violence 
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1 had had previous and had subsequent injuries, his 
2 opinion as to the causation of her injuries changed, 
3 and his opinion was that her injuries and her medical 
4 problems stemmed from something other than October 
5 12,1994, when she pulled on this cord or pulley at 
6 Blynco. I suggest that you should weigh that 
7 opinion, that expert opinion, very, very carefully. 
8 But what happens is that when the 
9 Defendant in this case by means of omission — 
10 material omissions, misrepresentations and lies gets 
11 money and gets valuable medical benefits that she is 
12 not entitled to, she is committing a fraud. 
13 Fraud is a crime. And I ask you, Ladies 
14 and Gentleman, to put aside the request of sympathy 
15 that has come from the Defendant simply because the 
16 Judge has instructed that you must not let sympathy 
17 play a role in your deliberations and go over the 
18 elements. And I have written down here one more time 
19 for my use: If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
20 doubt that each and every element has been proven by 
21 me on behalf of the State of Utah, then your duty is 
22 to come back and bring a verdict of guilt to a third 
23 degree felony, Workers' Compensation Insurance Fraud, 
24 against the Defendant. 
25 Ladies and Gentlemen, that's exactly what 
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; assault, when the evidence is beyond question that 
: four times earlier that year she had been in the 
3 hospital and treated for upper back pain, when the 
4 Defendant has been caught in a lie after lie after 
5 lie after lie after lie, then she says, "Well, can 
6 you give me some more money? What about the mileage 
1 money? What about the other check?" The Defendant 
8 is still trying to get the money from the Workers1 
9 Compensation Fund. And Brett wisely deflects that to 
;0 the adjuster. Ladies and Gentlemen, I suggest that 
11 that last series of comments from the Defendant 
12 should reveal her motive. Motive is different from 
J intent, but it can help you understand what's going 
14 on in her mind. The Defendant wanted money. And I 
|I5 suggest to you that she also wanted drugs. But at 
;16 all points, she wanted the Workers1 Compensation 
,17 Insurance Fund to pay for all this even though her 
|I8 problems dealt - stemmed from much more serious and 
jl9 definite things from October 12th, the 
pO non-work-related injury. 
|21 Finally you have the testimony of 
22 Dr. Chung, Jeff Chung. He was qualified as an expert 
23 in the field of physical medicine and 
124 rehabilitation. His testimony was that when he got 
'25 the follow-up records that showed that the Defendant 
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1 I am asking you to do, bring back a verdict of quilt 
2 in this case because we've met our burden and it is 
3 clear for all of you to know that the Defendant 
4 committed a crime. Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you 
5 very much. 
6 THE COURT: Miss Ah Ching. 
7 MS. AH CHING: Thank you, Judge. 
8 May it please the Court, Mr. Gardner, 
9 Miss Ellingsworth, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, 
10 it has been a long three days, so I will try and keep 
11 it short. 
12 To start off with, I'd like to talk about 
13 in our criminal justice system there's certain 
14 concepts that we regard very closely and we feel are 
15 very important. And those concepts are so important 
16 that throughout this trial you have been told over 
17 and over and over again, "You have got to remember 
18 this, you have got to remember this." One of those 
19 concepts you were told during jury voir dire, you 
20 were told when you were seated as a jury and you were 
21 told again in the Jury Instructions is the concept of 
22 presumption of innocence. In other words, 
23 Miss Ellingsworth, Brenda, is presumed innocent until 
24 and in fact she is proven guilty by the evidence that 
25 the State has presented. And even today and right 
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not have any prior back problems. And the records 
that we were in possession of at that point did show 
quite an extensive history of back problems. 
Q. All right. But why ten times did you ask 
her? 
A. Basically it was to give her the 
opportunity to explain or to tell us, you know, that 
she did have problems, that she did have back 
problems. 
Q. All right. Why did you ask her twice if 
she had subsequent problems? 
A. The reason I asked her twice if she had 
subsequent problems is because we were aware of an 
incident where she was assaulted after the alleged 
industrial injury, and we were trying to confirm the 
assault and when it occurred and just was going to 
get the view of the Defendant. 
Q. All right. Do you have a copy of your 
transcript there with you as part of your notes that 
you brought with you? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Let me just ask you some questions, first 
of all: On the first page of your conversation, when 
you asked the Defendant, "Do you have any prior 
history with your shoulder or your back," what was 
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1 asked, "And you haven't been since the industrial 
2 injury to now? The only time you have been in the 
3 hospital is your recent stay?"; how did the Defendant 
4 answer that question? 
5 A She stated, "Yeah, and this has nothing 
6 to do with that." 
7 Q. All right Did you ask the Defendant if 
8 she'd ever been in the hospital? And I am looking at 
9 Page 3 of your transcript, "What about in the last 
10 couple of years?" How did she respond to that? 
11 A. "No." 
12 Q. All right. The middle of Page 3, did you 
13 say, "Okay, have you had an injury since October the 
14 12th of f94?" How did she respond to that second 
15 question about that? 
16 A. "No, I haven't." 
17 Q. Okay. The bottom of Page 3, you said, 
18 "Okay, but you haven't had an injury?" How did she 
19 respond? 
20 A. "No." 
21 Q. Okay. Your next question: "You haven't 
22 been injured in any way, shape or form since the 
23 industrial accident?" How did the Defendant respond? 
24 A. "Not to my knowledge." 
25 Q. Can you turn to Page 7 of your 
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1 her response? 
2 A. "No, I don't." 
3 Q. All right. The very next thing you asked 
4 was: "Okay, so you had no prior history before 
5 October the 12th of '94?"; is that correct? 
6 A. That is correct. 
7 Q. What did the Defendant say? 
8 A. "No, I haven't." 
9 Q. All right. Your next question was: "Of 
0 your shoulder or your back"; is that right? 
1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. What did Brenda answer to that? 
3 A. "No, I don't." 
4 Q. The very next thing you asked was: "Do 
5 you have any injuries since the industrial accident 
* on October the 12th, 1994"; am I right? 
!7 A. That is correct. 
» Q. What did the Defendant respond to that? 
J9 A. "No, I don't." 
to Q. All right. The next thing you asked 
|l was: "Have you been seen by a hospital other than 
P your recent visit recently?" How did she answer that 
P question? 
M A. "No, I haven't." 
P Q. Okay. The bottom of Page 2, when you 
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1 transcript? 
2 Did you ask the Defendant, between Page 3 
3 and Page 7 of this transcribed interview, about the 
4 domestic violence assault on October the 14th? 
5 A. Yes, I did. 
6 Q. How did she respond to that revelation? 
7 A. On Page 7? 
8 Q. No. During this interview? 
9 A. During the interview, I started basically 
10 asking her about her address and asked her if she had 
11 lived at a particular address. And I had a copy of 
12 the Sheriff's police report set in front of me at 
13 that time. And then she actually kind of stopped me 
14 and says, "I know what you are getting at." And then 
15 we went into the industrial - or the domestic 
16 violence because her report was sitting in front of 
17 me at that time. 
18 Q. Did the Defendant admit that she had been 
19 a victim of a domestic violence assault on October 
20 14th at that stage of the interview? 
21 A. Yes, she did. 
22 Q. All right. On Page 5 of your transcript, 
23 did you ask the Defendant to reanswer your question 
24 as to how many times she had been in the hospital in 
25 the last year? 
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